Joint Test Publication 4-08





Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations





15 May 2001





Joint Test Publication 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, is interim joint doctrine under evaluation.

Its applicability is limited to the scope of the evaluation directive following.

THE JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON, DC



Reply ZIP Code: J-7A 00125-01 20318-7000 27 April 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List

Subject: Evaluation Directive for Joint Test Publication 4-08

1. <u>Purpose</u>. This evaluation directive identifies responsibilities, evaluation criteria, and methodology for the evaluation of Joint Test Publication (JTP) 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*.

- 2. <u>Background</u>. The following is background on the scope and history of this project:
- a. Military operations undertaken by the United States have been and are increasingly likely to be multinational in character. During multinational operations, it remains a generally accepted principle that logistics support remains a national responsibility. However, lessons-learned show that unity of effort is normally essential in the planning and conduct of effective logistics in multinational efforts. Lessons-learned also indicated that unity of logistics effort was adversely impacted by doctrinal gaps that resulted in ad hoc logistic support arrangements during previous multinational operations. The development of Joint Publication (JP) 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*, was directed to fill this assessed doctrinal gap.
- b. JP 4-08 identifies the unique logistical aspects associated with multinational operations, including planning, coordination, execution, command and control, and deconfliction of logistic requirements. It provides guidance and principles for conducting logistic activities when operating as part of a multinational force. It considers the nature of logistic support elements such as supply systems, movement control, maintenance, engineering, contracting, logistic information systems, host nation support, real estate management, security, and health support during the appropriate phases of multinational operations, and the US doctrinal requirements to interface with these elements. It outlines the organization, structure, methodology, coordinating responsibilities and processes to be performed during multinational operations. It recommends work priorities and institutionalizes the planning function for logistic support of multinational operations ranging from major theater war to military operations other than war. It will identify the need for the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels for multinational operations.

- c. Even after the directive to develop this joint doctrine, there remained some doubt in discussions among the US Services and combatant commands as to the extent of the need for such doctrine since logistics remains a national responsibility. After operations in the Balkans and East Timor there was a greater recognition of the need to formalize doctrine on logistic support to multinational operations. However, much of the doctrine proposed in early drafts of this publication remained subject to disagreement among Services and CINCs, based largely upon new and often untested nature of some of the concepts proposed.
- d. Preliminary Coordination (PC) staffing of JP 4-08 in November 2000 indicated that considerable uncertainty remains concerning the key concept of command organization structure for the command and control of logistic support to multinational operations. Additionally, other areas do not yet enjoy consensus, such as the reduction of in-theater resource competition, or are judged to be inadequate in light of recent developments, such as the coverage of Anti-terrorist/Force Protection (AT/FP) issues. Many of these issues are not readily resolvable through routine staffing procedures. In many cases, the difficulty lies not in a mere difference of opinion between or among Services, but a lack of objective evidence upon which to select the proper joint course of action, as the possible solutions have not undergone formal scrutiny in exercises or operations. Additionally, in the interim, the US has ratified several NATO Allied Joint Publications (AJP), which constitute standardization agreements to which the US will adhere during NATO operations; the potential impact of these agreements upon the doctrine presented in JP 4-08 has yet to be evaluated.
- e. In February 2001, the Joint Staff Director for Logistics (DJ-4), in accordance with JP 1-01, submitted a request and justification for having JP 4-08 undergo a formal evaluation before further staffing. The Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (DJ-7) concurred that JP 4-08 should be designated a Joint Test Publication, and requested that DJ-4 develop an Evaluation Directive for staffing and approval per instructions in JP 1-01. This document is that Evaluation Directive for the newly designated Joint Test Publication (JTP) 4-08.
- 3. <u>Responsibilities</u>. The Joint Staff Director for Logistics (DJ-4) is assigned as the Evaluation Agent with responsibilities as set forth in JP 1-01. DJ-7 will oversee the evaluation and ensure its adequacy, completeness and consistency. Commander, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) will support DJ-7 as required through the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC). Other combatant commanders will give appropriate priority to the inclusion of the JTP 4-08 evaluation during suitable exercises.

4. Evaluation Methodology.

- a. The PC version of JP 4-08 will be converted to JTP 4-08 as described in JP 1-01, by the affixing of required distinctive marking (e.g. "Joint Test Publication 4-08"), and the addition of differences of opinion and other critical areas for review and evaluation. This will be completed not later than 30 April 2001. JTP 4-08 will then be considered interim joint doctrine under evaluation. Its applicability will be limited to the scope of this Evaluation Directive.
- b. The evaluation period will be keyed to the Focused Logistic Wargame 2001 (FLOW 01), which is the main evaluation vehicle. FLOW 01 is a multi-scenario seminar/wargame with General/Flag

Officer participation, uniquely suited to testing this interim doctrine, as it involves all US combatant commands and Services as well as the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. This combination not only provides a joint and multinational approach, it also ensures that while NATO solutions to given issues may be used, non-NATO considerations will be addressed. FLOW 01 will test the concepts put forth in JTP 4-08, with the recommended resolution of issues developed and approved by the most senior logisticians of the US combatant commands, Services and multinational partners.

- c. JTP 4-08 will be utilized as the base US multinational logistics doctrine throughout FLOW 01. It will be tested against each of four scenarios. These scenarios address the full range of military operations from major theater war to military operations other than war. Scenarios will include situations in which the US has the lead and others in which allied/partner nations have the lead with US participation. US European Command, US Transportation Command, US Pacific Command, US Central Command and USJFCOM each have been assigned a scenario, and tasked to utilize the interim doctrine in JTP 4-08 as the basis for logistic support in that scenario, including the testing of command support structures. US-ratified NATO Allied joint logistics doctrine will be compared to JTP 4-08 to assess its impact, or possible adaptability as a solution to unresolved non-NATO multinational logistics issues. At the conclusion of each move of the wargame, the responsible CINC's senior logistician will report on lessons-learned in the application of the interim US doctrine, identify areas for improvement, and recommend specific actions necessary to capture the results in the proposed doctrine. These comments will be included in the after-action briefings and reports of each scenario move from June 2001 through September 2001. The results of the overall wrap-up wargame session will be briefed in October 2001.
- d. FLOW 01 has seven internal "pillars" (issue-focused work groups) assigned to closely examine specific issues. These pillars include the areas of Multinational/Interagency Logistics, Information Fusion, Ordnance, Joint Deployment and Theater Distribution, Engineering and Construction, Joint Health Service Support, and Agile Infrastructure. The pillars are composed of subject matter experts assigned from the Services and combatant commands. Each FLOW 01 pillar has been tasked to use JTP 4-08 when examining the logistics issues assigned and specifically to identify any areas for improvement, with recommendation of specific actions necessary to capture the results in the proposed doctrine. This will provide an evaluation of the interim doctrine across the entire range of logistics operations.
- e. In addition, the JWFC will conduct a comparative analysis to determine the degree of compatibility of JTP 4-08 with existing US joint doctrine as well as with key joint multinational logistics standardization agreements ratified by the US. As a minimum, this will include comparison with JP 4, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations" and JP 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations", as well as all US-ratified NATO Allied joint logistics doctrine. The JWFC will provide the results of this analysis to the Evaluation Agent, with copy to DJ-7, not later than 27 August 2001 for Evaluation Agent's incorporation into the evaluation.
- 5. Evaluation Criteria. General and specific critical aspects of JTP 4-08 that require evaluation are:
- a. How should the competition for scarce in-theater resources be planned, managed, and deconflicted? The desired doctrinal outcome should provide solutions for reduction in resource

competition among contributing nations, especially in operating environments with little or no infrastructure. Additionally, it must adequately discuss coordination and control of scarce resources to ensure their attribution against the Commander's highest priorities.

- b. What are the possible and optimal command structure requirements, especially between/among the multinational force commander and the national support elements that ensure the required logistic support to the force? The doctrine should provide sufficient discussion of various logistic support organizational structures related to the command and control of multinational operations.
- c. What constitutes adequate AT/FP requirements for logistic forces, including transiting units, during multinational operations? As recommended by the USS COLE Commission, all logistics doctrine must incorporate AT/FP considerations. This doctrine should specifically provide AT/FP considerations for logistics forces operating in a multinational force environment, including transiting units and units outside the US main force that are providing logistic support to contributing nations.
- d. Is the doctrine consistent with existing US joint doctrine and with multinational logistics standardization agreements ratified by the US? As a minimum, the doctrine should be consistent with JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations* and JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, and facilitate the implementation of any US-ratified NATO Allied joint logistics doctrine or similar regional standardization agreements.
- e. Does the test publication accomplish the requirements contained in the program directive?
- f. Was the test publication available to all appropriate Services, commands, and staff in sufficient time prior to the Focused Logistics Wargame 01 to ensure understanding, training, and coordination?
- g. Were all unresolved issues exercised and their pros and cons documented for later resolution?"
- 6. <u>Completion Date</u>. The completion of the Test Publication evaluation period, including necessary revisions, will be 15 December 2001. At that time, JTP 4-08 will revert to draft joint doctrine status as JP 4-08, with publication of the final draft and resumption of normal staffing on 15 January 2002.
- 7. <u>Amplifying Information</u>. An interim report will be provided to J-7 on 30 July 2001, following the move briefing on scenario two on 30 July 2001. It will provide information on the evaluation resulting from the two moves, including deficiencies found and possible solutions to be tested during moves three and four. An interim doctrinal update also will be provided to the October 2001 Joint Doctrine Working Party. A final written report of the evaluation and its findings will be provided to DJ-7 by the Evaluation Agent upon completion of the evaluation.
- 8. <u>Administrative Instructions</u>. DJ-4 point of contact is CAPT N. A. Reed, J-4 International Logistics Division (ILD), Commercial 703-693-5110, DSN prefix 223; e-mail

reedna@js.pentagon.mil (reedna@js.pentagon.smil.mil - SIPRNET). DJ-7 point of contact is Mr. Harry Simmeth, J-7 Joint Doctrine Training and Education Division (JDETD), Commercial 703-693-2881, DSN prefix 223; e-mail harry.simmeth@js.pentagon.mil (harry.simmeth@js.pentagon.smil.mil -SIPRNET). Direct liaison is authorized all concerned.

H. P. OSMAN

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1. Scope

2 3 This publication describes the unique 4 logistical aspects associated with 5 multinational operations, including coordination, planning, execution, command and control, and deconfliction of logistic requirements. It provides guidance and principles for the Armed 9 10 Forces of the United States in conducting 11 logistic activities when operating as part of a multinational force. It describes the 12 nature of logistic support elements such as 13 14 supply systems, movement control, maintenance, engineering, contracting, 15 logistic information systems, host-nation support, real estate management, security, 17 18 and health support during the appropriate 19 phases of multinational operations. 20 outlines the organization, structure, 21 methodology, coordinating 22 responsibilities, and processes; establishes 23 priorities; and institutionalizes the logistic planning function for multinational operations, ranging from major theater war, to military operations other than war. 26 27 It describes the responsibilities, 28 authorities, and organizational structures that may be established to coordinate logistic support during multinational 31 operations. It addresses the logistic 32 support areas that commanders and their staffs should consider during the planning 33 and execution of logistic support activities 34 35 during multinational operations.

2. Purpose

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This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and

interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 50 other joint force commanders and 51 prescribes doctrine for joint operations and 52 training. It provides military guidance for 53 use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of 55 this publication to restrict the authority of 56 the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the 57 58 mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the 60 accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces. subordinate components of these commands. These principles guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances If conflicts arise dictate otherwise. between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and

Preface 1 procedures ratified by the United States. 4 evaluate and follow the multinational 2 For doctrine and procedures not ratified by 5 command's doctrine and procedures, 3 the United States, commanders should where applicable. 8

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JOINT TEST PUBLICATION 4-08 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Describes the Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations
- Discusses Command and Control of Logistics for Multinational Operations
- Describes Use of Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements
- Provides Considerations for Multinational Logistic Planning and Execution
- Reviews Application of Relevant US Legal Authorities and Funding/Reimbursement Arrangements

Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations

Multinational logistics is a general term used to describe any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more countries or organizations in support of a multinational force.

In the future, the United States is likely to be engaged in multinational military operations conducted with allies as part of an alliance or coalition. These multinational operations may also be conducted under the auspices of the United **Nations.** Multinational operations may span the spectrum from major theater war to the full range of military operations other than war. Because the participants in multinational operations are sovereign nations with their own military establishments, logistic support for these operations presents unique challenges to US geographic combatant commanders, joint force commanders, the Services, and Defense Agencies. Multinational logistics encompasses two basic elements: (1) a command and control organization that delineates logistic responsibilities and authorities of the multinational force commander (MNFC) and participating nations; and (2) multinational logistic support arrangements for supporting a multinational force. Each type of operation and organizational structure has distinctive features, especially regarding command and control, funding, and participation, which places a premium on developing flexible logistic support concepts that can be tailored to effectively respond to a broad range of contingencies. The distinguishing characteristic of multinational operations is that participating forces are provided

by sovereign **nations.** These nations, including the United States, do not give MNFCs full command and control of their forces. Usually, MNFCs will exercise operational control (OPCON) over national force contingents and OPCON, by itself, does not include control of nationally provided logistic resources. Nations are highly reluctant to give MNFCs directive authority for logistics. Nonetheless, the use of multinational logistic principles will be critical to the success of future operations.

Multinational logistic operations are governed by unique principles.

Successful multinational logistic operations are governed by several unique principles. First, multinational logistic operations are a **collective responsibility** of participating nations and MNFCs, although **nations are inherently responsible** for supporting their forces. Secondly, MNFCs must be given **sufficient authority** over logistic resources in order to ensure that the force is supported in the most efficient and effective manner. Third, cooperation and **coordination** are necessary among participating nations and forces, which should make use of **multinational logistic support arrangements** in order to reduce the logistic footprint in the operation area. Finally, synergy results from the use of **multinational integrated logistic support**; to ensure this, the MNFC must have **visibility** of the logistic activity during the entire operation.

Obtaining early commitment of allied logistic resources is difficult, yet critical to tailoring logistic support of an operation.

Multinational operations are highly political. Generally, nations are reluctant to commit logistic forces early. In some coalitions, formal advance planning (deliberate or contingency) is considered too sensitive for sharing. Thus, US logistic planners must work closely with alliance and potential coalition partners to the extent possible in coordinating national plans to support political decisions. Obtaining early knowledge of the organic logistic support capabilities of forces provided by participating nations and identifying the means to support their needs will be critical to effectively supporting the total force.

Command and Control of Logistics for Multinational Operations

Command relationships and organizations that promote mutual and efficient logistic support are key to success. Unity of command and unity of effort may be more difficult for multinational operations, but every effort should be made to achieve these basic principles to the maximum extent possible. Logistics will remain a function of command for the MNFC and force components. Logistic support requirements and capabilities must be considered for every phase of the operation. The MNFC should be authorized the requisite level of authority over logistic resources necessary to accomplish the mission.

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To assist the MNFC in executing the logistic responsibilities, a variety of command and control organizations may be established, such as a multinational joint logistics center and functional area coordination centers comprised of participating nations' representatives, to facilitate multinational logistic operations. The appropriate command and control relationships and mechanisms must be clearly defined and established during operation plan development. **Determining the appropriate command and control of multinational logistic operations is the most important step in planning the support of multinational operations.**

Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements

Allied forces often require support beyond their capabilities. However, allies also can provide complementary logistic resources with resulting synergism.

Although nations are ultimately responsible for providing the logistic support of their forces, the capability of participating nations to support forces provided to the MNFC may vary widely in multinational operations. All nations, including the United States, will likely need some nonorganic support. The need for such nonorganic support - which may be provided by contractors, host nations, or other participating nations — must be identified during the planning phase and arranged for prior to participation in the operation. MNFCs must be aware of both the logistic needs and potential contributions of allies during an operation. The diverse force mix of a multinational operation complicates the logistic support concept. However, benefits will accrue to participants through the use of various multinational logistic support arrangements, such as the pooling of resources, to provide multinational integrated logistic support. The use of pre-negotiated agreements will facilitate logistic support. Nations may establish cooperative arrangements to more efficiently provide logistic support, thereby contributing to the operation but at a level consistent with national capabilities. Mutual support concepts, such as Role Specialist Nation for specific classes of logistic support and the use of Lead Nations to provide logistic support within a geographic area, will play an important role in the logistic support concept of a multinational operation. Nations' forces need not rely solely on national "stovepipe" logistics in order to participate in such operations. The fact that participating nations' forces are likely to have a wide variety of equipment does not minimize the importance of working to achieve standardization and interoperability among potential partners.

Multinational Logistic Planning

The capabilities and logistic shortfalls of participating forces must be considered when planning logistic support for multinational operations.

There are four critical tasks associated with planning the logistic support for a multinational operation: (1) identifying the logistic support required to accomplish the mission and support the multinational force; (2) identifying opportunities for US and other participants' logistic support contributions; (3) obtaining US and other nations' commitments; and (4) identifying the robustness of the organic logistic support capabilities of forces provided by participating nations. It is imperative that logistic support and operations planning occur simultaneously. Obtaining effective logistic support in a multinational operation will pose particular challenges for the MNFC and will require detailed planning and flexible execution, taking into account the logistical capabilities, demands, and limitations of each national contingent. US combatant commanders and their staffs should work closely with potential multinational partners in coordinating logistic support plans. Each phase of a multinational operation has distinctive logistic requirements that must be addressed during the planning phase. Of considerable importance are the logistic factors to consider in the transition from either a joint US-only operation to a multinational operation or vice versa. The logistic support burdens and opportunities to use multinational logistics to ease those burdens vary in these changing situations. It is important to ensure that such transitions are seamless and transparent to the operating forces and that the degree of logistic support does not suffer during these critical transition periods.

Relevant US Legal Authorities and Funding and Reimbursement Arrangements

US participation in multinational logistic operations is subject to the requirements and limitations of national legal authorities.

There are several standing legal authorities that affect the way in which logistic support may be exchanged between the United States, its allies, and potential multinational partners. US commanders and their staffs must be familiar with both these standing legal authorities and annual Department of Defense authorization/appropriation legislation to ensure that US participation in multinational logistic operations is conducted in accordance with these authorities. US participants must understand the funding and reimbursement requirements of different multinational logistic support arrangements before committing the United States to such arrangements.

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CONCLUSION

Several major considerations affect US logistic participation in multinational operations. First, US forces and logistic resources may be placed under the OPCON of a foreign MNFC, who should have sufficient authority for logistics to effectively and efficiently support the force. Second, US laws affect the exchange of logistic support between US forces and those of other nations as well as with host nations; US commanders must be aware of these legal considerations. Third, consultation, cooperation, and coordination between US commanders and other nations, multinational headquarters, and forces is essential to achieve unity of effort in providing logistic support. The use of centralized coordination centers in such areas as movement control, contracting, infrastructure engineering, customs and border clearance, and medical support can assist US commanders in effectively supporting US forces. Finally, use of multinational logistic support **arrangements**, coupled with modern technology and concepts. may reduce the US logistic footprint in the operation area. Use of host-nation support may be key to supporting US forces. Advances in such areas as information technology, joint deployment, and theater distribution systems can benefit both the United States and allies.

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CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTALS OF LOGISTICS FOR MULTINATIONAL **OPERATIONS**

"The man who goes alone can start today; but he who travels with another must wait till that other is ready."

Henry David Thoreau, American writer (1817-1862)

1. General

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> 8 Logistic support during multinational operations presents unique challenges for combatant 10 geographic commanders, subordinate ioint force commanders (JFCs), Services, and Defense Agencies. 12 The doctrine and policies for supporting 13 US joint operations has been established 15 (see JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations). Logistic support for multinational operations, however, differs fundamentally from single nation joint 18 operations in that the participating forces represent different sovereign nations. This 20 has profound implications for how the 21 United States should organize, prepare, 22 and execute the logistic support of the 23 24 Armed Forces of the United States participating in multinational operations. Although many of the principles of logistics for joint and multinational operations are the same, multinational 27 logistics (MNL) involves distinctive command and control (C2) concepts and 31 principles. Moreover, various multinational support arrangements are 32 available to ensure unity of effort, economy of force, and mission success. When doctrine in JP 4-0, Doctrine for 36 Logistic Support of Joint Operations, and this publication conflict, this publication takes precedence regarding US logistic

39 support during multinational operations. 40

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JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, provides overall doctrine and guidance for US forces involved in multinational operations. The purpose of 45 this publication is to expand upon the general guidance contained in that publication regarding logistics and to 48 provide more detailed guidance to US commanders and logisticians involved 49 50 with providing or receiving logistic support during multinational operations. 51 (Throughout this publication, the term 52 "multinational" encompasses operations 53 that also may be referred to as "allied," 54 "alliance," "bilateral," "combined," 55 "multilateral," or "coalition.") 56

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2. The Basis for Multinational Logistics

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a. **Definition.** MNL is any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more 62 countries supporting a multinational force (MNF) conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those conducted under 66 67 a United Nations (UN) mandate. During these operations, the multinational force commander (MNFC) coordinates logistic activities to accomplish the objective in 70 the most cost-efficient and effective 71 72 manner possible in accordance with prearranged agreements. In its basic 73 document on logistics (MC 319/1, NATO 74 75 Principles and Policies for Logistics), the 76 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines "multinational logistics" 77 78 as "an overarching term for the different modes to logistically support operations other than national, such as Multinational 80 Integrated Logistic Support, Role Specialist Support, and Lead Nation Support." 83 Logistic MNL

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CHALLENGE — MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS

"If we can achieve -

- · A framework for US involvement in multinational operations that removes barriers to cooperative actions,
- Expanded bilateral agreements to provide flexible responsive support throughout the spectrum of coalition operations,
- · Improved logistics capabilities in multinational organizations by leveraging the strengths of coalition partners,
- Increased interoperability through Focused Logistics core tasks . . .

Then we can —

Implement a multinational logistics support framework to:

- · Develop stronger regional relationships,
- · Establish equitable burden sharing among nations,
- · Increase operational efficiency among coalition partners,
- · Reduce logistics footprint, and
- · Reduce the operations."

SOURCE: Joint Staff Briefing, 21st Century Challenges

4 encompasses two basic elements: (1) a C2 organization that executes coordinates the logistic responsibilities and authorities of the MNFC and participating nations, and (2) use of multinational support arrangements logistic providing logistic support to MNF.

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b. Requirement. The United States has, in some circumstances, relied on other countries in supporting US forces — even within NATO during the cold war years when logistics was considered solely a national responsibility. For a variety of reasons, the requirement for MNL has increased in the new strategic environment, and in some multinational

operations the MNFC needs to play a major role in coordinating logistics for the 53 MNF. Nations may need to participate in 54 extensive multinational logistic support 55 **arrangements** to ensure that the operation 56 is effectively and efficiently supported.

58 The extent to which MNL is required 59 and can be effectively used depends on many factors, including the mission, the 60 size of the force, its degree of multinationality, the relative size of national force contributions, the degree of standardization and interoperability within 64 the force, use of a common language and 65 doctrine, and national legal restrictions on 66 67 exchanging mutual support.

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Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations



Many multilateral operations take place under the sponsorship of the UN.

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general, even multinational operations of modest complexity require some centralized coordination of logistic operations and use of some mutual support arrangements to ensure smooth, timely, responsive, and effective deployment and support. More complex operations, such as in a major theater war (MTW), could require more robust centralized coordination and management of critical logistic functions. functions could include, but not be limited to, movement control, contracting, negotiation of host-nation support (HNS), medical support, customs and border clearance, fuel supply distribution, engineering, and extensive use of mutual support arrangements (such as pooling of logistic resources and/or the designation of a single nation to provide a critical logistic service or commodity) to rationalize support for the MNF.

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A national "go-it-alone" approach to logistics in a multinational operation where a participating nation — on its own and independent of all other participants — would deploy its own forces, arrange

support from foreign nations, and compete

for commercial contracts to sustain its 32 national contingent, could lead to logistic 33 chaos and a logistically unbalanced 34 support structure.

MNL can be critical for the success of multinational operations. It facilitates deployment, smoother produces economies of scale, and results in effective sustainment of forces. It enables nations with less robust logistic capabilities to participate in multinational operations. And, it can save money.

3. Principles of Multinational **Logistics**

a. The principles of logistics for US joint operations, described in JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, also apply to the logistics of multinational operations. However, because participating forces represent sovereign 54 nations, there are several unique principles for multinational logistic 56 operations. Figure I-1 lists the principles of MNL (as contained in MC 319/1 document, NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics, and expanded upon in 60 NATO's publication Allied Joint

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Publication (AJP)-4, *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine*) to which the United States has
 agreed.

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• Primacy of Operations. Logistic support must be focused on accomplishing the mission, as defined by the MNFC. Logistic assets should be provided to the MNFC in sufficient quantity and diversity to support the MNF.

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• Responsibility. Logistic support during multinational operations is collective responsibility participating nations and the MNFC. The precise balance of responsibilities varies operation to operation. However, national force commanders and the MNFC must work together to ensure that the operation is effectively and efficiently supported. Logistic support in multinational military operations should not be considered solely national a responsibility.

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• Authority. The MNFC must be given sufficient authority over logistic resources to ensure that operational priorities are effectively supported. Sovereign nations are reluctant to give MNFCs directive authority for logistics. However, the MNFC should have the authority to redistribute logistic assets as a temporary expedient to meet unanticipated or emergency situations. In addition, the MNFC have operational control may (OPCON) of logistic units provided to support the overall operation. The degree of authority granted the MNFC must be clearly delineated during the planning process.

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Figure I-1. Logistic Principles of Multinational Operations

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Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations

• Cooperation. A high degree of cooperation is necessary among participants to achieve the desired unity of effort in multinational operations. Nations must cooperate with each other and with the MNFC to ensure that their forces and the overall operation are adequately supported. In fact, because multinational operations primarily conducted by consensus of the participants, the need for cooperation is paramount.

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- Coordination. Given the absence of traditional logistic C2 authorities, nations should closely coordinate their logistic actions with the MNFC throughout both the planning and execution phases operation. the coordination must exist between all levels of the operational and logistical command structure. Coordination is especially important in the areas of movement control. contracting, medical support, customs and border clearance, negotiation and allocation of HNS, provision of fuel supply, and negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements. MNFC may establish functional area logistic coordination centers to formalize the logistic coordination functions of an operation.
- Provision and Sufficiency. The provisioning of sufficient support to participating forces and the overall operation may be accomplished individually or by cooperative arrangements among the participants. The levels and distribution of logistic resources must be sufficient to achieve designated levels of readiness, sustainability, and mobility to meet operational

- requirements. A variety of support arrangements, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, may be used to facilitate the provision of logistic support. The MNFC must develop a process for ensuring the **robustness of the logistic capability** of forces identified to participate in the operation.
- Flexibility. Changes in operational tempo and relationships among multinational participants require a high degree of flexibility in planning and executing logistic support. Since the scope, mission, and composition of multinational operations differ, logistic support must be tailored to meet operational requirements unique to each operation. The logistic support concept for multinational operations must be flexible enough to accommodate the needs. restrictions, and capabilities of diverse forces.
- Simplicity. Logistic support for multinational operations is complex. However, to be effective, the logistic support concept and implementation must be easily understood. Standardized procedures, mission-type orders, and a clearly defined logistic support structure with precisely stated missions, roles, and responsibilities must be developed, established, and promulgated. Peacetime efforts to achieve interoperability, especially alliance among members, must be pursued to facilitate operational cohesiveness. Simplified reporting requirements and formats must also be developed and provided to nations to ensure that accurate and timely information is provided.

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- Timeliness. Developing and establishing an effective logistic framework requires more time than for single-nation operations because of the involvement of multiple nations in the planning process. Logistic planners and operators should allow extra time for proper coordination with nations during the planning and execution of logistic activities in a multinational operation.
- Economy. Logistic resources must be used effectively, efficiently, and economically. Given the limits on logistic resources and the need to reduce logistic footprints in the operational area, nations should work together to pursue opportunities for achieving economies of scale through the pooling of logistic resources and use

mutual support arrangements.

- Visibility. The exchange of logistic information among participating national forces and the MNFC concerning the status of assets and capabilities is essential for efficient management and coordinated support. As a means of gaining such visibility, the MNFC must be authorized to require reports and inspect specified logistic assets as National cooperation is necessary. Common reporting formats must be provided participants and use made of complementing automatic identification technologies rapidly passing and processing logistic status information.
- Synergy. MNL can be an effective force multiplier. The logistic footprint within an operational area can be reduced through the use of multinational logistic concepts,

such as forming multinational integrated logistic units (MILUs). Multinational logistic support arrangements can be used to achieve economies efficiencies, speed the deployment of forces and supplies, and maximize the use of limited Examples of mutual resources. support arrangements include use of role specialist nations (RSNs) for providing a specific commodity or service; lead nations (LNs) to provide a variety of support within a geographical area: bilateral/multilateral support agreements; and basic ordering agreements (BOAs) to obtain economic procurements.

- b. In addition to the logistic principles of multinational operations, the logistic principles for US-only operations should also be considered:
 - Responsiveness. MNL can be very responsive with rapid exchange of common support items among the forces. This requires planning and standardization far in advance of the operation, however.
 - Survivability. The same requirements apply for multinational forces to prevail in spite of potential destruction as for US-only forces. Survivability must be considered when assigning role specialties to ensure critical support items are adequately defended and/or appropriately dispersed.
 - Sustainability. Long-term support can be achieved through MNL, either individually or by cooperative arrangements as discussed under "Provision and Sufficiency," above.

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Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations

• Attainability. MNL may permit minimum essential levels of support to be on hand in a more rapid manner since there are more avenues to obtain those items other than just through national resources.

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c. To facilitate logistic support among participants, a partnership must exist between the MNFC and contributing nations. Application of these principles (and those listed in JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations) should materially aid the logistic support of any particular operation by increasing operational effectiveness, sharing the burdens associated with participating in such operations, and generating significant cost savings.

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4. Special Considerations in **Organizing and Conducting** Multinational Logistic **Operations**

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a. The **Impact** of **National** Sovereignty. The planning and conduct of logistics in multinational operations characteristically differs from that in Sovereign single-nation operations. nations do not give MNFCs command of their forces, but MNFCs are likely to have OPCON over forces from participating nations, including logistic units that may be assigned to support the operation. However, nations may place conditions on the employment of their logistic forces.

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OPCON within a multinational operation is whatever is agreed upon by participating nations, provided that the agreed upon terms are consistent with US law, regulations, and applicable international agreements. multinational operation, the definition of OPCON is similar to the US definition of tactical control (TACON).

By definition, OPCON does not extend, 49 in and of itself, to the logistic resources that are organic to the forces under 50 OPCON to the MNFC. In US joint 51 operations, the JFC may be delegated 53 some directive authority for logistics by 54 the geographic combatant commander. In multinational operations, however, the 55 56 MNFC only has those authorities specifically granted by participating 57 nations. Nations give MNFCs only as 58 much authority over their national logistic 60 resources as they are willing to concede to achieve their national objectives. (MC 319/1, NATO Principles and Policies for 62 specifies 63 Logistics, that NATO 64 commanders have "redistribution" authority to "overcome unanticipated 65 deficiencies," but this authority is 66 extensively qualified.) JP 0-2, Unified 67 Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), gives a 68 full explanation of combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) and other 70 command relationships. JP 3-16, Joint 72 Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 73 provides an explanation of these relationships in multinational operations.

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Effective logistic operations depend 77 on good personal relationships between multinational and national force commanders. MNFCs and the logistic staff must use persuasion and diplomacy 80 to ensure that national contingents support operational priorities. In order to reduce friction and misunderstanding between 83 commanders, liaison teams or officers should be dispatched from higher to lower levels, lower to higher, laterally, and in combinations of these. Liaison 88 teams/officers generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but they can greatly understanding promote commander's intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters.

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Chapter I

US and other multinational forces must operate under the limitations imposed by status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) and national laws and regulations. SOFAs generally are the umbrella agreements under which forces may operate within a nation. Detailed provisions are usually contained in supporting technical arrangements (TAs). Many of the areas contained in the TAs relate directly to logistic issues: medical, environment, customs and duty taxes, traffic control and movement, landing rights and/or port utilization and related fees, protection and rights of contractors. Accordingly, the MNFC's logistic and legal staffs may become very involved with negotiations, implementation, and application of the SOFA and TAs to ensure that the TAs are in full agreement with the political/diplomatic agreements and understandings associated with the operation.

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National laws guide the exchange of logistic support among nations. There are a number of legal provisions that stipulate the manner in which US forces can exchange logistic support with other force contingents. These legal provisions provide the parameters under which US

32 commanders can participate 33 multinational logistic arrangements. (See Appendix C, "Relevant US Legal Authorities Affecting Logistic Support in 35 Multinational Operations," for a more 37 complete discussion of this subject.)

b. The United States as Provider and 40 Recipient of Logistic Support. Because of its generally robust logistics posture with highly specialized and, in some cases, unique logistic capabilities (e.g., extensive strategic lift, logistics over-the-shore [LOTS] assets), many nations view the United States as a source of logistic support to fill shortfalls in their own capabilities. The US national security strategy reflects the possibility that the United States might provide logistic 50 support as part of its national contribution to a multinational operation. However, given its global security interests, the United States has concerns about overcommitment of logistic resources to regional multinational operations. In some operations, the United States could require extensive external logistic assistance to support its forces and, hence, is likely to be both a consumer and provider of logistics. US commanders and logistic planners should view MNL as a means to



Forces of other nations can bring unique capabilities to a multinational force.

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Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations

effectively and efficiently support US forces and provide a flexible logistic

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c. Differences Multinational Logistics Based on Organizational Structure. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, lists two basic types of multinational operations (alliances and coalitions) and describes the general command structures associated with each. Multinational logistic concepts are applied somewhat differently between alliances and coalitions. Each of these types of multinational arrangements has distinctive characteristics that affect the broad nature of the supporting logistic effort and the ability to integrate that effort, especially C2 relationships, funding and reimbursement mechanisms, possible allied contributions, and logistic support capabilities.

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• Alliance Operations. Alliance operations are conducted under the auspices of a formally chartered defense organization, such as NATO, that consists of several nations united by treaty in the promotion and defense of common security interests. Alliance operations characteristics are shown in Figure I-2.

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Although these characteristics may apply generally to regional alliances and may serve to facilitate logistic support planning and execution, their specific application in actual operations may not be clearly established, as was discovered during the early stages of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF **MULTILATERAL LOGISTICS** IN POWER PROJECTION **OPERATIONS**

"We must take a powerful armament with us from home to a distant land . . . Here a friendly country is always near, and you can easily obtain supplies. There you will be dependent on a country which is entirely strange to vou . . . '

Nicias of Athens (discussing the planned expedition to Syracuse, Sicily in 415 BC)

In addition, in today's strategic environment — which emphasizes broad multilateral participation — alliance operations often may include nonalliance members. The logistic support of nonalliance members needs to be integrated into the alliance's overall logistic support concept for the operation. For example, Russian forces were included in Kosovo operations and needed to be considered when planning 73 logistic support. To ensure that nonalliance nations possess adequate logistic capabilities prior to being accepted for an operation, a logistic assessment and certification process should be developed and used by the MNFC.

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• Coalition. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action Coalitions can form within the framework of a formal international organization or through one of the nations in the coalition (typically the United States in operations in which it participates).

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Chapter I

CHARACTERISTICS OF ALLIANCE OPERATIONS USE OF ESTABLISHED, FREQUENTLY EXERCISED

COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES THAT CAN BE

TAILORED FOR PARTICULAR OPERATIONS.

BROAD AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER LOGISTIC AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, THE NEED FOR AND USE OF SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS, AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

SUBSTANTIAL PRIOR AND ONGOING LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING EFFORTS.

CONSIDERABLE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND SOME DEGREE (MODERATE TO HIGH) OF STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY AMONG ALLIANCE MEMBERS.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTICIPANTS' LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES AND STRUCTURES.

ESTABLISHED LOGISTIC PROCEDURES AND PROCESSES; STANDING PLANNING STAFFS; AND ALREADY EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PARTICIPANTS.

ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING HOST-NATION SUPPORT.

Figure I-2. Characteristics of Alliance Operations

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•• UN Operations. These operations are conducted under the authority of a UN resolution and under the leadership of a UN military force commander and a representative of the Secretary General. participation in recent operations in Somalia and Haiti are examples of this model. Such operations differ from operations that are UNauthorized but led directly by the United States or another nation. These operations are characterized by the following: (1) They established UN policies and procedures, which generally may not familiar to US or commanders. (2) There is little prior requirements determination and operational planning. (3) Standardization and/or interoperability among participants is likely to be quite low. (4) They are more likely to be ad hoc than operations conducted by regional alliances.

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•• US-Led Coalition Operations. US-led coalition operations may be authorized by the United Nations, but they do not involve the use of UNdeveloped logistic policies and procedures. The logistic C2 relationships, doctrine, and procedures of US-led coalitions generally based American concepts, although the actual C2 structure may be one of the types discussed in JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations. These operations are characterized by the following: (1) The core logistics planning staff consists primarily of Americans, although it is augmented by coalition members. (2) The degree of standardization and/or interoperability among coalition members for both nonmaterial processes and procedures and materiel equipment depends upon the coalition partners involved in a specific operation. The more inclusive the coalition force, the less standardization and interoperability there is. (3) The US MNFC must ensure that the logistic support requirements of other participating nations are identified and included appropriate logistic plans.

• Non-US-Led Coalition **Operations.** The United States may participate in coalition operations led by another nation. In such operations, the lead nation establishes the parameters for logistic participation. The US JFC (or separate Service component commanders if there is no joint force command) is guided by applicable US laws, regulations, and established agreements concerning the provision or exchange of logistic support among participants. In such operations, during the planning phase, the United States must clearly identify the extent to which it can participate in mutual support arrangements. The US JFC must clearly understand the expectations of the MNFC regarding US contribution to the overall logistic support concept. To the extent permitted by US laws, US logistic activities should be integrated into the overall operation seamlessly and with transparency expected of participants.

Whatever the structure of the coalition, the nation or international organization that has the lead in organizing the coalition is **challenged to orchestrate the logistic support of the disparate members of the coalition.** The MNFC may direct the use and application of logistic policies and procedures of the sponsoring nation or

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Chapter I

agency. However, considerable ingenuity is required to ensure that such policies and procedures are clearly understood and integrated.

The variable conditions under which US forces may operate in either an alliance or coalition multinational structure place a premium on developing flexible logistic support concepts that can be tailored to effectively respond to a broad range of contingencies in anv situation. Regardless of the method of employment, US forces participating in multinational operations must adhere to US laws as well as to appropriate international security agreements such as the UN or NATO charters.

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d. Impact on Multinational Logistics by **Type of Operation.** JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine* for Multinational Operations, lists the variety of military operations in which Armed Forces of the United States may be involved, ranging from the extremes of MTW to the vast variety of military operations other than war (MOOTW). The nature of the military mission greatly dictates both the extent and type of multinational logistic support required.

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• Logistic Support in War. Logistically, intensive combat operations result in increased demands upon in-theater medical capabilities and medical evacuations; all classes of supply, especially for fuel and ammunition; battle damage repair capabilities; replacement of major items/principal items of equipment; spare parts; and transportation. Intense combat operations involving a multinational force reinforce the requirement centralized coordination of support capabilities and the need for mutual support arrangements to achieve economies of scale through coordinated logistic support activities. Reimbursement is less of an issue; redistribution and reallocation may be more easily authorized.

• Logistic Support in MOOTW. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, and JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, describe the nature of MOOTW and the extent to which US military forces may be involved.

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Noncombat MOOTW, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, offer numerous opportunities for multinational logistics. In such operations, nations are likely to be interested in controlling costs. broad multilateral participation is solicited. There is a need for close coordination with international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local civilian agencies operating within the same areas. The MNFC is likely to be responsible for coordinating 76 operations of the MNF with these organizations and for coordinating selected logistic activities of the force, e.g., contracting, movement control, and engineering.

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e. Benefits of Multinational Logistics. A diverse force mix complicates the logistic support concept. However. significant benefits can accrue to the United States (and other nations) from using multinational logistic support arrangements.

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• It lessens demands on the United States to provide full support of forces from organic resources. Use of bilateral or multilateral support arrangements, pooling of resources,

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Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations

HNS, in-country resources, and contractor support for multiple nations can lead to significant cost savings and reduced logistic force structure in the operational area.

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• Centralized coordination of at least some logistic functions movement control, port operations, and medical evacuation) may result in a better coordinated, effective, and efficient deployment and support of forces. Centralized coordination of contracting reduces competition among participating nations for common goods and services. reduces black marketeering opportunities, acts to inflationary reduce pressures, maximizes utilization of restricted local resources. and leverages economic resources (e.g., economic ordering quantities) to benefit all participants.

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• It provides opportunities for nations without sufficient logistic resources to participate.

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• It provides the opportunity for a nation to provide a logistic capability for integrated logistic support, allowing them to participate in an operation other than with combat forces.

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f. Limits to Using Multinational Logistics. Although the use of MNL has substantial benefits, there are limits as to how extensively it can be used.

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- Most nations lack the deployable logistic assets to support both their own forces and to provide additional logistic units for general support of the multinational force. Nations are reluctant to commit logistic forces early during the force generation process to support the overall operation.
- Lack of established multinational planning organizations, logistic especially in coalitions, leads to ad logistic organization hoc development, which in turn adversely impacts the effectiveness efficiency of logistic support, especially during initial stages of operations.
- While the functional area of maintenance is not as amenable to "multinationality" as some other areas (such as food and fuel), opportunities may exist for a nation to obtain maintenance support from another country when vehicles and/or equipment are standardized.

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• It is difficult to achieve multinational consensus during the planning phase regarding common funding for financing/reimbursement arrangements, yet up-front (common) funding can significantly reduce critical support costs.

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82 83 84 Possible lack of standardization of procedures, supplies and equipment, especially when operating with non-NATO military forces.

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CHAPTER II

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND ORGANIZATION FOR MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

"We should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent, conflict prevention, and peacetime activities. Further, our history, strategy, and recent experience suggest that we will usually work in concert with our friends and allies in almost all operations."

Harry S. Truman (1884-1972)

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1. General

The command authorities and C2 structure for managing logistics during multinational operations vary depending upon the type of multinational command arrangement established for the operation. Logistic C2 organizations may be established at the MNF headquarters level, at MNF component commands (land, maritime, air, special operations), and/or at a combined joint task force (CJTF) headquarters. The authorities and responsibilities that follow relate primarily to the logistic function and generally apply to any of these operational command arrangements.

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2. Multinational Logistic **Operations: Authorities and** Responsibilities

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces

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(UNAAF), describes the four levels of command authority available to US COCOM, OPCON, commanders: TACON, and support. Other authorities outside the command relations include administrative control, coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, describes the general use of these authorities in multinational operations. (See the Glossary, Part II, for descriptions of each.) Each of these levels of authority (except COCOM) may apply

to US logistic forces assigned to a multinational operation.

a. Multinational Force Commander

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Given the flexibility required for 50 multinational operations, there are several approaches to the assignment of authority responsibility for and logistics. The MNFC may spend considerable time and effort establishing the level of national authority granted over the logistic forces and resources. The level of authority granted the MNFC 57 varies depending on the situation and the nations involved. However, underlying the authority and responsibility granted to the MNFC is the retention of sovereignty rights by each nation.

63 64 Depending upon the size, scope, nature, 65 and expected duration of the operations,

66 the MNFC or the CJTF commander may 67 establish a multinational joint logistics center (MJLC) to centrally coordinate 68 specified logistic functions. The MJLC, 70 which comprises participating nations'

representatives, may be established to 72 facilitate these multinational logistic

operations. The appropriate C2 73 74 relationships and mechanisms must be

clearly established, defined, and approved during operation 76 plan (OPLAN)

77 development. **Determining** the appropriate C2 of multinational logistic 78

operations may be the most important

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step in planning the support of the operation.

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Generally, MNFCs are given OPCON over assigned forces. In a multinational operation, the definition of OPCON is similar to the US definition of TACON. However, OPCON, of itself, does not include authority over administrative and logistic functions. Thus, in granting OPCON of US forces to the MNFC, the degree of MNFC coordination and tasking over the administrative and logistic functions must be specified. Additionally, US logistic units may be placed under the OPCON of an MNFC as part of the overall logistic support for an MNF. US logistic forces may be assigned in **support** of the MNF. In this case, both the supported MNFC and the supporting US commander must understand the degree of authority that the supported MNFC is granted.

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Directive authority for some logistics may be delegated to a JFC. However, such authority may only be granted to the MNFC through prearranged agreements. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, provides general guidance for situations where US forces are placed under the OPCON of a foreign commander. In most cases, foreign MNFCs are granted **coordinating** authority as the normal command authority for coordinating logistic issues. Under coordinating authority, the MNFC can require consultation between forces but does not have the authority to compel agreement. Coordinating authority recognizes the consultation relationship necessary for forces of sovereign nations to reach consensus during multinational operations to achieve the objective. In the event the MNFC is authorized only coordinating authority, the limitations of such authority over the logistic function 48 must be clearly understood by 49 participating nations.

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- MNFCs may exercise directive authority over attached ground logistic resources in accordance with provisions agreed upon by the participating nations. Nations, including the United States, may delegate to the MNFC a degree of authority over logistic resources consistent with the OPCON of assigned combat forces.
 - The MNFC may be given authority to exercise TACON of ground units transiting through the area normally designated as the communication zone (COMMZ). consideration may apply regardless of whether the operational area resembles either the traditional linear or nonlinear operational area. The authority and responsibility for TACON of units in the COMMZ is normally subordinated to commander assigned responsibility for the COMMZ. This arrangement provides a single point of contact for the MNFC, the TACON units and the nation(s) that comprise the COMMZ.
 - Normally, tanker airlift control elements and aircrews either transiting or based in the operational area are excluded from MNFC exercise of TACON since the Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) normally retains OPCON of all intertheater assets.

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90 The MNFC, through the logistic staff, 91 must plan the logistic support necessary to 92 support the concept of operations. To do 93 this, the MNFC must have the authority 94 and responsibility to define the logistic

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Command Relationships and Organization for Multinational Logistic Operations

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capabilities of participating forces and exercise overall authority and coordination for logistic support of the multinational operation. The MNFC must determine the logistic requirements for operational level support forces, work with nations to obtain appropriate forces, and exercise authority over logistic resources to the extent permitted by participating nations. addition, the MNFC must be able to ensure that participating nations possess the required logistic capabilities, through 12 13 either organic resources and/or 14 arrangements made with other sources. These efforts are important to the 15 following: 16

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 Ensure responsive, effective logistic support is provided to the MNF at the most efficient cost.

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 Provide common logistic guidance to subordinate organizations in accordance with the mission and as directed by higher authority.

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 Develop a spirit of cooperation, coordination, and communication with and among participating nations.

Additional logistic responsibilities of the MNFC include the following:

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 Develop bilateral and multilateral agreements, as required, with troopcontributing nations and/or with nations in, through, or over which multinational forces will be employed.

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 Determine HNS requirements and develop HNS agreements, especially regarding the use of in-country resources (ICR) with appropriate nations for logistic support.

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- Develop funding requirements and obtain necessary common funding to support early logistic requirements to support the MNF.
- Determine the priority, process, and
 procedure for the use of common
 funding and participating nation
 resources, including theater
 support contractor capabilities and
 manpower.
 - Determine the requirement for LN support and seek acceptance by appropriate nations.
 - Determine areas in which an RSN may be appropriate e.g., contracting, functional specialty, or strategic lift and initiate action to obtain acceptance/approval from the prospective nation.
 - When appropriate, arrange and/or implement common support from nations outside the operational area, e.g., bunkering for vessels, refueling services for aircraft, staging areas for land forces, and recreational areas for the force.
 - Ensure that logistic planning efforts coincide with and occur simultaneously with operational planning. Integrated planning must occur throughout the planning phase. Logistic annexes must reflect the MNFC's concept of logistic support.
 - Establish the MNL C2 organization. (In an alliance or for a US joint task force [JTF], this may be accomplished as part of routine peacetime organization development.)

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• Direct, track, and redirect strategic 48 • Interface, as necessary, at the national and operational movements in the 49 level with those nations providing 2 logistic assets/units for the operation. 3 operational area. 50 4 51 • Validate, coordinate, and deconflict • Ensure that coordination is conducted 5 52 MNF strategic and operational with the Civil-Military Operation 53 6 Center (CMOC) to provide possible 7 movements. 54 8 55 logistic support to IOs, NGOs, and voluntary 56 private organizations 9 • Validate and coordinate assigned 57 (PVOs), as necessary. 10 common-user transportation. 58 11 59 • Coordinate with National Support 12 • Coordinate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) 60 Elements (NSEs), as necessary. 13 operations in the operational area. 14 61 15 62 • Coordinate all logistic 16 Determine the manning levels 63 requirements at necessary for functioning of the MNL 64 theater/operational level. 17 C2 organization. The resulting 18 65 • Prioritize logistic requirements in 19 manning document — Statement of 66 Requirement in NATO — is not a 20 67 accordance with concept static document. Personnel levels 21 68 operations. should be expected to fluctuate 22 69 23 during the operation based upon 70 Establish and publish 24 evolving requirements reporting requirements. 71 25 changing situations. 72 26 73 • Develop a process to identify logistic 27 • Determine the equipment 74 shortfalls and initiate, in coordination 28 requirements, especially 75 with nations, actions necessary to 29 communications, vehicles, 76 remedy those shortfalls. 30 computer support necessary to outfit 77 31 the MNL C2 structure. Sources for 78 • Identify, promulgate, and these assets should be identified prior 32 79 compliance with host to potential operations. 33 80 environmental guidelines 34 81 restrictions. 35 • Establish and arrange infrastructure 82 requirements for the MNF. 36 83 • Develop logistic support plans to meet the needs of the evolving 37 84 38 • Coordinate MNF/LN or component operation, especially transitioning to 85 39 petroleum requirements. either subsequent planned phases or 86 40 87 changes in 41 • Coordinate intertheater airlift, aerial management. 88 refueling, aeromedical evacuation, 42 89 and commercial air transportation

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responsibilities may apply to any given

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to support the movement and

sustainment of forces deploying to,

through, or from the operation area.

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operation is the necessity for close and continuous coordination with the sovereign nations participating in the operation.

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To meet exigent requirements during an operation, the MNFC must have the authority and responsibility redistribute reallocate logistic or **resources.** The conditions for the use of this authority and responsibility should be clearly delineated in the OPLAN, operation order (OPORD), or contingency In such circumstances, national authorities may designate that such redistribution may only occur for the duration of the specific operational requirement.

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b. Secretary of Defense (SecDef)

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• In concert with Secretary of State (SECSTATE), develop US policies for use during an impending operation that will include negotiating and executing possible bilateral and/or multilateral support agreements with the MNFC and/or with potential partner nations.

- 31 • Review the responsibilities identified in JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for 32 33 Multinational Operations, 34 consider logistic implications and 35 requirements such as negotiations for HNS, en-route and over-flight 36 rights, and Office of the Secretary 37 of Defense (OSD)/Joint Staff 38 39 involvement in SOFA negotiations. 40
 - Authorize the US to accept RSN and LN responsibilities for designated functions.
 - Review the foreign military sales (FMS) system as a source of support for allies and identify opportunities to streamline the approval process for sales. Develop alternatives to upfront funding, such as a line of credit, and/or replacement in kind, and/or for reimbursement offsetting US force structure requirements in the operational area.

c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

• Provide advice and recommendations to the National



Multilateral operations such as Desert Storm require frequent consultation at the highest levels.

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Chapter II

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- Command Authorities (NCA) regarding forces (including logistic forces) to assign to a multinational operation.
- Formulate policies for training joint forces for multinational operations.
- In coordination with the geographic combatant commanders, Services, and Defense Agencies, identify functions for which the US can be a RSN/LN. Examples include strategic lift, deployment information system, procurement and distribution of fuel and food, and waste disposal.
- Upon approval to provide an RSN function, recommend a Department of Defense (DOD) activity/command to provide the specific functional support to the MNFC.

d. Geographic Combatant Commanders

• Retain COCOM over all US forces designated to participate in multinational operation. COCOM may not be delegated, although as identified in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), authority may be exercised through subordinate JFCs, Service, and/or functional component commanders. Should a geographic combatant commander establish a JTF, its commander will usually be delegated OPCON authority. Such authority will specifically identify the extent to which administrative and logistic functions are included. Further, the authority given to the JFC should identify the extent to which the JFC may directly communicate with the US Military Services and Defense Agencies in order to streamline the channels of communication and support.

- Geographic combatant commanders receiving forces from another combatant commander normally exercise OPCON over those forces, as defined in the SecDef-approved CJCS deployment order.
- Ensure that JTF components clearly understand the policies and procedures associated with logistic support provided to and received from allies during military operations.
- Participate in logistic exercises and become familiar with the logistic support concepts, policies, and procedures of potential multinational partners. Within a regional alliance, peacetime operating procedures and processes should be harmonized with those to be used during anticipated combat operations or MOOTW.
- Become familiar with the unique logistic support provisions of UN operations.
- Educate potential coalition partners on US logistic doctrine, policies, procedures, and processes and existing Service-level standardization agreements to facilitate their participation.
- Develop and maintain a logistic technical information data base for each nation within the region. The data base should include data on HNS capabilities, including available contractors and their capabilities.
- Obtain knowledge of logistic information systems used by

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nations within the area of responsibility (AOR) and develop plans that allow interoperability with US systems when and if necessary.

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- Ensure all command echelons support and interface with the deployment information system to be used by the MNFC.
- Initiate action to develop and/or complete acquisition cross-Service agreements (ACSAs), FMS letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs), HNS agreements, and other logistic support agreements with allies in the region.
- Be prepared to deploy, as required, logistic planning cell(s) with appropriate logistic planners and functional area experts to participate in MNL planning activities.
- Identify need for and expedite negotiation of bilateral and multilateral logistic support agreements.
- Develop, document, and build a relationship with prospective participating IOs, NGOs, and PVOs.
- Consistent with current DOD policy, ensure adequate protection provided to contractors supporting US forces in the operational area. Such protection must be included in appropriate SOFAs, SOFAimplementing agreements, OPLANs, and contingency plans. Protection for non-commander of a combatant command (CINC) assigned DOD personnel and assets is responsibility of SECSTATE through the US embassy, Chief of Mission (COM). For the geographic combatant commander to have

protection responsibility for nonassigned DOD personnel, it must be specified in CINC/COM a memorandum of agreement (MOA) [per universal memorandum of understanding (MOU) between SECSTATE/SecDef and Title 22, United States Code (USC) 4802]. geographic combatant commander assumes force protection non-assigned responsibility for personnel only through legally recognized SecDef/SECSTATE MOUs.

e. Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command

- Provide decisive, capabilities-based joint forces to the supported combatant commander or the MNFC as directed by the NCA.
- Identify the specific units that can fulfill the supported geographic combatant commander requirements, select those forces with the required capabilities and readiness status, train those selected forces to joint mission essential task standards, and deploy them to the MNFC.

f. Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command

As the premier strategic military transportation agency, perform the following:

- Task United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to provide the intertheater airlift mission.
- Provide intratheater airlift capabilities to the supported JFC or the MNFC as directed by the NCA.

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- Provide assistance to the geographic combatant commanders for the responsive and timely closure and sustainment of the force.
- Support and interface with existing deployment information systems to be used by the MNF.
- If assigned to provide RSN support, provide strategic lift information system support to affected multinational nations.
- Provide strategic lift to allies, as approved by the SecDef. This may be on a reimbursable basis, if so approved.

g. Military Departments/Services/ Defense Agencies

- Provide RSN/LN support to the MNFC when authorized by SecDef.
- Execute Title 10, USC responsibilities to train, equip, and supply forces provided for multinational operations.
- Engage nations likely to be allies during a multinational operation in logistic training opportunities.
- Develop and implement approved international standardization agreements.
- Review US capabilities that can be provided to satisfy possible RSN requests. Serving as RSN for particular logistic functions may be a tradeoff for the amount of US logistic force structure provided within the operational area.

- Ensure that JTF components clearly understand the policies and procedures associated with logistic support provided to and received from allies during military operations.
- Review support procedures under FMS and those provided under wartime transfer terms.
- Issue instructions to US contracting officers concerning use of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) during multinational operations. Identify FAR provisions that may be waived during contingency operations. If a FAR provision conflicts with contracting rules established by the MNFC, the FAR has precedence.
- Ensure contracting officers conform to prioritization policies and processes established by the MNFC, especially the applicability of restricted items lists promulgated by the MNFC.
- Define for US operational participants and contracting officers the legal aspects for US implementation of logistic contracts awarded following official alliance procedures.

h. Joint Force Commander

- May be delegated OPCON authority. Authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training must be specifically delegated by the geographic combatant commander.
- Exercise OPCON of all US forces assigned, as indicated in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), when directed in the

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unified command plan or otherwise 2 authorized by the SecDef. 3

3. Command and Control of **Multinational Logistic Operations**

7 8 a. General. There is no single C2 arrangement that best fits the needs of all 10

multinational operations. Accordingly, the MNL C2 structure must be adaptable to meet the needs of any particular operation.

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b. Logistic **Considerations** Command and Control. Regardless of the type of overall multinational command structure, the following general considerations should apply in establishing the MNL C2 structure:

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• The MNFC's authority for logistic matters must be clearly defined in the OPORD and supporting plans.

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• A flexible MNL C2 structure must be established early in the planning cycle national coordinate and multinational logistic operations and support the MNFC's concept of operations.

• MNL C2 activities must be organized on the basis of the operational mission and coordinated with nations to obtain support and manning for the structure. alliances, the MNL C2 structure may be established in peacetime in order to improve contingency planning, participate in exercises, establish manning requirements for actual operations, and serve as an integral component of the operational planning process. (NATO has done this by promulgating MJLC doctrine, core planning manning staffs. identifying augmentation staffing levels, and identifying equipment requirements.) For coalition operations, the MNL C2 structure may not be established in advance. However, in anticipation participating in coalition operations, geographic combatant commanders should establish the capability to coordinate future MNL operations within existing US JTF planning structures/headquarters to facilitate expansion during coalition operations in order to effectively

coordinate logistic support. Effort

must be made to minimize the



Participation of forces from many nations can severely complicate coordination of logistic support.

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potentially adverse affects of last minute, ad hoc MNL support arrangements.

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• The general conditions under which (and the extent to which) the MNFC may redistribute or reallocate logistic resources should be established during the planning phase.

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• The MNL C2 structure must ensure that coordinating mechanisms and established procedures are facilitate linkages with the appropriate operational headquarters, coordinating agencies/headquarters, component commands, and other national headquarters, as appropriate.

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• MNL C2 operations require the use of effective liaison system, consisting of technically skilled logistics representatives.

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c. Multinational Force Commander **Considerations**

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The size and complexity of a multinational operation influence the logistic structure of the force. There is always a need for a logistician on the staff of the MNFC. In particularly large MNL operations, there may be a need an operation-level organization to oversee and integrate common MNL activities. The senior staff logistician (normally referred to as Combined-joint Logistics Officer [CJ-4]), consultation with the determines the need for a supporting MNL C2 organization. Such a need should be identified early during the initial planning, especially if participating nations are anticipated to provide logistic units to the MNFC for use as operational-level forces.

In the case of operations utilizing considerable common support among components, an **MJLC** may established to assist the CJ-4 in executing the operation's logistic support plan. The MJLC, headed by a director, normally consists of functional coordination centers that provide centralized coordination of common support services. In addition, the MJLC, when specific 56 direct and general support relationships are identified and agreed to by appropriate national authorities, may be assigned the responsibility for coordinating the efforts of logistic units provided for common support (i.e., logistic units provided by nations to serve at the theater/operationlevel). In addition, there may also be a need to establish tailored multinational logistic centers (MNLCs) at the component levels to conduct componentlevel coordination. An MNLC often may be established at the maritime component of a multinational operation while relying on the inherent support capabilities of the air and land components for common However, US common-user support. logistics (CUL) is normally accomplished through a designated NSE that is commanded by a Service, not a functional component commander.

The CJ-4 is responsible for developing the initial logistic guidance, planning for the logistic support of the operation, and promulgating logistic policies on behalf of the MNFC. The MJLC director is primarily concerned with implementing the guidance, policies, and plans developed by the CJ-4 and approved by the MNFC. Essentially, the MJLC performs the execution role for the CJ-4, serving as an extension of the CJ-4 staff.

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Some functions, e.g., movement priorities and infrastructure engineering, may not fall under the staff cognizance of the CJ-4. These functions may be organized under other staff sections, e.g., Combined-joint Operations Officer (CJ-3), staff engineer, or staff medical officer. Nonetheless, the CJ-4/MJLC will be involved in coordinating these functions.

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Regardless of the MNL structure developed for an operation, execution of the MNFC's logistic responsibilities should be clearly delineated between the CJ-4 and the MJLC director. overlapping of responsibilities should be minimized to the extent possible.

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4. Logistic Organizations in **Multinational Operations**

a. Organizational Structures

Several possible organization structures exist for the C2 of MNL operations consistent with the various overall C2 structures described in JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations. The MNL C2 organization established for an operation must complement and be integral to the operation's overall C2

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• Type of operation (e.g., MOOTW or MTW)

structure. Use of a particular MNL C2

model is based upon several factors:

• Size of operation area

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• Number of contributing/participating nations

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• Number of components involved

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 Availability and types of HNS available

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• Complexity of the operation.

Figure II-1 depicts a model MNL C2 49 structure and indicates the command, 50 control, and coordinating relationships that exist among the various elements. The 52 concept for this model works with any of 53 the overall C2 variations. This overall 54 model can apply across the spectrum of 55 multinational operations, from MOOTWs 56 through MTWs. The key components of this model are an MJLC, an MNLC for the 57 maritime 58 component, and **NSEs** supporting respective national contingents. 60 For coalition operations, standardization agreements may already be concluded to determine the organization arrangements 62 required, depending on who the coalition 63 64 partners are. Within the American-65 British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) Standardization Program, the participants 66 have agreed to an Army logistic organization structure for coalition operations that consist of two or more of

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the ABCA nations.

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Figure II-2 depicts the modular MJLC that can be tailored to meet the needs of the overall MNL C2 structure. The figure depicts the composition of the MJLC as including centralized coordination centers for engineering (ECC), joint transportation control (JTCC), medical (MEDCC), activities theater contracting office (TACO), HNS activities (HNSCC), and the joint logistics coordination center (JLCC) coordinates most CUL issues. Alternative organization structures may developed; the key is the centralized coordination of common functions.

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Functionally oriented coordination centers are established to provide of coordination these centralized functions. Key to the success of these centers is their early establishment and staffing with functionally skilled personnel.

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


Figure II-1. Multinational Logistic Command and Control Relationships




Figure II-2. Model Multinational Joint Logistics Command Structure

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LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT MULTINATIONAL JOINT LOGISTICS FROM OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Lessons are bountiful from the first NATO out-of-sector experience. The magnitude of the challenge — from organizing a headquarters vision, to designing a theater deployment, sustainment, and initial redeployment package, to the execution of the plan — is mind boggling. There were no similar NATO operations for comparison. The staff of the NATO Commander for Support (C-SPT) in Joint Endeavor had to learn through trial and error, but being able to address mistakes without outside interference was a rare opportunity. C-SPT was initially successful primarily because of good men and women who had spent the better part of a year together coming to grips with multinational logistics. NATO would not go out-of-sector for the first time and fail on their watch; teamwork and personal pride were in-grained.

Multinational logistics, NATO, and C-SPT dodged the proverbial bullet in Joint Endeavor. Few understood the C-SPT role or how to measure its performance. The only line between success and failure early on was the thin façade of the unknown, behind which we labored diligently to solve issues never before confronted by NATO.

A concern for future NATO operations is that success breeds higher expectations for next time. Unfortunately, without a standing logistics headquarters, a benign theater, and a dedication to institutionalizing the logistic lessons learned from Joint Endeavor, replicating C-SPT's success is questionable. Logistics is a national responsibility. Nevertheless, national logistics have shortcomings in joint, combined, multinational, and alliance environments, especially when service and commodity contracts, ports, and facilities are managed and controlled by a theater logistics command. Theater logistic synergies appear to be optimized by centralized instead of national control of certain funds, services, contracts, and assets. In a multinational logistic operation, such a command can return huge dividends — to the advantage of participants.

Much remains to be accomplished in the diverse and misunderstood world of multinational logistics. Any military scenario that is not dedicated to optimization and mutual synergy — that is, derived from proven or potential multinational logistic practices such as collective bargaining for outsourcing and contracting, common funding, centralized support services, and reduced manpower requirements — squanders precious resources. A NATO commitment to move away from ad hoc planning and operations would be a major step toward optimizing logistic support. Depending on piecemeal logistics is like relying on a bank account with no balance. No commitment can be made from the account without first making a deposit. Someone once said that good logistics alone cannot win a war but that bad logistics can lose one. US and NATO policies suggest a heavy future reliance on multinational logistics. A concerted effort must be made now to get it right.

SOURCE: MG William N. Farmen, USA (Ret.), NATO logistics commander during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, published in *Joint Forces Quarterly*

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NATO has approved staffing levels for the generic MJLC that include a standing nucleus of core personnel for initial planning and augmentation staffing to meet logistic needs. Exact augmentation requirements — to which the United States, in all likelihood would contribute — are determined upon tailoring of the MJLC staff for specific operations.

Figure II-2 also depicts the relationship of the director of the MJLC to either the logistic units provided by nations to provide theater/operational-level logistic support or unit contributions from two or more nations to form MILUs to also support operation-level logistic operations. MILUs may also be established to directly support specific components, in which case the MILU is OPCON to the component commander.

b. Employment Considerations

The type of operation (MOOTW or MTW) significantly impacts the concept of logistic operation and the specific C2 organization implemented. Within an alliance, such as NATO, the existing regional command structure with its CJTF and organic logistic organizations, in conjunction with host nation military and civil authorities, coordinates logistic operations. The MJLC is a staff agency intended to provide the means for supporting participating nations, commands, and other organization during NATO operations using the CJTF concept.

Within the overall C2 organization, the MJLC is considered a module that may be flexibly adapted to different requirements and C2 structures, as the situation dictates. In principle, the MJLC can be employed as any of the following:

- Augmentation to the CJ-4's staff, especially during initial planning or for smaller operations of limited duration
- A separate staff section within the CJ-4 organization
- A separate organization integrated in
 or collocated with the MNFC
 headquarters (HQ) or other
 supporting HQ

 A module placed within a component command.

The option chosen depends on the specifics of a particular operation. In most cases, it is likely that the MJLC will be established separately under CJ-4 cognizance.

If established, the mission of the MJLC is to coordinate, and when specifically designated by national authority, control the logistic activities of designated organizations in order to support the MNFC. These activities may include the following:

 Coordinating support between the NSEs, components, and host nations and interfacing with the CMOC regarding logistic support associated with IOs/NGOs/PVOs, especially through the use of liaison staffs

 Coordinating development and implementation of HNS agreements with nations

 Coordinating provisioning of common supplies and services, as authorized by the contributing nations

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45 46 When specifically authorized by national authority, tasking, on behalf of the MNFC, MILUs or other national logistic units dedicated to providing theater/operational-level support.

c. Operational Level Support Elements

• National Support Element

•• General. A NSE is any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are part of a multinational force. NSEs serve as the intermediary between the strategic level of logistic support from nations to their forces at the tactical level and to coordinate and consolidate CUL functions. Routinely, the US Service component of a joint force which has the preponderance of the lead Service CUL responsibilities (normally the Army), would be designated the US NSE responsible to provide CUL support in multinational operations. In situations where there is no lead Service with sufficient capabilities to perform NSE and multinational (MN) CUL functions, the geographic combatant commander may authorize the establishment of a subordinate logistically focused JTF that would be designated as the US NSE. A site may be designated an advanced logistics support site (ALSS), a forward logistic site (FLS) in maritime operations, or intermediate staging base (ISB) for a land operation. If previously agreed upon through bilateral/multilateral agreements, an ALSS may be a multinational logistic activity supporting maritime forces of several nations. In that case, the ALSS would be subordinate to the MNLC (maritime), if established.

•• Functions. An NSE (ALSS or ISB) provides multifunctional logistic support, including supply, maintenance, transportation, health services. customs and border engineering, clearance, environmental, and contracting and may provide a hedge against enemy interdiction of support capabilities/assets. Planning for the establishment of an ALSS/ISB must be accomplished as early as possible and is critical to the balancing of requirements determined to be necessary by the MNFC with the capabilities made available by the nations involved in the operation. NSEs should possess the following characteristics: (1) The capability of handling, receiving, storing. consolidating, recouping, and forwarding personnel, mail, materiel, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), and ammunition to all units within the operational area or retrograde to the strategic industrial base of each nation. (2) The availability of, or arrangement for easy access to, health services capabilities to accept, treat, and hold casualties until returned to duty or evacuated to national health systems. (3) Access to basic ship repair capabilities (for an ALSS). Access to US and foreign contractors to include express mail delivery (5) Communications contractors. with **MNFC** for reporting information.

•• Location. NSEs are usually located within an operation's designated COMMZ. In today's nonlinear battle space, NSEs are

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located geographically to best support the force and sited to take advantage of air, rail, and/or sea lines of communications (LOCs). Since the MJLC usually has real estate management responsibility, especially in the COMMZ, nations desiring to locate NSEs in the MNFC's AOR must coordinate with both the MJLC and the host nation for final site approval. This is critical in those areas with limited air and sea ports of debarkation with several nations competing for limited available space or facilities. NSEs from several nations may be collocated achieve economies efficiencies. Less logistically robust nations may find it especially advantageous to form a combined NSE. Such arrangements are formalized through an appropriate MOU signed at the national level. The MOU often identifies national staffing requirements, provides common funding for operations (e.g., facility leases and establishes cost sharing criteria).

•• Command Relationships. NSEs are national activities that remain of under control However, authorities. command relationship may exist in

one of several ways. (1) The US NSE will normally be under direct command of a US Service component commander (e.g., NSE Army based, attached or assigned to the Army

commander). forces (2) exceptional cases, the US NSE may

be a logistically focused JTF OPCON'd to the senior commander (e.g., Army based

logistically focused JTF OPCON'd to a Marine Corps based JTF).

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Regardless of the national command relationship that may exist, NSEs are expected to coordinate and cooperate fully with both the appropriate MNL C2 organization and the host nation. It is incumbent upon the NSEs to provide liaison personnel to such C2 organizations as the MJLC in order to establish and maintain appropriate relationships. In those cases where the MJLC can only exercise the MNFC's coordinating authority, NSE commanders are expected to coordinate appropriate activities with the MJLC.

• Forward Logistic Site

- •• When utilized in support of maritime operations, a FLS is located closer to the supported force than the ALSS. These sites may be multinational, serving the maritime forces of all nations operating within a prescribed area. These sites are manned either multinationally with individual nation contributions of personnel and equipment or by a LN assigned to provide designated support to the forces. Although the FLS works very closely with the ALSS, the FLS is subordinate the **MNLC** to (Maritime).
- •• The FLS is normally the final land transshipment and distribution hub for personnel, mail, and other forms of logistic support. For this reason, the FLS must be linked to the ALSS by intratheater airlift. It should be capable of receiving personnel, mail, and cargo (PMC) from an ALSS or nations and forwarding the PMC to afloat units either by helicopter or carrier-on-board delivery. It may also include a medical support capability to accept,

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CJ-4 staff,

and

respectively.

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stabilize, and hold battle casualties until returned to duty or evacuated into national health systems in accordance with the theater/national evacuation policy. While it is most likely that the FLS will be located ashore, it is possible that a ship with appropriate capabilities can serve as an FLS.

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5. Functional Area Coordination

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a. General. Areas such as general supply and maintenance do not easily lend themselves to coordinated activity by the MNFC. However, there are certain logistic functions and operations that impact an operation that require total visibility of requirements, capabilities, and execution, e.g., movements control. These functions are those that apply throughout the operational area, require prioritization for execution, use limited resources, and facilitate the leveraging of volume procurements. There are four functional activities in which these characteristics are usually found in any operation: movement control, infrastructure improvements, health support, and contracting.

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The necessity for activation, organization, and staffing of each center must be evaluated for each operation. In some instances, due to the relatively small size of the force, there may be a need for only one center, while the other functions can be performed either by members of the logistic staff or delegated to one of the components.

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• Organizational Location. The organizational location of the coordination centers varies based upon the function. The centers may be formed as part of an expanded 53 54 55

> • Staffing. These centers should be staffed with qualified representatives from as many participating nations as possible. NATO has established a generic staffing plan for its MJLCs. staffing However, should be determined for each operation to meet specific requirements.

as separate entities

MJLC.

staffs,

reporting to the CJ-4, or as modules

Normally, the JLCC, HNSCC, and

TACO are integral to a MJLC.

However, the ECC and MEDCC may

be extensions of the theater engineer

surgeon

within an established

theater

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b. Incorporation of US Theater **Management Logistic Considerations in** Multinational Operations. Chapter I, paragraph 1e, JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, describes the unique logistic aspects of participating in multinational operations. In alliance operations, US forces are guided by previously agreed upon provisions of alliance processes and procedures. In the case of US-led coalitions, the US JFC is encouraged to expand upon the tools available for managing joint logistic operations and adapt them to the multinational environment. These options include using a predominant Service organization, such as the Army's theater support command, as the nucleus operational logistic activity to manage common requirements. The JFC may expand the logistic readiness center, and 88 make use of the executive agency role of a Service. In this regard, the US MNFC may place increased emphasis upon CUL support and use of an integrated logistic force. To the extent feasible, the US MNFC should strive to use improved communications and modern technology

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to integrate the logistic reporting and information systems of participating nations. The challenge is to gain visibility of the logistic requirements and status of the total force. Enhanced logistic connectivity may be difficult to achieve because of the differences in technological sophistication among participants.

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• The US MNFC is responsible for establishing the MNL organization for US-led operations. In coordinating MNL activities, US MNFCs should consider establishing an MJLC modeled on Figure II-2, "Model Multinational Joint Logistics Command Structure." Given the modularity of the model MJLC, its organization can be tailored to satisfy an operation's overall logistic coordination requirements. Staffing for an operation can be achieved by levying augmentation requirements upon participating nations. nucleus for such an organization may be available through personnel currently staffing logistic readiness centers and/or from other logistic commands not anticipated participate in the operation as a unit. The extent to which geographic combatant commanders conduct logistic exercises with prospective regional allies can facilitate establishment of an MJLC-like The JFC logistician organization. (Directorate for Logistics, Joint Staff [J-4]) exercises authority for the full range of logistic functions described in JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, and supported by the appropriate joint boards and centers. Each component provides its own logistic support under the logistic policies and guidance and procedures established by the JFC J-4 and approved by the JTF commander.

- The JFC assigns responsibility for specific common functions to the component commanders. Examples include the assignment of the common-user land transportation function to the Army component.
- If the US Joint Task Force (USJTF) is employed as an entity within a multinational operation, necessary coordination must exist between the US and the MNL staff C2 organizations.

c. Movement Control. A variety of organizations may be established or used to manage, control, and coordinate strategic and operational movement for multinational operations. In the case of NATO, an allied movement coordination center (AMCC) is established at both NATO strategic commands (SC). The AMCC is responsible for management of strategic movement. The AMCC coordinates national plans for deployment, transportation for sustainment (resupply), and redeployment into multinational plans and resolves strategic lift shortfalls in cooperation with nations and civil agencies. The AMCC deconflicts national detailed deployment plans (DDPs) in order to meet the force generation priorities of the MNFC.

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At the operational level, the MNFC may establish a **multinational movement coordination center (MMCC)** that coordinates and controls movement into/out of the theater. The MMCC may be located at the MNFC headquarters, under the staff cognizance of either the CJ-3 or CJ-4, or in the MJLC if established. (This is a crucial C2 decision for the MNFC, with justifiable arguments for either assignment.)

95 Outside of NATO operations, the 96 MMCC also performs the functions of the

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AMCC. During termination and redeployment, the MMCC ensures the smooth execution of the redeployment plan. If operating in a host nation that has 4 5 functioning national movement coordination center (NMCC), the MMCC must coordinate with the NMCC. In such 7 cases, the MMCC is often collocated with the NMCC. During NATO operations, a joint theater movement section may be established by the MNFC, under either the CJ-3 or CJ-4, to develop movement 12 directives and plans and to prioritize movement requirements to meet the MNFC's required delivery dates. 15 16

In US-led coalition operations, the MNFC's movement control concept is usually an extension of US joint doctrine, as discussed in JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, JP 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control*, and JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.

To assure an effective interface between intertheater and intratheater air mobility forces, the Commander, Air Force component Forces/joint force air commander will normally establish a director mobility of forces (DIRMOBFOR) to coordinate and inter- and intratheater integrate air mobility operations through the mobility division within combined/joint air operations center. Organizations such as a regional air movement coordination center (RAMCC), under the DIRMOBFOR, may established and collocated with a combined air operations center (if established). The MMCC should provide a liaison to the RAMCC to facilitate interagency coordination and cooperation.

Within a NATO MJLC, a JTCC may be established. This JTCC coordinates with

49 the other movement control organizations, 50 but focuses primarily on managing intratheater movements tasking/controlling any 52 transportation assets provided 53 for operation-level 54 movement. Because of its relationship to other logistic activities, it is highly 55 desirable that the JTCC be located in the 57 MJLC.

58 59 Staffing. The MMCC and JTCC 60 require a diversity of skilled personnel in all modes 61 62 transportation, including both military and commercial transportation and 63

the associated infrastructure.

• Information Requirements. Information is vitally important to the effectiveness of the MMCC organization. Thus, information reporting requirements must be carefully developed and communications and automated management systems must be readily available to support the MMCC. Given the important role of this center, attention must be given to ensuring the quality and timeliness of the data flow. The information flow includes not only requirements and capabilities, but must also provide visibility of the movement status. This in-transit visibility provides the necessary means to track the identity, status, and location of assets, from origin to destination, across the range of multinational operations and is critical to managing those assets and delivering them to the required points of application.

 Operations. The MMCC collects movements requirements, for inbound/outbound, intertheater and intratheater requirements, and prioritizes such requirements against

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movement capabilities of all modes available in theater. Taskings are then issued to appropriate transportation mode operators for execution.

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• Supporting Activities. The MMCC operates at the MNFC/CJTF level in the operation. There may be a need to establish similar centers within subordinate multinational or national elements, such as a joint movement center under a US JFC. Additional centers may be required and established where the responsibility for the geographic area is subdivided among subordinate commands. In this case, there needs to be linkages developed between and among the MMCC and subordinate movement coordination activities.

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d. Infrastructure Engineering. Overall engineering coordination within a operation multinational is responsibility of the theater engineer, a special staff officer under the MNFC. The theater engineer's primary role is to effect centralized direction and decentralized execution of the infrastructure engineering effort and to ensure a unified and efficient use of the force's engineering resources. To assist the theater engineer, an ECC may be established, with liaison detachments with key participating nations or at critical geographic locations in the operational area. Personnel staffing the ECC should be skilled in base and infrastructure development, including real estate and facility management.

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The relationship between a coordination center and the theater engineer must be clearly delineated within the appropriate support plans. A primary purpose of the ECC is to provide development and execution of multinational engineering, environmental,

49 and public works projects. In the case of
50 an alliance, these centralized coordinated
51 projects may be funded using the
52 alliance's common funding mechanism.
53 For coalitions, a centralized fund may be
54 established to fund such projects.

The ECC provides the link between the 56 57 MNFC's priorities and the engineering function as reflected in the theater engineer plan. In MOOTW there is often a premium placed on developing 60 or repairing the infrastructure within the 61 operational area. The ECC obtains 62 requirements for engineering work that 63 encompasses two or more geographic 64 commands/components 65 or in instances where subordinate multinational 66 67 commands have either an 68 emergency requirement or inadequate resources necessary to perform required 69 work If a US joint civil-military 70 71 engineering board has been established, it 72 should coordinate closely with the ECC. 73 The ECC, through its access to engineer forces provided for operation-level 74 support (when available), contractor 75 support, and/or HNS can either satisfy the requirement or reprioritize existing 77 projects where possible. In accomplishing 78 79 its assigned tasks, this center must coordinate closely with the JLCC, the 80 81 JTCC, the TACO, and the financial (budget and fiscal) elements. 82

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• Staffing. Personnel assigned to this center should be skilled in appropriate engineering skills and functions. To the extent possible, appropriate engineer resource specialists should represent each nation involved in the operation and are able to commit their nation's financial resources, monitor the funding process and oversee execution processes when needed. In the case of an alliance, the EEC may be augmented by military and civilian specialists, such as from the Engineer

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Centers (Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency [AFCESA], Air Force Civil Engineer Element, or other). These specialists are the most familiar with the required specialized construction, demolition or other engineering specifications and Visa and access to procedures. overseas locations of ECC must be assured to both military and civilian members of the ECC.

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• Information Requirements. The ECC requires a standardized project management software, which includes the ability to estimate, cost, and monitor project status which includes contractors' capability to support operational requirements. There is also a need for a reliable communications link with potential customers through which a clear definition of requirements and funding information may be made available.

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• Operations. The ECC and its regional/component subordinate offices must develop and maintain close contact with potential contractors, operational customers, other coordination centers, and staff elements such as the command legal counsel and the budget and finance offices.

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e. Contracting. Contracting is an essential element of logistic support, especially in multinational operations. Contingency contracting operations available provide locally supplies, services, and construction capability in immediate support of deployed units, at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward operating locations. (See Chapter III, "Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements," for fuller description of

48 contracting activities.) The need to 49 coordinate contracting activities is 50 especially important during MOOTW when locally available supplies and 51 resources may be very limited and the 53 disjointed unilateral competition for 54 such resources could result in bidding 55 up the cost of those services. commanders are guided by US laws and the FAR in obtaining contractor services. 57

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The use of contractor services can play a very important role in the economic health within the countries where the conducted. operation is being **Centralized coordination of contracting** efforts is essential to provide the necessary controls to ensure that the MNFC's priorities are satisfied. centralizing coordination of contracting efforts maximum benefits are derived from volume procurements, competition is optimized, price escalation is avoided between nations and components, and the opportunities for local black market operations are minimized. To accomplish these objectives, the MNFC may establish a centralized contracting coordination center, sometimes known as the TACO.

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The establishment of this center is not intended to usurp the contracting prerogatives of any nation; rather it relies on each nation to perform its own procurements while relying on the center to arrange for the procurement of goods and services that are in limited supply within the operation area or are commonly needed by the entire force (or more than one component). These commonly needed goods and services may include food, fuel, lodging, labor, construction materials, facilities, and transportation. The center is also useful to deconflict competing national requirements for limited, in-theater resources. In these

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cases, the MNFC usually publishes a **restricted items list.** The restricted items list identifies those critical and limited supplies and services within the operation area, the procurement of which must be coordinated with the TACO.

• Staffing. Personnel assigned to this

should be skilled procurement functions. To the extent possible, the personnel should represent each nation involved in the operation and warranted to commit their nation's financial resources, In the case of an when needed. alliance. the TACO may procurement augmented by contracting specialists, such as from the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). These specialists are the most familiar with the alliance's specific technical contracting and

procurement procedures.

- Information Requirements. A data base of goods and services available in the operational area, as well as contractors' capability to support operational requirements, must be developed. There is also a need for a reliable communications link with all potential customers through which a clear definition of requirements and funding information may be made available.
- Operations. The TACO and its regional/component subordinate offices must develop and maintain close contact with potential contractors, operational customers, other coordination centers (especially the HNSCC), and staff elements such as the command legal counsel and the budget and finance offices.

f. Health Service Support

• General

• Nations ultimately are responsible for providing health service support (HSS) for their Because of its sensitivity, nations strive to rely on national resources for providing HSS to their forces to the maximum extent. Nonetheless, opportunities exist to rationalize HSS within a multinational operation. However, differences in medical standards, customs, and careful training require consideration in planning multinational medical support. The exchange of blood and blood products between nations is an especially sensitive issue.

Additional guidance may be found in JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Services Support, JP 4-02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support Logistics in Joint Operations, and JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

•• Even where nations may share a common view regarding the care and treatment of casualties, nations differ in the standards used in providing care to their forces. These differences must be clearly understood by US medical planners during their participation multinational operational planning. US medical planners should assess the HSS capabilities of all nations participating in a multinational operation as early as possible in the planning process. Unique

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requirements and capabilities must be evaluated realistically to ensure the most robust HSS capability for the total force. While collaboration in the area of HSS among the various nations is desirable, US planners must clearly understand the terms and conditions of such efforts. In the event of critical HSS shortfalls, medical planners must apprise the MNFC of the situation along with recommendations for resolution.

- •• US commanders must be apprised of the legal limitations concerning the use of non-US medical treatment facilities and supplies, especially blood, by US forces. The commander must also be apprised of limitations of providing medical care or supplies to non-US Mutual medical support forces. must be in accordance with existing To exchange legal authorities. support participants among requires prearranged agreements, especially an ACSA for obtaining support from the United States.
- •• The MNFC must ensure that health care planners consider veterinary services and preventive medicine when developing a full health care plan for a multinational operation.

• Operational Considerations

•• There is no set pattern of demand that allows a prescription of the type of HSS that will be most needed to overcome potential HSS shortfalls within a multinational force. US HSS personnel involved in planning US support of a

multinational operation must tailor their support to the specific operation. During the planning phase, the estimate of the situation must not only include an evaluation of the HSS capability required to provide quality support to US forces but consider supporting other nations as well. Under certain circumstances, the US may accept RSN designation to provide medical care to other forces, especially those operating directly with US forces in a multinational force; in other situations, the US may be expected to provide HSS within a geographic area as part of fulfilling LN responsibilities.

- •• To assist HSS planners, a data base of HSS support capabilities of nations that are considered to be potential partners for the US in multinational operations should be Such a data bank developed. would be most useful to the US medical planners involved in developing the HSS portion of multinational OPLANs. This data base should outline the HSS capabilities of the nation(s) within the US area of operations, while, at the same time, identifying the HSS capabilities of prospective partners.
- •• Since multinational forces are quite often structured along component (land, maritime, air, special forces) lines, HSS planners must determine the methods by which quality HSS can be provided to the individual component(s) that include US forces.
- •• The potential HSS support areas in which the US may be able to provide support to coalition partners

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include the following: (1) Class VIII medical supplies; (2) Veterinary services; (3) Medical laboratory services; (4) Optical fabrication; (5) Medical equipment; (6) Preventive medicine; (7) Casualty evacuation (ground/air).

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• Evacuation

•• The MNFC establishes the overall medical evacuation policy in consideration of the policies of the participating nations. The availability and type of transport assets, the length of the evacuation route, and the operational environment determine the size and capability of medical facilities at intermediate levels. Medical evacuation assets are key logistic assets to be provided by nations.

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• Aeromedical evacuation has proven to be the quickest and most desirable form of casualty movement. casualty evacuation ultimately a national responsibility, opportunities for multinational cooperation either through LN or RSN designations should be considered during the planning process. As with many logistic areas, the advantages of efficient and effective casualty evacuation through multinational cooperation may be obtained through such initiatives.

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• Medical Coordination Center

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•• A centralized MEDCC may be established to work under the technical direction of the theater surgeon. This center is designed to coordinate multinational, joint, and multifunctional medical

issues, including aeromedical The center is not evacuation. intended to usurp the individual nation's responsibility providing quality health care to its members, rather it is to ensure that where and when necessary, medical care and facilities are available to assist in the event emergencies exceed an individual nation's capabilities in the operational area. One of its purposes is to determine opportunities to rationalize HSS in terms of individual medical facilities. disciplines, and transport. The center facilitates coordination of HSS regionalization, initiatives. standardization and interoperability, review of medical support plans, and integration with the overall operation. Apart from the (1) Staffing. administrative and clerical personnel needed to support center activities, each person should be a skilled health services practitioner. Ideally, representation should be provided by each nation participating in the operation. (2) Information Requirements. This center depends on information. critical and timely Information needed includes a clear definition of the description of emergency medical requirements and the location of need. A clear picture of the HSS capabilities of participating nations must be developed, shortfalls identified (primarily prior to force deployment), and the need determined for Role 3 level medical facilities to supplement national in-theater Role 1 and 2 medical capabilities (see Figure The MEDCC depends on situation reports provided by all elements of the MNF in order to ensure that adequate medical/dental capability is available where and

when needed particularly in the case

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


Figure II-3. Levels of Medical Capabilities

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of crises or where national capabilities are inadequate to meet requirements. These reports may be supplemented by MEDCC staff

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- visits. Of critical importance is the absolute need for an accurate patient tracking system. Medical
 - information connectivity must exist

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between the MEDCC, national elements, and all members of the medical technical chain. (3) Coordinating Activities. The MEDCC coordinates closely with the MMCC and JTCC, as appropriate, for transportation assistance, with the TACO for contractor support when required, with the ECC particularly for facility construction requirements, and with the JLCC for needed logistic The MEDCC must support. coordinate closely with the HNSCC and CMOC regarding the availability of local civil medical resources to supplement military HSS capabilities. (4) **Operations.** Prior to and during actual operations, the MEDCC performs six important functions: (a) determine the medical "robustness" of prospective participating nations: (b) execute the overall theater medical structure in coordination with the theater surgeon, including rationalization of Role 3 medical facilities; (c) certify the adequacy of local civil medical/dental resources to meet MNF standards; (d) coordinate the medical evacuation of casualties; (e) establish veterinary procedures to ensure quality food storage, distribution, and preparation; and (f) plan and execute a preventive medicine program to reduce or eliminate nonbattle casualties. All six functions are vitally important.

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In the first instance, MNF HSS planners must determine the ability of prospective participants to provide medical capabilities for the operation. Participating nations are expected to provide organic Role 1 and Role 2 medical capabilities. If nations are unable to provide Role 2 capabilities, alternative sources of

46 **support must be determined** and the 47 involved nations entered into either 48 bilateral or multilateral agreements for that 49 support.

Secondly, HSS planners must develop operation's overall the medical architecture. Of critical importance is the determination of the number, size, capabilities, location, and source of Role 3 Two important medical facilities. determinants for this planning are (1) the expected number and type of casualties and (2) the operation evacuation policy. This is especially important since it determines operation's medical "footprint." The result also determines the Role 3 facilities required at the theater level. Sourcing of Role 3 medical capabilities is especially critical.

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The MEDCC is very involved in certifying the adequacy of host nation resources to meet MNF standards of treatment or care, thereby contributing to the theater medical architecture. The certification process depends upon local conditions. Often, medical certification is part of the formal HNS process.

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Coordination of the medical evacuation of casualties from the theater is the most important routine operation of the MEDCC during an **operation**. The MEDCC coordinates with national elements, the medical facility from which the evacuation will occur (either at the theater or component level), the evacuation providers, and the MMCC that will coordinate the actual movement of the casualties. Close coordination with appropriate national liaison personnel is extremely critical during this entire process.

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Chapter II

g. Host-Nation Support

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The identification, availability, and use of HNS may be critical to the success of a multinational operation. The availability of HNS is a key factor in logistic support planning as it may determine the size and scope of support required for the operation. availability of HNS agreements, MOUs, and other bilateral or multilateral agreements to obtain HNS needs to be considered in early plan development. In the case of NATO, available HNS may be relatively well-known because of its formal HNS program. This may not be the case for ICR provided by nations that do not have formal prearranged HNS agreements.

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The MNFC and the logistic staff must have a clear understanding of logistic assets available within the operational area. Assets potentially available to the are the logistics civilian MNFC augmentation program (LOGCAP) and the Air Force contract augmentation program (AFCAP) contractors. contractors generate and maintain data bases on the availability of materiels and services worldwide. Information regarding LOGCAP is available to the MNFC (and the logistic staff) through the Army Service Component Command LOGCAP contracting agency, the US Army Materiel Command. Information regarding AFCAP is available through the HQ AFCESA at Tyndall AFB, FL. Their website is www.afcesa.mil.

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In NATO, the NAMSA serves as a logistic support agency whose mission is to provide logistic services in peacetime and wartime in support of weapons systems and equipment held in common by NATO nations. The NAMSA maintains a data base concerning potential suppliers and contractors for spare parts,

maintenance, and services focused on 50 weapon systems and other equipment. NATO nations are not obliged to use 52 NAMSA for support of their military 53 equipment. However, where 54 collaborative approach proves to be more cost effective than individual nations 55 supporting their own equipment, it is in 56 their interest to do so. NATO is currently 57 58 studying the feasibility of providing a data base of military contractors capable of 59 supporting NATO forces during 60 61 operations.

A significant logistic consideration of the MNFC at the outset of an operation is HNS, and the extent of existing HNS agreements and/or the need for supplementary arrangements. Knowledge and coordination of activities relative to the spectrum of HNS available to support an operation can be accomplished by a centralized HNSCC.

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• Staffing. The HNSCC should be staffed with specialists familiar with developing and executing HNS agreements. In addition, consideration should be given to including representatives of the host nation within the HNSCC to facilitate coordination and identification of resources for potential use by the MNF and to provide interpretation and translation services to the MNL staff.

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Operations. In the case of NATO, formalized HNS agreements have been developed with nations, which may need to be augmented for a particular operation. Appropriate subordinate commands are responsible for regional planning and the negotiation of more detailed TAs. TAs may be required in all disciplines, including infrastructure,

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finance, purchasing and contracting, engineering, environment, hazardous material storage, landing and port fees, medical, border customs, tariffs, and real estate. NATO is the final approving authority for TAs.

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• In a coalition, HNS agreements or TAs have not usually been concluded. In any multinational operation, HNS arrangements concerning the use of available ICR may need to be concluded with the appropriate national agencies. ICR utilization is usually unplanned support that may be available within the operational area. The HNSCC may be heavily involved with developing such arrangements, in conjunction with appropriate legal counsel

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• Coordinating Activities. In conducting its the operations, HNSCC works closely with appropriate CMOC organizations and the MJLC TACO. The HNSCC includes an ICR section and coordinates with the national components as they identify HNS or ICR requirements.

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h. Other Logistic Operations

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In most multinational operations, there is a requirement to establish an office to coordinate general logistic operations on a theater-wide basis and those areas not within the province of the specific functional centralized coordination centers. This office, the JLCC, coordinates and manages sustainment and services support operations within the operational area. This center is designed to provide oversight of the logistic posture of the It also monitors the logistic functions of food, fuel and fuel services,

- maintenance, and recovery operations and 50 assists where possible to resolve conflicts or priority issues on behalf of the MNFC. 51 52 The JLCC may also manage the 53 operation's overall petroleum resource; manage environment, property, and real estate matters; coordinate 55 support functions with LNs, RSNs, IOs, NGOs, 56 PVOs, NSEs, and the components; and 57 exercise tasking authority for assigned 59 operation-level logistic units.
 - Staffing. This center should be staffed with experienced logisticians from several nations with functional expertise, particularly in supply and maintenance operations, fuels and fuel management, and ration management. From a strictly US perspective, consideration should be given to including representatives from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
 - Information Requirements. Reporting requirements formats must be established in the logistic support plan. Adequate and information is critical. Reporting requirements must focus on the critical information required at respective command levels. Forces must cooperate in providing timely and accurate information. MNFC must have visibility of the MNF overall logistic situation. The JLCC is the proponent for logistic information gathering for the MNFC.
 - i. Supply, Maintenance, and Repair. In general, supply, maintenance, and repair operations during multinational operations continue to be primarily national responsibilities. Because of the diversity among national forces for supply, maintenance, and repair requirements, there are limited opportunities to integrate these activities on a multinational level.

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There may be occasions when nations participating in an operation are using equipment procured from another participating nation. Logistic planners should identify equipment similarities among participating nations during the planning or force generation process. In these situations, operation planners should be apprised of such considerations in

assigning forces to specific commands or 10 11 areas. Logistic planners should encourage nations to develop bilateral 12 13 or multilateral agreements among 14 participants to mutually benefit from 15 sharing, combining, or integrating these activities. It is possible that the logistic 16 footprint of participating nations may be 17

18 reduced by such initiatives.

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CHAPTER III MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

"The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to "win" across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and international organizations. . . . Mutual support relationships and collaborative planning will enable optimum cooperation with multinational and interagency partners."

Joint Vision 2020

10 1. General

Normally, MNFs are supported through of 13 a combination national 14 multinational sources. To ease individual national burdens and achieve economies of scale, nations may supplement purely national support by participating in one or more of the multinational logistic support arrangements listed in Figure

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These support arrangements, which overlap to some extent, can implemented at different levels of command and to different degrees for any given type of operation, from the entire range of MOOTW through MTW. The MNFC may play a key role in developing and implementing these arrangements and should be closely involved in providing policy guidance and integrating such support arrangements into the operation's overall logistic organization. For the States, like United other nations, participation in multinational support arrangements remains a national decision and that must be undertaken in accordance with applicable legal authorities. US legal and procedural requirements for MNL operations are discussed in paragraph 4 below and in Appendix C, "Relevant 42 Legal Authorities for US Logistic Support in Multinational Operations."



Figure III-1. Multinational Logistic **Support Arrangements**

45 2. Multinational Logistic **Support Arrangements** 46

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48 a. Lead Nation Logistic Support. Under the LN concept, one nation agrees

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to assume responsibility for procuring or providing a range of logistic support services to either all or part of a multinational force. Such services may include transportation, medical support, rear area security, engineering, and 7 movement control.

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Often, LN assignments are based upon geographic considerations. For example, a COMMZ area may be divided into sectors with LN responsibilities assigned to the major significant force in that area. Thus, more than one LN may service an operation based upon the division of geographic areas.

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Commanders designated to assume LN responsibilities must coordinate logistic support for forces within their geographically assigned limits. Appropriate liaison must be maintained with the LN. And LNs, if within the geographic responsibility of the MJLC, must coordinate activity with the MJLC and its centralized coordination centers.

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b. Role Specialist Nation Logistic Support. Under RSN arrangements, one nation assumes responsibility providing a particular class of supply or service for all or part of a MNF, usually at

33 a determined rate of reimbursement. This option should be strongly considered 34

35 when a participating nation possesses

unique logistic strengths. The major 36

difference between RSN and LN is that 37

the RSN arrangements usually are 38 single-item/single-service oriented, while

the LNs are concerned with providing 40

41 or coordinating multiple services within

42 designated geographic regions. 43

> Possible items or services for RSN include strategic lift, contracting services, fuel management and provisioning, real estate management, hazardous waste disposal, and aeromedical evacuation. **Prospective RSNs** should be approached early in the planning of an operation, since considerable time may be required in obtaining national approval for such designation.

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Because of its robust logistic 56 capabilities, the United States may often be asked to accept RSN responsibilities for particular services. If so requested, geographic combatant commanders should coordinate the request with appropriate US agencies, forwarding a

formal request to the Joint Staff for



Long distance airlift of military equipment is an important factor in logistic planning.

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Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements

and appropriate action decision. Because of the impact this decision may have on the logistic posture of an operation, such a request should be expeditiously transmitted and acted upon. Acceptance of RSN responsibilities may be crucial for the initial stages of an There should be financial, operation. management, or force structure benefits accruing from using an RSN arrangement. For example, serving as an RSN for one logistic function may be used as a basis 12 for obtaining support from other nations in another functional area, thus reducing the amount of US logistic support forces to be provided within the operational area. 16

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c. **Pooling.** One of the most effective ways for nations to leverage logistic capabilities in a multinational operation is through pooling of assets. Nations may place national assets within a loosely coordinated and organized pool for MNFC tasking, or nations may decide to participate in a **MILU**. A MILU results when two or more nations agree to provide logistic assets to a multinational logistic force under the OPCON of a multinational commander for the logistic support of a MNF. Nations contributing to the MILU

31 may divide responsibilities — with one 32 nation providing a HQ (for example) while other nations provide functional logistic support units. MILUs offer the opportunity for smaller nations, which may lack fully capable logistic units, to 36 contribute meaningfully to the logistic 37 support of a multinational operation. Such units can be used to effectively augment or 39 supplement the logistic units within component commands or by serving as 41 operation-level resources. If supporting a 42 particular component, they may be 43 44 OPCON to a component MNLC, or report directly to the component commander. If 45 used as a theater-level asset, MILUs may 46 47 receive taskings through the MJLC.

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d. Individual National Contributions to Multinational Support. In addition to pooling, nations individually may make logistic assets available for support of the MNF. For example, country A may contribute a transportation unit to supporting a multinational operation, while country B may provide an engineer unit. For maximum effectiveness, these forces are typically placed under OPCON of the MNFC for direct tasking. Such contributions to support of an MNF may



Saudi Arabian contribution to coalition operations in Desert Storm included sealift of US equipment.

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1 be made at any level of organization and 2 command, and may either be single 3 function or multifunction, i.e., the 4 contributing nation might provide a 5 composite logistic support unit, including 6 transportation, engineering, and medical 7 evacuation units. For many multinational 8 operations, there is an urgent requirement 9 for national contributions of logistic units 10 at the theater/operational level.

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e. Host-Nation Support/In-Country Resources. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, defines HNS as "those military or civil capabilities made available by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises, or war." HNS can be viewed as a special case of LN support, in which the LN is a host or transited nation. HNS can be an important, and in some cases essential, source of support for a multinational force. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, identifies some areas in which HNS may be provided. These include transportation, civilian labor, services, rear area protection, petroleum, telecommunications, supplies, health services, facilities and real estate, and contracting. This support is not limited to an operational area but may extend to nations through or over which US forces need to traverse en route to a specific operational area.

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HNS is generally furnished in accordance with an agreement negotiated prior to the start of an operation. HNS agreements are normally established in diplomatic channels between a nation or a multinational force and a receiving nation. These are normally umbrella-type agreements that are augmented by TAs detailing the specific support to be provided and the type/amount of

reimbursement. In some cases. 48 reimbursement may not be required 49 because the providing nation recognizes 50 the importance of supporting forces on their territory and/or considers the HNS to 51 52 be their contribution to the security As part of the HNS 53 arrangement. 54 agreement process, an assessment must be conducted of the host nation's ability to 55 56 satisfy MNF support requirements. 57 Responsibility for funding possible 58 improvements (including eventual 59 disposition) to host-nation facilities by either the MNF or a nation must be clearly 60 identified in the HNS agreement.

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63 During crises, it may be necessary for 64 the US geographic combatant 65 commander to request authority to negotiate bilateral agreements with a 66 receiving country on behalf of the 67 United States. Such negotiation must be 68 conducted expeditiously in coordination 69 70 with the Joint Staff, theOSD, and the State Department, compliance 71 in applicable DOD directives. Alternatively, 72 73 the MNFC may be authorized to negotiate 74 HNS agreements on behalf of the nations contributing forces to the MNF, with their 75 This approach prior concurrence. 76 77 simplifies and streamlines the process and reduces the amount of time required to put 78 79 such agreements into place. NATO, this approach has 80 incorporated into alliance logistic doctrine. 81 82 Whereas arranging HNS formerly was solely a national responsibility (except 83 for a few small multinational forces), 84 NATO's current doctrine gives NATO 85 86 commanders important roles planning, negotiating, and prioritizing 87 HNS for multinational forces. HNS 88 89 agreements may now be concluded either by sovereign states or authorized NATO 90 commanders, subject to the concurrence of 91 92 participating nations.

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Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements

Since HNS represents a very significant capability to a MNFC, such support must be prioritized to ensure it is allocated to the user who can apply it best to meet operational requirements. To assist in coordinating the full spectrum of HNS and ICR issues, an HNSCC may be established within an MJLC to prioritize and coordinate these activities.

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HNS should be distinguished from ICR. HNS is arranged through formal country-to-country agreements, which usually are the result of a detailed requirements determination and planning process. ICR, on the other hand, represent those services or supplies obtained through local contracting, usually in an operational area. The planning and use of ICR do not result from a formalized planning process, but are developed to meet emerging operational requirements and are part of normal logistic support during an operation.

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f. Bilateral/Multilateral Arrangement. arrangements Multinational logistic encompass arrangements made between/among two or more nations for the routine and/or emergency support of 31 designated logistic supplies and services. 32 The arrangements may establish 33 conditions for mutual support 34 between/among nations or the provision of support by one nation to another nation or nations. In such arrangements, the 36 terms and conditions of support are solely 37 the responsibility of the participating 38 39 nations. The MNFC, however, should be 40 apprised of any such arrangement that affects the logistic capability of forces 41 under multinational command. Examples 42 43 of especially useful bilateral/multilateral 44 logistic arrangements are shown in Figure 45 III-2.

3. Implementing Multinational **Logistic Support Arrangements**

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Implementation of multinational logistic support arrangements may involve a range of legal, administrative, or financial 54 mechanisms. These implementing 55 mechanisms include contracting, mutual agreements, 56 support MOAs, standardization agreements, and common funding. Once the support arrangements have been agreed upon, the MNFC's logistic staff must coordinate expeditiously



US aerial refueling during Desert Storm is an example of how cross-servicing can provide a unique force multiplier in multilateral operations.

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Chapter III

BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS

- **BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR** THE PROVISION OF SELECTED LOGISTIC SERVICES BY FRAMEWORK UNITS TO FORMATIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES THAT ARE ELEMENTS OF THE MULTINATIONAL UNIT.
- **AIRCRAFT CROSS-SERVICING** ARRANGEMENTS, IN WHICH A NATION OPERATING AN AIR BASE PROVIDES VARIOUS SERVICES (FROM REFUELING TO REARMING) TO AIRCRAFT FROM OTHER **COUNTRIES THAT (FOR EMERGENCY OR OTHER REASONS) USE THE BASE.**
- **MULTILATERAL MUTUAL SUPPORT** ARRANGEMENTS, ACCORDING TO WHICH ALL PARTICIPATING NATIONS ARE PREPARED TO **RENDER TO OTHER NATIONS** WITHIN THE FORCE EMERGENCY.

Figure III-2. Bilateral/Multilateral **Logistic Arrangements**

with participating nations and international organizations to identify and develop the required implementing mechanisms.

a. Contracting. Contracting is an increasingly useful means of obtaining multinational logistic support operations, especially with development of LOGCAP and AFCAP. use contingency contracting procedures,

- and increased emphasis by NATO on third party logistics (TPL). Nations can 12 use contractors to provide support to other 13
- nations as part of RSN, LN or other 14 multinational responsibilities. 15
- example, a nation that has assumed an
- RSN role for fuel could rely on private 17 contractors for supply and distribution of
- fuel to the MNF.

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The MNFC can also negotiate contractor support for common logistic supplies and services — such as fresh rations, fuel, and accommodations — to be provided to participants who want to make use of such support. In recent operations, NATO has successfully employed this 26 kind of contractor support, in some cases negotiated by NAMSA, to achieve significant cost savings.

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In principle, all contracting activity in support of multinational operations must 32 conform to the policies established by the 33 MNFC. In establishing these policies, the MNFC must weigh nonmilitary as 35 36 well as military considerations. 37 Nonmilitary considerations include the potential need to enhance the economic situation within the host region, the 40 avoidance and/or elimination of black market 41 activities. and development/improvement of the in-42 theater infrastructure. To maintain 44 multinational cohesion and support the 45 political aims of the operation, 46 participating nations must conform to the contracting policies established by the 47 US law, however, always 48 MNFC. 49 controls in the event of inconsistencies between US law and MNFC policy. 50

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There are two broad scenarios for US forces' involvement in multinational contracting operations. First is US participation in a multinational contract negotiated and managed by the MNFC or a designated multinational entity. NATO, for example, a multinational contracting capability is available through 60 NAMSA. This capability was used to support the multinational operations in Bosnia 62 during Operation **JOINT** ENDEAVOR. US forces can utilize such multinational contracting capability to the extent allowed by current US contracting regulations.

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Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements

Second is the situation where the United States has accepted LN designation for logistic support in a geographic area. In exercising this LN responsibility, the United States may provide contracting services to support participating nations that are operating within the US sector. In general, these services are provided under the US policies and procedures established for contingency contracting. Contingency contracting in multinational operations 12 13 not meant to replace HNS arrangements or the existing supply 14 systems, but should be used to augment 15 those procedures, especially when HNS 16 arrangements are not in place or it is more economic or effective to use local purchases vice the supply system. substantial contracting activity envisaged, it is imperative that a contracting capability be available as part of the enabling element of a 23 deploying US force. This capability 24 should be provided even if the US force's contracting responsibilities do not include other nations. Additional guidelines for developing and executing US contracts in support of a multinational operations are contained in Appendix D, "US Contracting Considerations in Multinational Operations."

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For additional information see JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, JP 1-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Financial Management During Joint Operations, and JP 3-16, Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

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• Third Party Logistics

• As used herein, TPL describes a variety of capabilities — other than US military forces — that may be employed to support MNF during an operation. These capabilities include resources provided by a host nation, either directly with military units or by military and/or civilian personnel; by contractor support arranged for by the host nation; or the use of civilian contractors in programs such as LOGCAP and AFCAP.

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•• TPL possibilities should be considered during the planning phase of a multinational operation. The prospective uses of LOGCAP and AFCAP should be assessed while considering the support that may be made available to the US by its allies, a host nation, or ICR. Such support may be provided by another nation in its capacity as an RSN or under a bilateral or multilateral agreement between the US and another nation(s).

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•• US geographic combatant commanders should assess the availability of TPL alternatives within their AOR for possible use during multinational operations. Where possible, and in concert with the Department of State, geographic combatant commanders should negotiate standby support agreements with probable candidates during peacetime for use during crisis situations. This may obviate the need to negotiate such agreements during a crisis. Commanders should continually assess the risks associated with the nonavailability of TPL capability. In addition, plans need to be developed to cope with situations in which TPL may not be available.

• Logistics Civilian Augmentation

Program

•• The US Army initially designed LOGCAP as an alternative method of providing logistic support to deployed

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Support offered under forces. LOGCAP can span the spectrum of logistic support, including base camp construction, maintenance, transportation, and the entire range of base operations and logistic support in the operational environment. Because of its success, both the US Air Force and US Navy have adopted the concept. The Air Force's version of this is called AFCAP which is very similar to LOGCAP.

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•• Under LOGCAP and AFCAP's provisions, a contractor is selected and paid a retainer, which allows it to preplan and perform selected administrative and logistic support functions — during peace, crises (MOOTW), or war - using its capability as a substitute for military support forces. When activated, this program is intended to provide a rapid, in-theater logistic support capability.

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• As a contracted capability, during operations the LOGCAP and AFCAP contractors must adhere to the contracting. purchasing, movement control guidelines and restrictions established by the MNFC. The MNFC may also consider expanding the LOGCAP and AFCAP roles to provide support to other participants in the operation besides the United States. In such case, the MNFC TACO coordinates with other interested nations.

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•• It is particularly critical that policies and procedures be clearly established to facilitate LOGCAP and AFCAP (and other civilian contractor) operations within the operational area, including their activities in transit nations.

address contractor access to ports, airfields, and other distribution 59 system linkages, prioritization for use 60 of these facilities, responsibility for aircraft and ship unloading, air base 61 clearance, identification of contractor 62 personnel and security clearance 63 where necessary, in-theater protection 64 to be afforded the contractor, 65 purchasing of items on the restricted 66 67 items list, etc. These issues should be 68 clearly addressed in the appropriate

documents.

LOGCAP

particular concern are policies

concerning environmental protection;

customs, duties, and taxes; force

protection; contractor liability; and

the protections to be afforded

contractor personnel under the SOFA,

TAs, or other appropriate guidance

logistic support plans, as well as the

need for contractor management

personnel to cooperate and coordinate

with the appropriate MNFC staffs

and/or MJLC/MNLC coordination

Provisions for using

and AFCAP should

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centers.

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b. Mutual Support Agreements. Mutual support agreements are a broad class of agreements developed by an MNFC or IOs and agreed upon by nations. These mutual support agreements may serve as the implementing vehicle for a broad range of multilateral support arrangements. They can either be general in application or tailored to a specific class 84 of support or operation. An example is the NATO-brokered Theater Mutual Support 86 Agreement for the Implementation Force 88 (IFOR) in Bosnia. It provided that the 89 forces of any signatory nation could 90 receive logistic support from any other signatory nation for unforeseen requirements in return for prompt repayment in cash or kind. Development NATO-brokered this agreement

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eliminated the need for individual bilateral agreements among all the nations involved.

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The mutual support agreement concept has been accepted as an element of NATO logistics doctrine, but it may be employed in any multinational operation. commanders and logisticians should be aware, however, that an MNF or NATO-negotiated mutual support agreement alone generally does not provide sufficient legal authority for exchanging support with an alliance or coalition partners. Specific additional agreements between the US and coalition partners (e.g., ACSA or FMS agreements) may be required to fully implement mutual support agreements that obligate US forces to provide logistic support to other nations.

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c. Memoranda of Agreement. instances where nations agree to combine national logistic assets units to form MILUs OPCON to MNFC, they may do so under the terms of an MOA. The legal status, form, and content of an MOA are generally determined by the nations involved. However, it usually addresses issues such as internal C2, scope of national contribution, division of MILUresponsibilities, level cost sharing, liability, and administration. requirement for an MOA, like its contents, is a national decision.

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d. Standardization Agreements. standardization Several types of agreements have been developed by IOs and nations to enhance operational compatibility, especially for logistics. NATO has developed formal standardization agreements (STANAGs) to document agreed upon doctrinal, procedural, or materiel standards. addition, the various **ABCA** standardization programs have developed 50 Although complete standardization of supplies, equipment, and materiel is a difficult goal to attain, NATO and the 53 ABCA nations have agreed on a 54 substantial number of logistic-related standardization agreements. These can 55 facilitate and simplify the implementation of many support arrangements. 57 example, the forms and procedures for exchanging logistic support within NATO 60 have been documented in a single STANAG that has also been made

their own standardization agreements.

- available to NATO's Partnership for Peace US commanders and their 63 nations staffs should be aware, however, that 64 65 standardization agreements generally
- do not provide legal authority to 66 provide or receive logistic support; they 67 68 merely document agreed upon standards for items, services, or

procedures to be used in multinational 70 71

logistic support arrangements.

72 73 e. Common Funding. Common funding — national funds paid into a common account managed by an IO such 75 as NATO or the UN — can be an invaluable means of funding common 77 logistic requirements essential to the start of an operation. Common funding 79 can also reduce the necessity for the United States to unilaterally fund those 81 requirements. Examples 82 include 83 international headquarters operating 84 expenses, common communication systems, and improvements to theater 85 supply routes and airfields. 86 US commanders assigned as MNFCs need to identify potential requirements, 88 sources, and procedures for obtaining common funding as early as possible. 90 91 Without such alliance arrangements, other 92 funding arrangements must be developed ad hoc for either areas not covered by 93 94 alliance common funding procedures or

for coalition operations. In cases where

two or more nations form MILUs,

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integrated operational units, or support groups (e.g., multinational NSEs), the methodology for sharing common costs must be determined. Contributions to a common fund must be based on a mutually agreed upon formula as well as the basis for allocating operational costs.

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4. US Participation in **Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements**

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a. US Legal Authorities. US participation in multinational logistic support arrangements must be undertaken in accordance with US legal authorities. US combatant commanders may not enter into multinational logistic arrangements without specific authority. Several legal authorities are available to US commanders, but they differ significantly in terms of required conditions, type of permitted support, and implementation procedures. Most of these authorities also require advance negotiation of some type of nation-tonation agreement, generally at the DOD or geographic combatant command level. many cases, US combatant commanders and their staffs must tailor their plans to participate in MNL support arrangements to reflect the requirements of preexisting legal authorities and their implementing agreements.

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This section describes the applicability of selected US legal authorities to different multinational logistic support arrangements. There are numerous legal authorities that enable different support multinational arrangements. 42 These authorities include the ACSA authority, Cooperative Military Airlift 44 Agreement authority, Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Foreign Assistance 45 Act (FAA), Federal Property and

Administrative Services Act, Fly America 48 Act and the Cargo Preference Act, and 49 annual DOD authorization 50 appropriations acts. Appendix C, 51 "Relevant Legal Authorities for US 52 Logistic Support in Multinational Operations," contains a more detailed description of the general provisions, 53 54 financial requirements, and required 55 56 implementing agreements for these 57 authorities.

Acquisition and **Cross-Service Agreement Authority**

•• The ACSA authority provides authority for US forces to acquire or exchange logistic support from foreign sources and/or coalition partners in combined exercises, training, deployments, operations, cooperative other efforts, unforeseen circumstances emergencies. It constitutes the most operationally flexible authority for participation in MNL arrangements. After meeting applicable coordination and notification requirements, the responsible US geographic combatant commander may initiate, negotiate, and implement the required crossservicing agreements implementing arrangements (IAs). In an operational setting, US and coalition commanders have the flexibility to structure exchanges of logistic support in accordance with local requirements and conditions. operational For example, commanders may determine the timing, location, and reimbursement terms for ACSA exchanges. For these reasons, an ACSA is a useful tool to enable the exchange of logistic between US support

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Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements

multinational forces, particularly in emergencies and unforeseen circumstances.

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•• To use the ACSA authority for preplanned logistic support arrangements, such as RSN or LN, US commanders and logistic planners must be aware of the limitations on the type of support permitted as well as the requirement for prior negotiation of a cross-servicing agreement and an IA. Because the nomination/negotiation process requires coordination with the **Department** of State and notification of Congress (for ACSA agreements with non-NATO nations or organizations) operational commanders identify the need for and request the negotiation of any required cross-servicing agreements as far in advance of the start of an operation as possible.

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• Another consideration is that the ACSA legislation explicitly prohibits the DOD from increasing inventories in anticipation of meeting foreign logistic requirements. For this reason, US commanders consider using the ACSA authority to meet routine logistic requirements of foreign nations partners must ensure that in doing so they do not place the operational readiness of US forces at risk. Since ACSA transactions may involve items or supplies purchased with appropriated US funds, its use may be subject to additional restrictions contained in DOD authorization appropriation or legislation.

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• Cooperative Military Airlift
Agreement Authority (CMAA).
The CMAA authority provides

authority for US forces to acquire or exchange airlift support from foreign sources and/or coalition partners in training, exercises, combined deployments, operations, other cooperative efforts, and unforeseen circumstances or emergencies. While not as flexible as the ACSA authority, some foreign nations have expressed preference for **CMAA** arrangements. USTRANSCOM was delegated authority to enter into CMAA arrangements with foreign military authorities. Due to the length of time necessary to negotiate a CMAA, commanders should identify and request the negotiation of any required CMAA as far in advance of the start of an operation as possible.

• Arms Export Control Act

•• The AECA of 1976 provides DOD the authority to sell (1) defense articles or services from existing DOD stocks or new procurement or (2) DOD design or construction services to friendly foreign nations or IOs. Collectively, these governmentto-government sales of defense articles or services are known as FMS or Foreign Military Construction Sales. The AECA is best used for providing logistic supplies (such as food or bulk fuel) that US and multinational forces can use in common and for which demand is relatively predictable. As such, the AECA can serve as the authority for US participation in preplanned support arrangements (such as RSN or LN) involving basic logistic commodities. When planning US support authorized under the AECA, geographic combatant commanders and their logistic staffs need to allow sufficient time for the negotiation of the required FMS agreements.

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Regular and early coordination with and approval from security assistance elements and implementing materiel/logistic commands is essential. Occasionally, an operation will begin before the required FMS agreements are in place. In this situation, US commanders should inform multinational partners in advance that the expected US support cannot be provided immediately; MNF partners have to develop or rely on interim arrangements, support such ACSAs. while awaiting the negotiation and activation of the necessary FMS agreements.

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•• US commanders must also recognize that some participants, for a variety of reasons, may decline to purchase US logistic support through the FMS channel. Though this may introduce inefficiencies in operation, nations have a sovereign right to determine their preferred means of support. Although AECA requirements can sometimes complicate and/or delay the planning and delivery of multinational logistic support, this law constitutes the most frequently used US legal authority for the provision of routine US logistic support to multinational partners.

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• Foreign Assistance Act

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•• The FAA of 1961 contains a broad range of authorities to provide military goods or services to foreign countries or IOs for multinational operations, the two most important of which are Section 506, which provides authority for DOD drawdowns to friendly foreign nations for unforeseen emergencies,

48 and Section 607, which allows DOD
49 (and other government departments)
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51 to friendly foreign countries or IOs on
52 an advance of funds or reimbursable
53 basis.

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- •• By law, Section 506 of the FAA cannot be used to provide routine logistic support. Within DOD, the drawdown process is generally managed by the responsible Military Department materiel commands using security assistance personnel and information systems. The geographic combatant command role is usually limited to alerting the NCA that a military emergency exists and coordinating the delivery of support with the foreign recipient and responsible DOD materiel commands. In rare cases, the drawdown may be provided from the operational stocks of a Service component of the respective geographic combatant command.
 - •• Section 607 may be used to provide routine logistic support under an LN or RSN arrangement, but is generally used only in those situations in which other support authorities, such as **FMS** agreements, cannot be used. In the past, the DOD has provided significant logistic support under section 607 to the UN. Support has been provided both by Service components operating with the UN continental United States (CONUS)-based materiel commands and defense agencies. Because foreign requests for support usually require coordination with Department of State, as well as approval by OSD, this authority is not well suited for unforeseen or

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emergency situations. Also, because DOD regulations require the DOD component or agency providing support to separately account for and bill for such support, Service component commanders must be prepared to commit dedicated manage resources to these transfers. Geographic components commanders and their logistic and financial staffs should coordinate with OSD, the Joint Staff, and potential recipients to define responsibilities and procedures for approving, implementing, and tracking requests for logistic support under Section 607. It is also critical to coordinate with the Military Departments and other DOD agencies providing section 607 support from outside the area of operations.

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• The Federal **Property** and Administrative Service Act. The Federal Property and Administrative Service Act provides authority for any US Government agency, including DOD, to transfer foreign excess personal property (FEPP) to foreign countries for foreign currency, substantial benefits, or the discharge of claims. The narrow definition of FEPP and the procedural requirements for transfers under this law limit its operational utility. The Federal Property and Administrative Service Act is not well suited for emergency transfers. It is best used for planned transfers of overseas property for which the DOD requirement is limited and which the host foreign country is willing to accept. In operational terms, it is most applicable in the redeployment termination or phases of a multinational operation. Although DOD regulations assign the Military Departments and DLA the responsibility for screening negotiating the transfer of FEPP, components Service of geographic combatant commands are well placed to identify potential FEPP and foreign recipients, particularly in an operational context. Geographic combatant or component commanders who wish to initiate FEPP transfers should coordinate with the appropriate Military Department logistic staff and/or with local DLA representatives.

• Fly America Act and the Cargo Preference Act

•• The Fly America Act and the Cargo Preference Act are two authorities that apply to all US Government-funded transportation operations. The Fly America Act prohibits the expenditure of US funds for air transportation aboard a foreign air carrier if a US air carrier is available to provide such a service, even if the foreign air carrier provides less costly and more convenient service. Since the vast majority of DOD-funded air transportation. or operational otherwise, historically been provided by USowned or chartered air assets, this authority imposes few practical constraints on US operational commanders. In certain circumstances, however, it may apply. For example, US forces may be prohibited from using appropriated funds and the acquisition-only authority of the ACSA to contract with a foreign air carrier for transportation between destinations outside the United States if a US air carrier was "reasonably available." On the other hand, the Fly America Act might not apply if the same service was provided by a

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foreign government as reimbursement for US supplies or services provided under an ACSA. Operational commanders should consult staff legal counsel to determine the precise applicability of the Fly America Act to operationally related air moves.

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•• The second authority, the Cargo Preference Act of 1904, requires that all items procured for or owned by the Military Departments and defense agencies be carried exclusively in USflag vessels that are available at fair and reasonable rates. Since the DOD has the capability and experience to quickly acquire US-registered vessels, there are few instances in which it would constrain US forces' ability to participate in MNL operations. As with the Fly America Act, however, this law could limit a US operational commander's ability to accept sea transportation of US defense goods as reimbursement for US supplies or services provided under an ACSA. In this case, the responsible US commander or ordering authority should negotiate an alternate form of reimbursement and/or consult staff legal counsel.

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• Annual DOD Authorization and **Appropriation Acts.** The authorities described above provide a broad legal framework for US participation in a broad range of multinational logistic operations. In addition, the standing legal authorities may supplemented and, in some cases, overridden, by provisions contained in annual DOD authorization or appropriations acts. Such provisions may, for example, prohibit or restrict exchanges of logistic support that involve the expenditure of US appropriated funds, such as those authorized under the ACSA or Section 607 of the FAA. combatant commanders must ensure that subordinate forces are informed of legislative such provide restrictions and appropriate guidance for adhering to them. At the same time, commanders should consider alternative support mechanisms for MNL, such as FMS, that may not be affected by legislative constraints on the expenditure of US funds.

b. Funding and Reimbursement

• General. In general, nations are expected to fund their participation in multinational logistic support arrangements and reimburse providers for any support received from other nations. Funding and reimbursement requirements for US participation in these arrangements are generally a function of the applicable US legal authority. For example, US support provided under an LN/RSN or emergency support arrangement is generally implemented under the AECA or ACSA authority, respectively. In these cases, funding and reimbursement are managed in accordance with the funding procedures for these authorities. However, some multinational support arrangements, such as provision of national logistic assets to a MNL organization or participation in a MILU, may involve deferral or waiver of reimbursement. US combatant commanders who envision participating in support arrangements for which reimbursement is to be waived must coordinate with higher headquarters. A decision to waive

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or defer reimbursement for support provided to other nations is ultimately a political decision and is transmitted from the NCA to the commander.

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Detailed policies and procedures for funding and reimbursement in multinational logistic operations are described in JP 1-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Financial Management During Joint Operations.

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• Financial Reporting. US participation in multinational logistic operations requires regular financial reporting. The content and source of these reports vary with the controlling In general, the legal authority. Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), in coordination with the security assistance offices of the responsible Military Department, prepares and distributes financial and other reports on support provided under the AECA and Section 506 of

the FAA. Geographic combatant commanders should ensure that they receive copies of these reports. The responsible geographic command Service component prepares reports on support provided under an ACSA and forwards them to the geographic combatant commander and Military Department as input for an annual report to Congress. Service component commanders are also responsible for ensuring that the allocated ceiling on the value of ACSA acquisition and exchanges is not exceeded. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for allocating to each Service component its share of the statutory ceiling on ACSA activity. The responsible Service component prepares reports on commander support provided under Section 607 of the FAA and forwards them to DFAS. Failure to complete these reports may result in failure to recoup the costs of providing the support.

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CHAPTER IV MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC PLANNING

"The stroke of genius that turns the fate of a battle? I don't believe in it . . . You think out every possible development and (when) one of these developments occurs, you put your plan in operation, and everyone says, 'What genius . . . ' whereas the credit is really due to the labor of preparation."

> Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander of Allied Forces in Europe during World War I, interview April, 1919

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This chapter provides guidance to US MNFCs and their staffs in development of multinational logistic support plans. This guidance intended to (1) complement doctrine and procedures developed by IOs (such as NATO) that have been ratified by the United States and (2) to serve as the basis for planning logistic support in operations where such guidance does not apply. This chapter also provides guidance for the development of logistic support plans for US forces participating in multinational operations and for transition operations.

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Logistic planning of multinational operations poses considerable challenges. Realistically, only a few nations can logistically support themselves in every operational phase: deployment; in-theater 30 RSOI: sustainment: redeployment/termination. 32 Planning multinational support arrangements to ease national logistic burdens and to make logistic support more efficient is a key planning objective. However, nations are generally reluctant in the early planning process to commit forces to the multinational force. This is especially true regarding logistic contributions to support the force. Logistic planning for 42 multinational operations, therefore, can be a lengthy iterative process during which nations come to agreement on the C2 organization and support arrangements only after extensive deliberation.

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48 Given the ad hoc nature of coalitions 49 and the political sensitivity within 50 alliances, regarding deliberate advance planning, planning for multinational 51 operations may only commence after the 52 crisis has developed. Since logistics often 53 is a limiting factor in operations, logistic 54 planning needs to commence as soon as 55 possible and occur concurrently with 57 operational planning.

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Within a multinational operation it is 60 imperative that participating nations have confidence in the way partners are supporting their forces. Nations are often reluctant to, and sometimes prohibited from, sharing national OPLANs with potential partners because of the highly 66 sensitive nature of such planning. Nonetheless, efforts should be made to share operations and logistic support plans during the plan development stage. While details may not be shared, general logistic support concepts, possible contributions, logistic support requirements, capabilities, and possible support arrangements should be discussed.

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76 2. Multinational Logistic **Planning Issues**

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a. MNFC Perspective. The MNFC 80 (with overall mission guidance from

Chapter IV

1	participating nations) develops a concept
2	of operations and initial support concept.
3	Upon approval of participating nations,
4	multinational and national logistic
5	planners then iteratively develop the
6	support plan during a series of planning
7	conferences

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The primary logistic concerns of the MNFC are to ensure that (1) the MNFC has sufficient logistic authority and resources to support operational priorities, and (2) nations leverage their logistic capabilities to ensure that all national and multinational formations are robustly supported while minimizing logistic footprint. Obtaining early knowledge of the organic logistic support requirements and capabilities participating national formations is critical.

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The MNFC must address the following critical issues in logistic planning for multinational operations.

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• Logistic C2 relationships.

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• Logistic authorities and responsibilities of the MNFC and participating nations.

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• Interoperability of logistic communication systems within the force.

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 Capability of C2 and logistic automated information systems to be interoperable or to have interface capability.

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 Logistic requirements for national contingents (e.g., level of medical support, amount of supplies to be maintained in the operation area).

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 Requirements for multinational support, including requirements for theater/operational-level logistic forces.

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 Support concepts for relevant logistic functions and multinational logistic support

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As in all aspects of multilateral military operations, logistic planning and execution often require extensive coordination.

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Multinational Logistic Planning 1 arrangements, such as RSN and LN, 48 environmental issues, to be addressed to implement such concepts. 2 49 in SOFAs and supporting TAs. 3 50 4 • Standards of supportability 51 • Environmental considerations and participating formations. hazardous material/waste treatment 5 52 53 and removal. 6 54 • Priorities for use of in-theater military 7 and civilian logistic capabilities. 55 • Up-front common funding authority and availability of funds. 56 9 57 10 • Elements of a logistic intelligence data base in the operation area and 58 • Logistic certification of participating 11 responsibilities for developing and maintaining such a data base. (Much nations in the coalition. 59 12 60 13 of the information required for such a In addressing these issues, MNFCs 14 61 needs to consider cultural and religious aspects of multinational partners that could data base may be obtained from the 15 62 US Army component command's 16 63 LOGCAP contractor, and NAMSA in affect the operation (e.g., dietary 17 preferences, physical characteristics, and 18 NATO operations, from Service 65 security assistance commands, and religious taboos). 19 66 from the intelligence community.) 67 20 68 For more details see Appendix A, 21 "Commander's Checklist for Logistic 69 22 • Mechanisms in place to protect to the Support of Multinational Operations." logistic technical data bases; logistic 70 23 71 24 information systems and logistic b. US Commander's Perspective. For 25 intelligence data bases from 72 the US commander of formations 73 26 Information Warfare. participating in multinational operations, 27 the critical planning tasks relating to MNL 75 More information is provided in JP 28 are the following: 29 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information 76 Operations. 77 30 78 • Incorporate MNFC logistic guidance 31 into US support plans. • HNS requirements and authorities and responsibilities of the MNFC and 79 32 80 33 • Coordinate US logistic planning with MNFC logistic planning and maintain nations in arranging support from 34 81 host and transited nations. 35 82 36 83 continuous liaison. 84 37 • Relationships with and support to/from IOs, NGOs, PVOs, and other nonmilitary organizations. • Determine sources of support from the host nation and local contractors 38 85 39 86 and consult with other participating 40 87 nations and the MNFC in identifying • The extent to which infrastructure 88 41 improvements are to be made within 89 potential multinational support 42 arrangements. 43 the operation area and funding 90 arrangements for such improvements. 91 44 45 92 • Notify the MNFC as to the logistic 93 services that the United States will 46 • Logistic-related items, such make available to support other 47 landing rights, customs, taxes, and 94

Chapter IV

participants in the MNF. (US logistic contributions to the MNF approved by the NCA communicated to MNFC planning staffs.)

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• Notify the MNFC of relevant aspects of the US support plan in order to assist the MNFC in harmonizing support for the entire multinational force.

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• Coordinate closely with nations contributing forces US to "framework" units (divisions, brigades, air wings, maritime task forces) regarding support available from the framework unit and on what terms.

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• Promulgate MNFC logistics policy, plans, and procedures to participating US units.

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• Assemble data bases from all available sources on logistic capabilities of non-US units operating within US framework units and with nations, including host nations, located in the operation area.

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The US commander must be an early and active participant in the planning process, anticipate support requests, identify US support requirements, and be prepared to respond appropriately. If additional ACSA agreements are required, for example, the commander must coordinate with designated negotiating authorities (generally the cognizant geographic combatant commander) and ensure that Service components identify points of contact and implementation procedures for this authority. Close and continuous coordination with the Joint Staff may also be necessary, especially when NCA approval is required for US

participation in a specific multinational logistic support arrangement — for 49

example, acceptance of RSN or LN 50

51 responsibility.

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53 Appendix A, "Commander's Checklist for Logistic Support of Multinational 54 Operations" and Appendix B, "Draft 55 56 Multinational Logistics Annex to OPLAN" are provided to assist US commanders 57 and logistic staffs prepare to participate in multinational operations. 59

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3. Multinational Logistic Planning by Operational Phase

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In every multinational operation, the MNFC needs to develop at least some logistic plan covering force deployment, sustainment. and redeployment/ termination.

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a. Phase I: Deployment (includes strategic movement from ports of embarkation [POEs] to ports debarkation [PODs] in the operational area and RSOI).

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The designated multinational headquarters planning staff, with representatives from each nation participating in the operation, often conducts deployment planning. NATO operations, such planning involves the SC headquarters as well as the designated operational planning staff (e.g., CJTF). If the MNF is to be organized 85 along component lines, representatives from each component headquarters also participate.

89 90 Although the United States has perhaps 91 the most experience in deployment 92 planning, multinational operations are

93 partnerships, and the United States needs to integrate its national movement plan

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Multinational Logistic Planning multinational arrangements for the

most efficient provision of such

into a prioritized and harmonized multinational movement plan. This plan may be developed using non-US deployment planning systems, such as NATO's Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS), with which US movement planners must interface.

• Key MNFC planning tasks during the deployment planning phase are shown in Figure IV-1. The MNFC organizations involved in controlling the flow of forces must be closely linked with the intelligence community as well as with each participating nation to identify potential disruptions or changes to the flow. To the extent that such changes impact on the MNFC's concept of operations, alternative courses of action must be developed for the commander's approval. The resultant changes must be immediately communicated to all deploying forces.

 In planning deployment of US forces in a multinational operation, the US commander must perform the following:

•• Develop a DDP plan for US forces and coordinate with the MNFC in harmonizing the plan with other national deployment plans.

•• Establish interconnections between US and MNFC deployment planning systems, e.g., the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and ADAMS.

•• Identify requirements for reception and onward movement and coordinate with the MNFC and participating nations in planning

support.

•• Identify US logistic capabilities that can be used to contribute to the support of deploying forces, if requested.

b. Phase II: Sustainment Operations. In planning for sustainment, both the MNFC and national commanders face a common challenge — how to be responsive in providing logistic support to mission forces (combat or peacekeeping) while minimizing the logistic footprint in the operation area. Both the MNFC and US force commanders must plan for maximum feasible use of multinational arrangements to achieve both objectives.

• The key tasks to be accomplished by the MNFC during planning for this phase are shown in Figure IV-2. Planning by the MNFC for the sustainment phase requires a thorough understanding of the logistic support requirements and capabilities of participating nations. As part of this process, a methodology should be adopted for determining the ability of each nation to support its forces (whether through organic resources or other means).

• In planning for sustainment of US forces during a multinational operation, US commanders should do the following:

 •• Cooperate with the MNFC and other participating nations to take full advantage of opportunities for MNL in sustaining US forces.

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KEY MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER PLANNING TASKS DURING DEPLOYMENT

- ASSIGN FINAL DESTINATION, REQUIRED DELIVERY DATES, PORTS OF DEBARKATION (PODs), AND DEPLOYMENT ROUTES TO DEPLOYING FORMATIONS, BASED ON THE COMMANDER'S OPERATIONAL PLAN.
- PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO PARTICIPATING NATIONS REGARDING MODES OF TRANSPORTATION AND TRANSPORTATION ASSETS.
- HARMONIZE INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL DETAILED DEPLOYMENT PLANS INTO A SINGLE INTEGRATED MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENT PLAN.
- DEFINE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION TO MANAGE, COORDINATE, AND CONTROL FORCE DEPLOYMENT.
- IDENTIFY THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF LOGISTICIANS (ESPECIALLY CONTRACTING AND BUDGET/FINANCE PERSONNEL) TO BE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE ENABLING FORCE.
- ARRANGE HOST-NATION SUPPORT (HNS) FOR PORT RECEPTION OF DEPLOYING FORCES OR ARRANGE FOR LEAD NATION/ROLE SPECIALIST NATION OPERATION OF PODs.
- ARRANGE FOR USE OF HOST-NATION TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE.
- ARRANGE HNS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT OR ARRANGE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM TROOP-SENDING NATIONS OF TRANSPORTATION/CARGO HANDLING ASSETS TO SUPPORT ONWARD MOVEMENT.
- DEVELOP AGREEMENTS WITH RELEVANT NATIONS FOR TRANSIT AND OVERFLIGHT OF FORMATIONS OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE.
- IDENTIFY LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF DEPLOYING FORCES, INCLUDING EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPORT, VEHICLE RECOVERY, ENGINEERING, AND TROOP SUPPORT.
- ARRANGE SUCH SUPPORT FROM THE HOST NATION OR LOCAL CONTRACTORS.

Figure IV-1. Key Multinational Force Commander Planning Tasks
During Deployment

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Multinational Logistic Planning

KEY TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER (MNFC) DURING SUSTAINMENT

- IDENTIFY CRITICAL SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OPERATION.
- DEVELOP CONCEPTS OF SUPPORT, INCLUDING MNFC AND NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SUSTAINMENT FUNCTIONS.
- PRIORITIZE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOST-NATION SUPPORT AND ARRANGING SUCH SUPPORT ON BEHALF OF PARTICIPATING NATIONS.
- IDENTIFY CANDIDATE LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS FOR LEAD NATION OR ROLE SPECIALIST NATION ASSIGNMENT AND SOLICITING CANDIDATE NATIONS.
- ESTABLISH POLICY FOR LOCAL CONTRACTING IN THE OPERATION AREA AND IDENTIFY RESTRICTED ITEMS REQUIRING MNFC PURCHASING APPROVAL.
- IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMON FUNDING.
- ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS FOR LOGISTIC REPORTING AND SPECIFY REPORTING FORMATS.
- IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS FOR STAFFING MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC HEADQUARTERS AND COORDINATING CENTERS.
- DEVELOP ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR PREVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION.
- IDENTIFY ALL LOGISTIC SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE COLLOCATION OF MUNITIONS OR EXPLOSIVE STORGE SITES AND RELATED SAFETY POLICIES/PRACTICES.

Figure IV-2. Key Tasks to be Accomplished by Multinational Force Commander (MNFC) During Sustainment

Coordinate	with	the	MNFC	in
harmonizing	US		sustainm	ent
planning with n	nultina	tiona	al plannin	ıg.

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•• Develop concepts for providing support to non-US elements of US framework units and ensure available resources for multinational support.

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•• Establish communications links for reporting logistic status of forces to the MNFC, as required.

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•• Make provisions for possible emergency support of other participating forces and multinational headquarters and ensure enabling authorities are available.

c. Phase III: Redeployment/

• Redeployment. In many respects, redeployment of forces from a multinational operation is the reverse of the deployment process, and therefore in planning redeployment, the MNFC and nations must address many of the same issues as in deployment. Redeployment, however, may pose additional planning problems that the MNFC and nations need to collectively address.

•• The MNF (personnel, equipment, and supplies) may have increased during the operation and there may be a requirement for rapid exit (e.g., to deploy to another crisis area) so that an MMCC needs to manage a more complex activity.

•• There could be a requirement to improve ports for redeployment but common funding may be reduced or depleted.

•• National forces may need to prepare vehicles and equipment to meet agricultural standards for return to their home base. Nations establish such standards, but the MNFC can assist nations in coordinating multinational support for

 the provision of such services from LNs or local contractors.

•• As nations redeploy, care needs to be given to protecting the environment. The MNFC issues policy and guidance on environmental protection. Nations must be prepared to continue extended operations simultaneous with partial redeployment. This is especially true with low density, high demand force capabilities.

• **Termination.** The MNFC and nations collectively plan logistic activities relating to operation termination. A time-phased termination plan should be developed that addresses the following issues:

•• Property accounting. For the multinational headquarters, property must be accounted for and decisions must be made as to the disposition of excess property.

•• Borrowed equipment and real estate/facilities must be returned to the host/owning nation.

•• Environmental restoration. The MNFC promulgates policy and standards for environmental restoration and assists nations in arranging contractor or other support to accomplish the work.

•• Equipment disposal. Participating countries may decide to dispose of property and equipment in the operation area. The MNFC issues guidance on the disposal of common-funded equipment. In addition, the MNFC issues guidance on property disposal activities by participating nations.

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Multinational Logistic Planning



International disaster assistance efforts are often multilateral and rarely preplanned.

4. Transition Operations

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Three kinds of transition operations involve special logistic planning issues for US commanders, whether as the US JFC or as the MNFC.

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a. Transitioning from a US Joint **Operation** Multinational to a **Operation.** It is conceivable that the United States may find it necessary to initiate military action before international consensus develops (such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia). Following the development international support, a multinational operation, conducted by an alliance or a coalition, possibly under UN management, may be authorized.

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The main question for US logistic planners in such transitions is what role the United States will play in the logistic structure supporting the multinational force. Since the United States may have an extensive logistic structure (including HNS agreements and contracts with local suppliers) already in place in the operational area, it may be asked to

assume the lead role in the multinational
logistic organization — at least for a
transition period. The senior US logistic
commander may become the MN logistic
director; US contracts and HNS

35 agreements may become the vehicles 36 for multinational agreements; and the 37 United States may be asked to assume

38 LN and RSN roles, perhaps using 39 LOGCAP and AFCAP contractors, for 40 supporting the multinational forces.

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The extent to which the United States accepts logistic responsibilities for the multinational force is decided by the NCA. However, two conditions that are critical for a smooth transition to multinational support are as follows:

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51 52 The United States must have the proper legal arrangements (e.g., ACSAs) in place to provide logistic support to members of the deploying multinational force.

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 Deploying forces must be prepared to reimburse the United States for logistic services rendered.

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WHEN THERE IS NO TIME FOR DELIBERATE PLANNING: **OPERATION SEA ANGEL**

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48 49 50 Bangladesh has traditionally been one of nature's favorite targets. Cyclone Marian struck this delta on the southeast coast during the evening of 29 April 1991 with winds in excess of 235 km/hr and tidal surges between 15 and 20 feet. Well over 100,000 people died and millions were left homeless. For the government of Bangladesh (GOB), the cyclone could not have come at a worse time. The young, inexperienced government faced serious problems. The combination of a poorly developed infrastructure and the havoc wreaked by the cyclone effectively cut off Chittagong for several days. Further, once relief supplies were brought to Chittagong, the GOB virtually had no means to distribute them to isolated islands off the coast where needs were most acute.

On 10 May 1991, the President directed the US military to provide humanitarian assistance. A Contingency Joint Task Force was immediately formed under the command of Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole. A US Navy Amphibious Task Force returning from the Persian Gulf war was redirected to Bangladesh.

The relief effort truly was an international operation. Besides the indigenous GOB forces and the international and local NGO, several countries joined the United States in participating. The United Kingdom sent a supply ship with four helicopters. The Japanese government sent two helicopters. India, Pakistan, and China also provided assistance. Immediately upon his arrival in the capitol city of Dhaka, LtGen. Stackpole began an assessment of the situation.

LtGen. Stackpole proceeded to develop a Campaign Plan consisting of three phases. After initial survey, liaison, and reconnaissance, Phase I (one week) entailed initial stabilization of the situation (delivery of food, water, and medicine to reduce loss of life). Phase II (two weeks) entailed restoring the situation to the point where the Bangladesh government could take control of relief efforts. Phase III (two weeks) was the consolidation phase in which the Task Force would depart and the Bangladesh government would take complete control of all relief efforts.

In the final analysis, Operation SEA ANGEL proved to be unique in several respects. It was almost entirely sea-based, with no more than 500 service members on shore at night. It was conducted in a benign environment; no weapons were carried by US forces, except for some sidearms carried by guards of cryptographic materials. It was also the first time that a Marine air-ground task force was used as a joint task force nucleus. Finally, a unique effective command and control structure was used to synchronize the efforts of US, British, Bangladeshi, and Japanese non-governmental organizations, and other organizations such as the US Agency for International Development and a Chinese assistance element.

SOURCE: Paul A. McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, a Case Study, RAND, 1994

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Multinational Logistic Planning 46 from UN 47

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1 b. Transitioning 2 Operation to Another Multinational 3 **Operation**

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• In transitioning from a UN operation another multinational to operation, as in the transition from the UN Protection Force to NATO's IFOR in Bosnia, the UN may remain the lead agency for humanitarian assistance within the operation area. In this case, the MNFC should be prepared, within capabilities, to consider requests for assistance from NGOs, and **PVOs** IOs,

16 accomplishing their humanitarian 17 mission. A UN representative headquarters organization should 18 remain in the area and serve as the 19 coordinating point of contact for 20 21 possible assistance requests. 22

> • The incoming MNFC should use the in-theater UN infrastructure/ facilitate early organizations to development and establishment of the new MNF.

> • Essential to the successful transition is the development of a cooperative environment between UN and the new MNF. If a UN military force/headquarters is withdrawing from the operational area, the new MNF should be accorded the first right of refusal for all UNcontrolled resources, with possible cost reimbursement arrangements to be calculated on a nonprofit, equitable In addition, agreements basis. between the UN and the MNF are necessary to coordinate shared use of specified resources. Claims relating to incidents occurring prior to the MNF

assuming command of operations are the responsibility of the UN.

- To effect a smooth transition. working groups should be established at the appropriate levels to coordinate administrative, financial, and logistic matters.
- A critical component of the transition is the reorganization, certification, and reflagging of possible UN units, including logistic forces, to the MNFC.

c. Withdrawal of US Forces from a Multinational Operation. In supporting the US National Security Strategy, US forces may need to withdraw from a multinational operation in order to execute other missions. US forces participating in a multinational operation must maintain sufficient flexibility in multinational logistic arrangements, to the extent warranted by NCA risk assessments, to be able to logistically disengage from the operation and to support redeployment to another operation area.

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Conversely, MNFCs must plan for the possibility that US multinational logistic support may be withdrawn to support other US operations. In particular, the MNFC should develop contingency plans addressing alternative sources of support in the following areas, to which the United States may be a major contributor:

- LOGCAP and AFCAP functions.
- RSN provision of fuel.
 - LN functions, including POD operations.
 - Level III health service support.

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APPENDIX A COMMANDER'S CHECKLIST FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

checkl	istic operations as described in this publication cover a wide spectrum of subjects. It ist provided below offers the MNFC, the US JFC, and logisticians participating ational operations a tool for use in logistic support.
2. P	lanning
	Is the planning for the multinational operation underway concurrently by operation and logistic planners?
	What is the nature of the operation — warfighting or MOOTW?
	Will the forces be organized along component or national lines?
	Will a Combined Joint Task Force be formed? If so, to what extent has the logist C2 structure been identified and staffed?
	Has a JFC been designated to provide US input and interface with the multinatio planning element, especially for logistics?
	Will the US planning element represent both the operations and logistic communitie
	Has the force logistical concept and requirements been identified?
	Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of mission?
	What authority has the US ceded to the MNFC relative to control/redistribution logistic units and logistic assets?
	What infrastructure may be available in the operational area?
	What goods and services may be made by the host nations and/or contract?
	What is the quality of the health service capability in the operational area?
	Has a logistic determination been made. (i.e., what countries will provide what pion of the logistic system, health services to include aeromedical evacuation and heat service logistics)?
	What are the opportunities to establish a RSN responsibility?

Has the US offered to assume RSN responsibility for a specific logistic area?
 What area is the US able and willing to be designated as a RSN?
 What is the opportunity for the US to develop or use existing bilateral and multilateral agreements with allies involved in the operation?
 Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in the form of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?
 What action is being taken to obtain waivers to US legal authorities to engage in mutual logistic support with other nations?
 What LN responsibilities have been assigned and accepted?
 What US element is charged to assure that the necessary ACSAs and related implementing agreements are in place with participants?
 What will be the logistic C2 organization for the operation?
 What, if any, US logistic elements will be attached to multinational headquarters?
 Have logistic supported and supporting command relationships been established or referred to higher headquarters for resolution?
 Has the multinational command structure been designed to eliminate unnecessary duplication of logistic functions?
 Has the US structure been similarly aligned?
 Have coordinating centers been established for movements, medical, contracting infrastructure engineering, and logistic operations?
 Where will they be assigned?
 What authority will such centers have?
 What is the plan to transition goods, services, and contracts from existing in-theater users such as the UN?
 What automated system will be used to establish and execute the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL)?
 What will be the US contribution to strategic lift of forces other than US?
 Has the deployment plan deconflicted NGO/IO and contractor transportation requirements in order to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?

 What LOCs are to be established?
 What will be the responsibilities assigned relative the LOCs from reception to in theater destinations?
 What en route support will national elements require?
 What role will the multinational headquarters play vis-a-vis the sending nations with regard to external en route support?
 Has an environmental checklist been prepared for elements, including the US, for us in assuming responsibility for in-theater facilities?
 What are MNF/host nation policies relative to the handling, movement, storage, and disposal of hazardous material?
 Will there be rear area security responsibilities for logistics units?
 Will the US establish a NSE?
 Will the mission of the US NSE be to support all US components or will there be separate NSEs for each US component of the MNF?
 Where will NSE(s) be located?
 What US liaison elements are needed?
 Does the US have a process to insure that US liaison elements on multinational command staffs possess requisite authorities and have a full understanding of both national interest and multinational objectives?
 Have standards regarding logistic capabilities been established for certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated method or resolution?
 What organization will inspect and ascertain compliance with logistic-related standards prior to deployment?
 How will the logistic C2 structure coordinate with the CMOC, if established?
 Who has responsibility for negotiating a SOFA with the host nation(s) to include those through which elements of the MNF must traverse? What is status?
 Who is responsible for negotiating the technical arrangements to supplement the SOFA?
What US elements are participating in these negotiations?

	Are forces — MNF and US — sufficiently robust "logistically" to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?
	What efforts have been made to pool information with relevant IOs, NGOs, and PVOs, to enhance efficiency through coordination and eliminate redundancy in operations?
	Has the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence system been established to rapidly disseminate to all participants, time sensitive logistic related information?
	What mechanisms are in place to protect logistic information data bases? In case of cyber attack, what is available to utilize to still provide logistic support?
	Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?
	Does the US have an ACSA with each participating nation? If not, what will be the legal mechanism for exchanging logistic support?
	Has the US identified the main point of contact for C2 of contractor personnel?
	What are the MNF contractual policies and process?
	What agency will manage this process?
	To what extent has the US accepted the MNFC's authority to redistribute US logistic assets and services?
	Have logistic policies, processes, and reporting procedures been established and promulgated throughout the force?
	Has US and Multinational funding been identified to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets?
	Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs and expenditures?
	Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?
	Has funding been identified to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets?
	Are medical facilities identified to support the operation? What is the status of evacuation plans, both intra- and intertheater?

	To what extent will the US strategic medical evacuation capabilities be required to support the multinational forces?
	Have necessary provisions been made to allow rendering of such health support to foreign forces?
	Are chemical weapon threats known and are the US and MNF medical facilities prepared to cope with their possible use?
	What plans does the US and the MNF have to decontaminate personnel and materiel?
	To what extent will the MNF and the US need to provide such support to local civilia population?
	Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service multinational casualties to include recognition of culture differences in dealing with casualties?
	What is MNF plan to handle and care for prisoners of war (POW's)? US plan an role?
	What will be POW turn-over procedures and to what nation?
	What is MNF demining plan?
	What are the logistic support requirements for that plan?
	What logistic support is needed by MNF and US in the restoration of local government?
· · · · ·	What are MNF and US logistic requirements to support local population?
	What smaller participating nations have sizable equipment compatibility wit respective LNs? Does the MNF plan assure that these nations are linked together t enhance mutual support?
	What level of sustainment stocks is mandated by MNFC to maintain in the operationa area? What level should US maintain?
	What is MNF process to obtain and allocate indigenous labor in theater?
	What is MNF and US theater evacuation policy?
	What is process of reimbursement between US and multinational partners?
	What MNF rules govern the transport, storage and disposal of hazardous materiel?
	To what extent does US intend to contribute to and use a MNF Blood Bank?

	Is there any plan for the US forces to develop an Initial Preplanned Supply Suppor package?
	What element is responsible for force protection planning?
	What element will be responsible to identify force protection threats?
	Has munitions site planning been conducted?
	Have munitions control/security procedures been established?
3. I	Deployment
	What is the MNF requirements determination process for flowing the MNF forces interest the theater?
	Has a MNF time-phased force and deployment data/TPFDL been established? What is the method of insertion of forces into the theater?
	Is there a need for a LOTS operation? If so is that identified in a separate plan?
	What is the MNF plan to manage the flow of force into the operational area for th MNFC?
	What will be the US management and operational responsibilities to support deployment?
	What is the MNF plan to use US strategic lift capability to support deployment?
	What will be the reception ports of entry (to include border crossing points) into the operational area?
	What are MNF security arrangements for the POEs/PODs?
	What LOCs will be used?
	What is the plan to manage use of the LOCs?
	What LOC will the US use?
	What will be the US responsibilities for that LOC?
	What is MNF reception, staging and onward movement plan to include en rout support for US forces?
	Has the MNFC selected and allocated staging areas and tactical unit assembly areas?

 What staging areas and tactical assembly areas have been allocated by the MNFC fo US use?
 What MNF agreements have been made for en route support of deploying forces to include the US?
 Is the MNFC obtaining clearances for MNF elements transiting en route nations?
 What is MNF security plan for reception points in objective area?
 What is MNF plan for coordinating IO, NGO, and PVO movement into the operation area?
 What is the process to manage road and rail movement into and out of the theater?
 Who has that management responsibility?
 Who will be the US manager of that flow?
 What are the reception requirements for the force moving by these modes?
 Who has highway regulation and control responsibility?
 Have custom and border clearances been planned for? Obtained? By Whom?
 What HNS will be available, if any, to support US forces entering into the operation area?
 To what extent does the US plan to use the LOGCAP and the AFCAP during th operation?
 Who will manage this process?
 Will there be a single MNF manager for TPL to include HNS, LOGCAP, AFCAP and other contractor support?
 Who will be the US manager to interface into this process?
 What MNFC and US logistic capability needs to be deployed very early?
 What assets have been identified by the MNFC to be critical and require visibility?
 Does the US agree to provide such visibility to MNFC? To what extent will thi information be shared with other MNF participants?
 What is the mechanism and frequency of reporting such information?
 Is there an force protection plan?

Appendix A 4. Termination/Redeployment 3 The check list for deployment also applies in large measure to the redeployment process. 4 The following represent some additional issues associated with termination and redeployment. 5 6 Has the end state, exit strategy and redeployment plan been developed by the MNFC? 7 8 What is status of US redeployment plan? 9 10 Has the redeployment TPFDD and TPFDL been developed and validated? 11 12 What are the host nation and US customs/agriculture requirements? 13 14 Have the US Customs and Border Clearance agencies, particularly the US Department of Agriculture, been contracted to determine requirements for returning cargo and 15 16 passengers? 17 What US forces, equipment and materiel will remain in theater? 18 19 20 What will be support requirements for this force? 21 22 What MNF forces and materiel will remain in place? 23 24 What is the MNF plan to dispose of excess or unusable or equipment where 25 transportation costs exceed new purchase costs? 26 27 What is MNF plan for disposal of hazardous items? 28 29 What is the MNF force protection plan for withdrawing forces? 30 31 What logistic support will be required for withdrawal? 32 33 What is MNF close-out plan for facilities? Does it include a checklist for 34 environmental issues? 35 What will be the role of LOGCAP and AFCAP during US withdrawal? 36 37 38 What is estimated cost for facility restoration? 39 40 Who will pay for the restoration? US or common-funding? 41 42 What is the plan to dispose of equipment procured through MNF resources? 43 44 What will be destination for US equipment? 45 What will be equipment readiness standards to be met before being redeployed? 46 47 A-8 JTP 4-08

	Where will equipment being withdrawn be brought to standards? Are facilities adequate for the task?
	Have standards been established for equipment being relocated?
5. T	ransition Considerations
	Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption o in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency o alliance?
	Will the United States be asked to provide additional logistic resource or units to support the operation?
	To what extent can other participating nations provide logistic resources that will reduce the US logistic contribution to the operation?
	To what extent have the additional logistic requirements of the operation beer rationalized given the increased scope of the operation?
	To what extent has the logistic structure been identified to meet logistic requirement above the maneuver unit level, e.g., corps or theater-level logistic units.
	How will the US JTF C2 structure be affected? Will the US assume command of the operation?
	If the US is to lead the operation, to what extent will its C2 organization be augmented by personnel from other participating nations?
	Will a MNFC be established to coordinate logistic support for the operation?
	What degree of authority for logistics will be given for the operation?
	To what extent will the United States accept the concept of directive authority fo logistics for the MNFC?
	How will costs of the operation be apportioned amongst participating members?
	To what degree will up-front common funding be made available and for what uses?
	Have appropriate MOUs been developed to formalize relations among the participating nations?
	To what extent do participating nations have open FMS cases with the United States to facilitate participating in US logistic support?
	To what extent is the United States willing to accept RSN functions for the operation Have the necessary approvals been obtained?

 What modifications are necessary to existing SOFAs and TAs to accommodate force from the additional countries?
 What agreements are necessary to permit the redistribution of logistic resources during emergency conditions? Have all participating nations agreed to those provisions?
 To what extent will US logistic policies and procedures be changed to satisfy eithe UN or regional alliance policies and procedures?
 Have logistic policies, procedures, processes, and reporting requirements been identified and promulgated?
 Has the ability of transferred units to support themselves and/or logistic deficiencie been identified?
 If a NATO operation, to what extent and in what areas will NATO STANAGS bused?
 Will the participating nations provide logistically robust units that are self-sufficient?
 To what extent can existing contracts supporting US forces be amended to support the additional forces?

APPENDIX B DRAFT MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS ANNEX TO OPLAN

1	The following Draft Multinational Logistics Annex is based upon using the conventional US
2	five-paragraph order format. Also provided is a draft annex using a notional multinational
3	format. The notional multinational format is provided to acquaint US logistic planners with an
4	alternate format that they may encounter while planning to participate in a multinational
5	operation.
6	
7	REFERENCES
8	
9	1. SITUATION.
10	
11	a. Friendly Forces
12	
13	b. Enemy Forces
14	
15	2. MISSION. Statement of the MNFC's logistic support objective.
16	
17	3. EXECUTION. The MNFC's overall concept for logistic support, with specific guidance
18	concerning the following:
19	
20	a. Geographical Lead Nation
21	
22	b. Functional Role Specialist Nations
23	
24	c. Use of Contractor Support
25	
26	d. Logistic certification process regarding logistic capabilities of participating nations (if
27	necessary)
28	
29	4. LOGISTIC SUPPORT. (Detailed description of specific support concepts for various
30	classes of supply and services that delineate policy, requirements, tasks, and responsibilities of
31	nations and the multinational force by phase of operation and use of multinational logistic
32	support arrangements. Those functions that require significant centralized coordination, e.g.,
33	movement control, infrastructure engineering, medical support, and contracting, may be
34	discussed in separate appendices. Use may be made also of a support matrix and overlay.)
35	
36	a. Materiel and Services
37	
38	(1) Supply. Provide information by class of supply. For each subparagraph, list general
39	national or multinational considerations. List multinational supply point locations, if
40	applicable, and state supply plan and procedures. Post supply point locations to the support

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43 44 matrix and overlay.

(a) Class I. Rations. List ration cycle.

(b) Class II Organizational Clathing and Equipment and many Classified man requests
(b) Class II. Organizational Clothing and Equipment and maps. Classified map requests submitted through CJ-2.
(c) Class III. Petroleum, oil, and lubricants. Bulk and packaged fuel considerations, especially the possible use of role specialist nation for bulk fuel.
(d) Class IV. Construction and fortification materiels. Identify Restricted Items List considerations or command controlled items.
(e) Class V. Munitions. List consumption supply rates, stockage objectives, and procedures to request explosive ordnance detachment support.
(f) Class VI. Personal Demand Items. Health and comfort packs and items normally sold through the exchange service.
(g) Class VII. Major End Items. List command controlled items.
(h) Class VIII. Medical Material.
(i) Class IX. Repair Parts. List critical shortage and command controlled items. State the approving authority for controlled exchange of parts.
(j) Class X. Material for nonmilitary and civil affairs operations.
(k) Miscellaneous Guidance. For items that are not in one of the ten (10) classes of supply, e.g.; captured material and salvage material. Provide Restricted Items List.
(2) Transportation. Identify the facility locations, movement and traffic control and regulation measures, main supply routes (MSR) and alternate supply routes (ASR), transportation critical shortages, and essential movement/transportation data not provided elsewhere. Movement control procedures may be contained in a separate appendix. Provide multinational movement and transportation considerations by node. Post MSR, ASR, and transportation nodes to the support matrix and overlay.
(a) Land
(b) Sea
(c) Air
(3) Services. Identify services available via contract and multinational logistic support arrangements. The designation of the means and location of units providing support services, and the time the service will be available. List multinational procedures by type for requesting services. Post services to the support matrix and overlay.
(a) Construction. Include civil engineering.

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Draft Multinational Logistics Annex to OPLAN
(b) Showers, laundry, clothing repair, and light textile repair.
(c) Mortuary Affairs. Address cultural issues applicable to the composition of the multinational force.
(d) Food Preparation. Address cultural considerations and dietary concerns applicable to the composition of the multinational force. Indicate, if applicable, contractor responsibilities for storage, distribution and preparation.
(e) Water Purification. Indicate site locations, storage and distribution requirements, and availability of packaged water products.
(f) Aerial Delivery. Give rules for air space utilization when making deliveries.
(g) Installation Service. State requirements for refuse collection, storage and removal, snow removal, heating fuel availability and distribution, and hazardous waste collection, storage and removal.
(h) Labor. Include essential information as appropriate regarding use of local national labor, third country national labor, and contractor personnel.
(4) Maintenance. For each subparagraph, include priority of maintenance, location of facilities and collection points, repair time limits and evacuation procedures. Post maintenance points to the support service matrix and overlay.
(a) Air
(b) Ground
(c) Watercraft
b. Medical Evacuation and Treatment. State plan for collection and medical treatment of sick, injured or wounded personnel, prisoners of war and civilians. Discuss support requirements for combat health support logistics to include blood management, combat stress control, preventive medicine, dental services, and veterinary service. Post hospital locations and fixed medical evacuation sites to the support service matrix and the overlay.
(1) Evacuation. Explain inter- and intratheater evacuation policy. Give procedures for obtaining both from theater assets. Identify fixed evacuation sites on service support matrix and overlay.
(2) Hospitalization. Define levels (Roles 1 thru 4) of hospital care available in the theater and procedures for casualty admittance. Give respective levels of multinational medical care available in theater.
c. Personnel. Detail multinational plans for unit strength maintenance, personnel management, morale development and maintenance, discipline, law and order, headquarters

procedures for management of common funds provided. Identify use of multinational logistic support arrangements, if not previously provided. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Chain of Command. Address the difference in command relationships between US commanders and the MNFC. Describe use of authorities, especially directive authority and coordinating authority, and the importance of coordination, consultation, and cooperation among commanders at all levels. State rear area security responsibilities that may apply to logistic units or commands. (1) US command responsibilities and authorities for logistics. (2) MNFC responsibilities and authorities for logistics. b. Signal Communications. Ensure all logistic facilities and operators have interactive communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security		management, religious support, force provider, and force protection. Discuss impact of national rotation policies upon multinational logistic organizations.
d. Host-Nation Support. Reference bilateral and multilateral agreements in effect. e. Miscellaneous. Give details for obtaining funding for theater projects, indicate procedures for management of common funds provided. Identify use of multinational logistic support arrangements, if not previously provided. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Chain of Command. Address the difference in command relationships between US commanders and the MNFC. Describe use of authorities, especially directive authority and coordinating authority, and the importance of coordination, consultation, and cooperation among commanders at all levels. State rear area security responsibilities that may apply to logistic units or commands. (1) US command responsibilities and authorities for logistics. b. Signal Communications. Ensure all logistic facilities and operators have interactive communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security clearances and the correct procedure for overcoming this constraint. State logistical reporting		(1) Unit Strength Management
e. Miscellaneous. Give details for obtaining funding for theater projects, indicate procedures for management of common funds provided. Identify use of multinational logistic support arrangements, if not previously provided. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Chain of Command. Address the difference in command relationships between US commanders and the MNFC. Describe use of authorities, especially directive authority and coordinating authority, and the importance of coordination, consultation, and cooperation among commanders at all levels. State rear area security responsibilities that may apply to logistic units or commands. (1) US command responsibilities and authorities for logistics. b. Signal Communications. Ensure all logistic facilities and operators have interactive communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security clearances and the correct procedure for overcoming this constraint. State logistical reporting		(2) Morale
procedures for management of common funds provided. Identify use of multinational logistic support arrangements, if not previously provided. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Chain of Command. Address the difference in command relationships between US commanders and the MNFC. Describe use of authorities, especially directive authority and coordinating authority, and the importance of coordination, consultation, and cooperation among commanders at all levels. State rear area security responsibilities that may apply to logistic units or commands. (1) US command responsibilities and authorities for logistics. (2) MNFC responsibilities and authorities for logistics. b. Signal Communications. Ensure all logistic facilities and operators have interactive communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security clearances and the correct procedure for overcoming this constraint. State logistical reporting		d. Host-Nation Support. Reference bilateral and multilateral agreements in effect.
 a. Chain of Command. Address the difference in command relationships between US commanders and the MNFC. Describe use of authorities, especially directive authority and coordinating authority, and the importance of coordination, consultation, and cooperation among commanders at all levels. State rear area security responsibilities that may apply to logistic units or commands. (1) US command responsibilities and authorities for logistics. (2) MNFC responsibilities and authorities for logistics. b. Signal Communications. Ensure all logistic facilities and operators have interactive communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security clearances and the correct procedure for overcoming this constraint. State logistical reporting 		procedures for management of common funds provided. Identify use of multinational logistic
commanders and the MNFC. Describe use of authorities, especially directive authority and coordinating authority, and the importance of coordination, consultation, and cooperation among commanders at all levels. State rear area security responsibilities that may apply to logistic units or commands. (1) US command responsibilities and authorities for logistics. (2) MNFC responsibilities and authorities for logistics. b. Signal Communications. Ensure all logistic facilities and operators have interactive communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security clearances and the correct procedure for overcoming this constraint. State logistical reporting		5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
 (2) MNFC responsibilities and authorities for logistics. b. Signal Communications. Ensure all logistic facilities and operators have interactive communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security clearances and the correct procedure for overcoming this constraint. State logistical reporting 		a. Chain of Command. Address the difference in command relationships between US commanders and the MNFC. Describe use of authorities, especially directive authority and coordinating authority, and the importance of coordination, consultation, and cooperation among commanders at all levels. State rear area security responsibilities that may apply to logistic units or commands.
b. Signal Communications. Ensure all logistic facilities and operators have interactive communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security clearances and the correct procedure for overcoming this constraint. State logistical reporting		(1) US command responsibilities and authorities for logistics.
communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security clearances and the correct procedure for overcoming this constraint. State logistical reporting		(2) MNFC responsibilities and authorities for logistics.
		b. Signal Communications. Ensure all logistic facilities and operators have interactive communications to include automation. Address multinational participant disparate security clearances and the correct procedure for overcoming this constraint. State logistical reporting requirements.

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	Draft Multinational Logistics Annex to OPLAN
	NOTIONAL MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS ANNEX
RI	EFERENCES
1.	GENERAL.
2.	SITUATION.
;	a. Friendly Supporting Activities.
1	b. Resource Availability.
3.	ASSUMPTIONS.
4.	MISSION (or LOGISTIC OBJECTIVES).
5.	CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC OPERATIONS. (General Description)
;	a. General Support Concept.
1	b. Logistic Command and Control.
	e. Logistic Responsibilities of MNFC and Contributing Nations.
	d. Lines of Communication.
	e. HNS Support Concept.
	f. NGO/PVO Participation and Coordination.
	g. General Concept for Other Key Logistic Functions.
]	h. Key Logistic Tasks by Phase of Operation.
6.	TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. (Detailed description)
;	a. Logistic Responsibilities of MNFC and Subordinate Organizational Elements.
1	b. Logistic Responsibilities of Lead Nations and Role Specialist Nations.
	c. Logistic Responsibilities of Contributing Nations and other Troop Commanders.
7.	MATERIEL AND SERVICES. (Detailed description of specific support concepts for
	rious classes of supply and services that delineate policy, requirements, tasks and
	ponsibilities of nations and MNFC by phase of operation, and multinational logistic support
	angements. Those functions that require significant MNFC coordination — e.g., movement
	ntrol, medical support, infrastructure engineering, and contracting — are discussed in parate sections or appendices.)

a. GENERAL CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
(1) Role of NSEs, Coordination Between NSEs and MNF Organizations.
(2) Supplies and Services Provided Multinationally.
(3) Role of Contracting.
(4) Days of Supply, National Stockage Objectives, Storage and Transshipment.
b. SUPPLY (Specific concepts for each class of supply, emphasizing the multinational logistic support aspects, where applicable.)
(1) Class I: Rations, Water, Ice
(2) Class II: General Supplies
(3) Class III: Fuel and Lubricants
(4) Class IV: Construction Materials
(5) Class V: Ammunition
(6) Class VI: Personal Demand Items
(7) Class VII: Major End Items
(8) Class VIII: Medical
(a) Class VIII-b, blood and blood products
(9) Class IX: Spare Parts
c. SERVICES
(1) Maintenance
(2) Laundry and Bath
(3) Refuse Collection and Disposal
(4) Toxic Waste Disposal
(5) Mortuary Affairs
(6) Facilities

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(7) Moral, Welfare, Recreation	
(Functions that require significant MNFC coordination are described in the follational separate sections.)	owin
TRANSPORTATION AND MOVEMENT CONTROL.	
MEDICAL SUPPORT AND EVACUATION.	
. CIVIL ENGINEERING.	
. CONTRACTING (Including Restricted Items List considerations.)	
• FUNDING SUPPORT. (Especially emphasizing the availability, use, and account common funding.)	abili
. HOST-NATION SUPPORT.	
ENVIRONMENT (Including provisions for the handling and transport of hazaterial and waste.)	ardou
. ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL.	
. LOGISTIC REPORTING.	
. LOGISTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS.	
. FORCE PROTECTION.	
. CONTINGENCY PLANS.	

Appendix B		
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APPENDIX C

RELEVANT LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR US LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. General

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This appendix describes the general features associated with implementing agreements and financial requirements of the key legal authorities for multinational logistics operations. As noted in Chapter III, "Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements," US combatant commanders may not enter into logistic multinational support arrangements without specific legal authority and prior negotiation of appropriate agreements. These legal authorities differ significantly in terms of required conditions, type of permitted support, and implementation procedures. A complete description of the relevant statutes and associated implementation procedures may be found in the applicable DOD directives cited in Appendix G, "References."

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2. Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement Authority

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a. General Description. The ACSA authority was developed primarily to facilitate reciprocal logistic support during combined exercises, training, deployments, operations, or other cooperative efforts and for unforeseen circumstances or emergencies. The ACSA legislation provides authority for US forces to perform the following:

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• Acquire logistic support from foreign sources.

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• Exchange logistic support with coalition partners through cross-servicing agreements.

44 Among other things, the ACSA 45 authority waives selected provisions 46 of US contracting law and prescribes 47 ordering and reimbursement procedures

- 48 that are more flexible than those 49 permitted under other authorities, such
- 50 as the Arms Export Control Act. The
- 51 type of logistic support that may be 52 acquired or transferred under the ACSA is
- 53 broadly defined; it includes food, billeting,54 transportation (including airlift), POL,
- 55 clothing, medical and communications
- 56 services, ammunition, spare parts, and

b. Implementing Agreement. ACSA

57 other logistic services.

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acquisition-only authority is generally 60 implemented through an acquisition 61 agreement documenting the terms and the 63 condition of acquisition transaction. Exchanges of logistic support (which include both acquisition and provision of support) require the prior 66 negotiation of a bilateral ACSA and IA 67 68 between the DOD and the foreign nation. 69 Geographic combatant commanders may 70 initiate and conclude cross servicing agreements with ACSA-eligible nations when delegated the authority by the 73 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 74 Geographic combatant commanders may 75 also negotiate and conclude IAs, or delegate this authority to a Service component commander. Parties eligible to 77 conclude ACSAs with the United States 78 79 include NATO and other allies (and subsidiary organizations), the United 80 81 Nations, basing rights countries, and other 82 nations designated by the Secretary of 83 Defense in consultation with the Secretary 84 of State.

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86 c. Financial Requirements. A key87 ACSA provision is the range of

Appendix C

reimbursement options permitted for logistic exchanges: payment in cash, replacement in kind, or replacement by supplies or services of equal value. Furthermore, the terms of reimbursement may be negotiated by the US and foreign parties on a transaction-by-transaction basis. That is, the providing party (which determines the form of reimbursement) may require cash reimbursement in one 11 exchange transaction but accept replacement in kind or replacement of 12 13 equal value in another.

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3. Cooperative Military Airlift **Agreements**

a. General Requirements. **CMAA** (10 USC section 2350c) provides authority for US forces to acquire or exchange airlift support from foreign sources and/or coalition partners in combined exercises, training, deployments, operations, other cooperative efforts, and unforeseen circumstances emergencies. or USCINCTRANS is the single DOD authority for CMAAs.

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b. Implementation. The CMAA itself normally sets forth the terms, conditions, and procedures to be followed by the United States and the allied country involved. Operational, financial, and other detailed procedures may be included in a technical annex or appendix to the No additional agreements are CMAA. required.

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c. Financial Requirements. 2350c states that the rate of reimbursement 41 for transportation shall be the same for 42 each party and not less than the rate charged to military forces of the United 44 States. Credits and liabilities may be liquidated as agreed upon between the parties, either by in-kind transportation

services or by direct payment. liquidation must occur on a regular basis, 50 but not less often than once every 12 months. CMAAs may not be used by allied countries to transport defense 52 articles purchased under the AECA at less than the full rate of reimbursement that is 54 equal to the cost of transportation (see 55 paragraph 4). 56

4. Arms Export Control Act

a. **General Description.** The AECA of 1976 was developed primarily to manage and regulate the sales of major weapons systems and associated support and training to foreign countries or IOs, but it can and has been used as the authority for transfers of logistic support. Among other things, the AECA provides authority for the following:

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· Sales of defense articles or services from existing DOD stocks

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· Sales of defense articles or services from new procurement managed by DOD

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• Sale of DOD design or construction services.

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Collectively, these government-togovernment sales of defense articles or services are known as FMS or foreign military construction sales. The AECA imposes few restrictions on the type of goods and services that can be sold, but it does contain specific provisions regarding purchaser eligibility, third country retransfers congressional notification/ certification. reporting. 90 However, most of these restrictions apply to sales of high cost, high technology weapons systems; few apply to FMS made in support of US multinational logistics obligations.

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Relevant Legal Authorities for US Logistic Support in Multinational Operations

b. Implementing Agreement. All sales under the AECA must be documented in formal government-to government agreements, known as a LOAs are generally initiated, negotiated, and implemented by the materiel and logistic commands of the Military Departments and reviewed and approved by the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency; the geographic combatant commands (and their components) have little formal role in 12 these processes. The negotiation of LOAs required to fulfill US multinational logistic 14 responsibilities can be time-consuming, 15 particularly when many nations expect to receive support through FMS at the same time. In some cases this process may take 60 to 90 days.

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c. Financial Requirements. The **AECA** generally requires advance payment in US dollars for all FMS transactions. For US and multinational commanders, this requirement means that US logistic support authorized under the AECA cannot be provided until the recipient makes the agreed-on deposit in the United States. In addition, to ensure uninterrupted US support for the duration of the operation, the foreign purchaser must agree to pay the full value of the contract by which the item or service is procured, as well administrative and research and development recoupment charges, where applicable. The advance payment requirement means that no appropriated US funds are involved in the transfer of support under the AECA. Thus, such transfers would not be affected by any DOD authorization or appropriation act provisions regulating logistic transfers involving the use of appropriated funds, such as those under the ACSA.

5. Foreign Assistance Act

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a. General Description. The FAA of 1961 contains a broad range of authorities to provide financial aid or sell/transfer free of charge military goods or services to foreign countries or IOs. Although less important for multinational logistic operations than the ACSA and AECA, two provisions of the FAA are important: Section 506 (22 USC 2318) drawdowns and Section 607 (22 USC 2357) reimbursable sales.

Section 506(a)(1) provides authority to the President, on determination that an unforeseen emergency requiring immediate military aid to a country or IO exists, to direct the drawdown of existing DOD stocks or training services for transfer to a foreign country or IO. The 67 value of DOD stocks and training provided under this authority cannot exceed \$100 million in any fiscal year, and the drawdown equipment or supplies must come from existing stocks; no new 72 procurement is authorized. Additionally, Section 506(a)(2) authorizes up to \$75 million in DOD drawdowns in any fiscal specifically year for support counterdrug, disaster relief, and migrant and refugee assistance. The second authority, Section 607 of the FAA, allows Government US department (including DOD) to provide commodities and services to friendly foreign nations or on an advance-of-funds reimbursable basis. The agency providing support under Section 607 may also contract with nongovernmental personnel to assist in providing that support.

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b. Implementing Agreement. Section 506 drawdowns generally do not require a specific implementing agreement.

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However, support under Section 607 is usually provided under an agreement (known as a Section 607 agreement) negotiated between the intended foreign recipient of logistic support and the US State Department. The agreement defines the general terms and conditions for any US Government support for an individual country or specific UN mission. A signed 10 607 agreement expresses the policy 11 Department's approval 12 providing US support to a country or UN mission but does not commit the DOD to honor every UN support request. It does, however, eliminate the requirement for State Department review of individual support requests. Within the DOD, any 17 Section 607 support that is to be managed 18 through security assistance channels 19 20 (generally equipment leases and repair 21 parts provided by Military Department materiel commands) will be implemented 22 also though an LOA. Support provided 23 directly by US operational commands is usually not implemented through a 25 26 specific agreement.

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c. Financial Requirements. Section 506 does not require reimbursement for the provided equipment, supplies, or services, but it does require the DOD to closely monitor the value of stocks and training drawndown to ensure that the annual cap is not exceeded. The act authorizes supplemental appropriations to reimburse the providing DOD component for drawdowns but such appropriations require separate congressional action. By contrast, Section 607 requires the foreign country or IO to pay for US support, but imposes no specific deadline reimbursement. However, the law does state that the DOD component providing logistic support may receive reimbursement only if payment was received within 6 months after the end

of the fiscal year in which support was 48 provided. Payments received after this 49 period must generally be deposited in the 50 US Treasury. 51

6. Federal Property and **Administrative Service Act**

a. General Description. The Federal Property and Administrative Service Act permits any US Government agency, including DOD, to transfer FEPP to foreign countries for foreign currency, substantial benefits, or the discharge of claims. Within DOD, FEPP is defined as any DOD property, excluding major naval vessels and records of the DOD, not discharge of DOD required for responsibilities that is located outside the 66 United States and designated island territories (Puerto Rico, American Samoa, 68 Guam, the Trust territories of the Pacific Islands, and the US Virgin Islands). 70 Property that may be transferred under this authority includes such logistic items as accommodations, construction materiel, food, and medical equipment that are both excess to DOD requirements and/or costly to remove from a foreign country.

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b. Implementing Agreement. Transfers of logistic items under the 80 Federal Property and Administrative Service Act are implemented by a MOU developed by the cognizant Military Department and coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Among other things, the MOU identifies 86 the items to be transferred, the fair market value of the items, and the tangible nonmonetary benefits to be received by the US Government in exchange for the FEPP. The geographic combatant commanders have little formal role in this process.

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	Relevant Legal Authorities for US	Logi	stic Support in Multinational Operations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Relevant Legal Authorities for US c. Financial Requirements. The Federal Property and Administrative Service Act and the implementing DOD regulations allow the Military Departments and the DLA a broad degree of latitude in determining the financial terms of the transfer. DOD requires that transfers of FEPP for "substantial benefits" must be in the overall interests of the United States and be tangible and	Logi 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	appreciable in relation to the value of property being transferred. 7. Fly American Act and the Cargo Preference Act These two authorities are fully discussed in Chapter III, "Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements."

Appendix C		
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APPENDIX D ONTRACTING CONSIDERATIONS IN MILL TINATIONAL

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US CONTRACTING CONSIDERATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL
OPERATIONS

1. General

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During the planning phase of a multinational operation, US planners must address several issues relating to contracting operations, contractors, and contractor personnel. The issues should be addressed in such documents as the SOFAs and in both multinational and national OPLANs. The issues include:

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a. Assignment of an in-theater Head of Contracting Activity for all US forces participating in the operation.

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b. Protection of contractor personnel.

18 c. Use of third-country subcontractors 19 or personnel.

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d. Limitations on the physical presence of contractors; that is, boundaries within which contractors are to operate.

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e. Payment of customs duties by contractors when entering the country.

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f. Payment of corporate or individual taxes.

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g. Payment by contractors of taxes on goods bought in the operational area.

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h. Environmental matters be addressed, including transportation and disposal criteria and locations hazardous waste and scrap.

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2. Principles of Contingency **Contracting**

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a. Contracting policies, procedures, and rules established by the MNFC must be

followed unless they violate US law, in which case the latter will apply. 45

b. The MNFC must establish certain 47 rules to govern contracting in the 48 49 operational area. Such rules are designed not to impede access of US contracting 51 officers to goods and services but rather to assure that the priority for required goods 52 and services is maintained as established 53 by the MNFC. A Multinational 54 Acquisition and Contracting Board 55 (MACB) may be established to develop 56 and promulgate procurement policies and 57 priorities on behalf of the MNFC, in conjunction with the TACO, if an MJLC 59 is established. The MACB may assist with 60 developing and disseminating 61 restricted items list. 62

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c. The senior US procurement official will coordinate with the civil-military operations staff officers of both the USJTF and the MNF to assure that the staff officers understand the total requirements being levied on the host nation through contracting and through requests for HNS.

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d. Whenever possible, contracts should be awarded to local contractors to support the local economy.

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e. The US should consider obtaining contract administration services either from the host nation or another allied 79 nation.

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3. Execution of Multinational **Contracting Operations**

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84 a. Contracting operations multinational operations require a detailed 85 understanding of customer requirements. 86 Because of the diverse and unique needs 87

Appendix D

of the various nations, these requirements will be much more complex than for US joint operations. Knowledge of these requirements will help assure customer satisfaction and assure that the basis for reimbursement is accurate and complete.

b. There must be a clear understanding of the standards of performance required of the contractor. The standards must be clearly understood in those instances where the US has requested contractor support from an ally or a host nation.

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c. The senior US procurement official in-theater will coordinate with the MNF 16 MACB and TACO (if established) to assure that the US benefits from any leveraging available from consolidating requirements for multiple 21 Leveraging possibilities may be developed by the TACO and the JLCC, or by the contracting officer on the staff of the MNFC. Leveraging probably will be

particularly effective in common areas, such as fuel procurement and distribution, 26 construction materials, 27 transportation, staging areas, and lodging. 29

> d. A US warranted contracting officer should be attached to the TACO or staff

> element at the multinational force

headquarters to take full advantage of

available leveraging possibilities.

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36 Normal techniques used by US 37 contracting officers will be used during multinational operations subject to the 38 rules established by the MNFC. The techniques will include purchasing locally 40 and using BOAs extensively. BOAs facilitate leveraging of consolidated 42 requirements while simplifying 43 procurement process. **BOAs** are particularly useful when procuring theaterwide supplies and services, such as office supplies, food, vehicle maintenance, and construction materiel.

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APPENDIX E THE FUTURE OF MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS

1. General

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To promote and defend US national interests in an uncertain world of constantly evolving threats, the Armed Forces of the United States will continue to enhance joint warfighting capabilities into the next millennium. In fact, guided by Joint Vision (JV) 2010, US efforts to achieve and maintain full-spectrum battlespace dominance through new doctrine, operational concepts, technology, and information systems should intensify.

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The implementation of JV 2010 and other developments could have significant implications for US participation in multinational logistics. If current trends toward more multilateralism international relations continue, the requirement for multinational logistics will In several ways, however, increase. planning. organizing, and executing multinational logistics could become more challenging.

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2. JV 2010 and Focused Logistics

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JV 2010 prescribes a new joint warfighting "template" for US forces that is based on the four operational concepts of Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics and the two enabling concepts of Information Superiority and Technological Invention. The aim of Focused Logistics is to quickly deliver forces and sustaining supplies to warfighters where and when they need it and to do this with a reduced logistic footprint in the operational area. To achieve these aims will require new or enhanced logistic information systems, C2

45 organizations, doctrine, equipment, and 46 legal mechanisms.

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48 By implementing JV 2010 and 49 supporting Service "visions" that foresee more lethal, mobile, flexible, responsive, 50 survivable, and logistically leaner forces, 51 the United States could move so far ahead 52 of other countries in its warfighting 53 concepts and systems technology that in 55 10 years or so US forces will have 56 difficulty operating with other countries.

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58 Focused Logistics in particular could 59 of multinational hamper support operations unless steps are taken to 60 enhance logistics interoperability between 61 and United States 62 potential multinational partners. In recognition of 63 64 this fact, the Focused Logistics roadmap identifies "multinational logistics" as one 65 of six guiding concepts, although all of the emerging operational concepts have 67 important implications for multinational 68 logistics. In general, Focused Logistics 69 will affect multinational logistics by 70

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 Enhancing selected US strategic logistic capabilities, such as strategic lift, that could help multinational partners deploy and sustain their forces;

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 Reducing the availability of tactical logistic resources in the operational area and thereby diminish the ability of US forces to provide emergency logistic support to partners; and,

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 Giving US logisticians and MNFCs greater visibility over logistic assets so that available resources can be most effectively used to support the MNFC's operational priorities.

Appendix E

a. **Multinational Logistics.** US forces must be able to take advantage of multinational logistic support arrangements to achieve the key objectives of Focused Logistics — responsive, tailored support to the warfighter with reduced logistics footprint. The Focused Logistics "roadmap" contains a number of initiatives that will enhance using multinational logistics to help support US forces and to collectively ensure the success of a multinational operation.

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 Negotiate additional ACSAs with potential partners to further the geographic combatant commander's Strategy of Cooperative Engagement.

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• Improve logistics interoperability with NATO by harmonizing US and NATO logistics doctrine.

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• Improve UN logistic capabilities.

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• Share logistic information systems with allies to promote logistic interoperability.

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 Work with allies in developing a multinational asset visibility system that would enhance mutual support by sharing critical information about the location, movement, status, and identity of US logistic resources with the MNFC or partners.

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 Disseminate logistic information to partners to help prepare them to operate with US and other coalition forces.

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b. **Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution.** Focused Logistics calls for "a comprehensive distribution system for deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of units, personnel, materiel, and equipment to and from designated

points of need." The United States has 49 ongoing programs to ensure a rapid 50 deployment capability through 51 combination of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning. Other programs are 52 intended to establish a responsive theaterdistribution network based on latest 54 information technologies and commercial 55 practices. 56

• Deployment. The capability of US

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allies and potential coalition partners to rapidly deploy their forces by air or sea is very limited or nonexistent. The United States, therefore, could be requested by other coalition members or the MNFC to provide strategic air and sea lift for an operation perhaps as a RSN responsible for such a function. On the other hand, the United States could use foreign RSOL infrastructure and local transportation in an operation. The United States needs to work with multinational partners and MNFCs to ensure that all participants in a multinational operation are doing their part to arrange for the deployment of their own forces and that the burdens on special providers of deployment assistance (e.g., host nations and RSNs) are not excessive. Also, the United States and all other coalition participants must coordinate their deployment planning and execution with the MNFC and nations must take advantage of the intelligence information and movement control capabilities of multinational logistic organizations to facilitate deploying national force contingents.

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• Theater Distribution. Focused Logistics calls for the transition from a supply-based distribution system to a system that capitalizes on "the best

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business practices" to quickly deliver supplies to forward support activities. One of the implications of this transition from reliance on mass ("just in case") to reliance on the pipeline ("just in time") is that stocks and logistic management organizations in theater will be reduced. reduction in the US logistic footprint will limit the US capability to provide emergency, non-routine logistic assistance to partners. On the other hand, having a total asset visibility (TAV) capability will give US logisticians better visibility of the equipment and material in transit to and in the operation area so they will be able to identify available resources to assist allies if required. When individual national TAV systems are linked into a MAV system, the MNFC will have visibility of the logistic resources of all participants and will be able to help the United States receive assistance from other nations. Moreover, TAV and MAV also will help the United States and other nations reduce the flow of forces and supplies into operational area, which will ease the task of the MNFC in coordinating all the national LOCs into the theater.

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c. Information Fusion. MAV and TAV are elements of a larger effort to promote "information fusion," which aims to achieve "the timely and accurate access and integration of logistic data across units and combat support agencies throughout the world, providing reliable asset visibility and access to logistic resources in support of the warfighter." This series of initiatives is designed to give the commander real-time awareness of logistic needs and assets in the theater and to give him the C2 tools to allocate logistic resources where they are needed.

49 Information fusion programs will enable 50 the United States to more effectively support national forces using fewer logistic resources in the operation area. 52 53 Because other nations and MNFC headquarters also can use such systems to manage the support of national 55 contingents, the logistic information systems will enhance the supportability of 57 the entire multinational force. NATO and some of America's more technologically advanced allies are developing similar 60 comprehensive logistic information 61 capabilities. The challenge will be to 62 ensure interoperability between all the systems that are being developed. The 64 United States has unique military 65 requirements and must develop logistic 66 information systems that support the full range of its global military requirements. 68 Nevertheless, US logistic information 69 systems must be able to interface with 70 71 similar systems used by alliance organizations (e.g., NATO and the UN) 72 73 and major possible coalition partners.

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d. Joint **Theater** Logistic Management (JTLM). Focused Logistics identifies a requirement for 77 JTLM that optimizes support of a joint force by integrating and centrally managing movement control and material 80 management for the force. This capability could be established through a variety of options, including using an Army Theater Support Command, augmenting a J-4 staff, creating a stand-alone logistic 85 86 agency, or expanding the Logistic Readiness Center. A JTLM organization would enhance support for US forces operating both in complex logistically demanding joint US operations and in multinational operations. In the latter case. US organizations responsible for such capabilities will need to coordinate their activities with the proper coalition or alliance organizations that are responsible for theater-wide logistic coordination. In

Appendix E

fact, a US-JTLM organization could be used as the basis for an expanded capability for supporting a multinational force

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e. Force Medical Protection. Focused Logistics incorporates a new concept of medical protection that reflects the general aim of reducing the logistic footprint in the operational area. The new US medical support concept requires shifting from providing definitive care in the theater to providing "essential care in theater, enhanced aeromedical evacuation, and definitive care in CONUS." The United States is moving to this concept at the same time that some of America's NATO allies are adopting the old US concept of deploying definitive care medical assets into the operation area. One consequence of these two opposing approaches is that the United States will have fewer medical resources deployed in theater for assisting multinational partners with medical emergencies. The United States and its alliance or coalition partners should seek to harmonize approaches to theater medical protection. However, if other nations establish multinational medical capabilities for operations, US forces may be able to use those capabilities.

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f. Agile Infrastructure. The goal of the agile infrastructure initiatives is to infrastructure-related reduce forces, facilities, equipment, and supplies in the operation area by enhancing joint logistic policies, structures, and processes in inventory management, engineering, maintenance. and infrastructure improvements. The initiatives include:

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• Outsourcing and privatization of selected infrastructure functions;

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• Use of commercial business practices;

48 49 50 • Greater reliance on HNS; and,

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• A change in maintenance concept from "repair by fixing" in theater to "repair by replacing" components and evacuation to CONUS or offshore intermediate staging or base area.

56 The United States could help those 57 allies and potential partners who also are trying to streamline their logistic 58 59 infrastructure by sharing approaches and technology. For example, a multinational LOGCAP or AFCAP program, under 61 which alliance members would select and 62 63 retain a contractor to provide designated 64 logistic services, would enable alliance members and the contractor to provide 65 rapid, preplanned logistic support of a 66 multinational operation. What works for 67 the United States may not always work for other countries. The tendency is for all 69 countries to rely on HNS to fill shortfalls 70 in deployable logistic capabilities. That 71 tendency, however, makes it imperative 72 73 for the United States and all nations 74 participating in a multinational operation 75 to work closely together and with the MNFC to prioritize requirements and 76 coordinate HNS allocation so the MNFC's 77 priorities are properly supported.

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80 3. Budget Pressures and Force **Structure Downsizing**

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In response to pressures for lower defense spending, the United States and most other potential allies have or are in the process of downsizing their force structure, including logistic forces and stockpiles of supplies and materials. However, because the United States has always structured its forces to fight 90 beyond its national borders, US forces are better prepared to support operations than are other countries — most of which have

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traditionally structured their forces for homeland defense.

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Some nations tend to view the United States as a provider of logistic material to help meet logistic shortfalls. Lower budgets, downsized forces. legislative restrictions will limit the ability of the United States to provide logistic support to a multinational force. In addition, pressures will likely increase to obtain prompt reimbursement for any assistance provided.

Because of limitations in the US logistic posture, the United States needs to strengthen its security assistance programs with friendly nations to reduce their reliance on the US for support during minor contingencies or Such strengthening will MOOTW. require new approaches to this program, including critically reviewing the costs of these programs and other inhibitors to responsively transferring equipment.

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4. Allied Efforts to Improve **Defense Capabilities**

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Some of America's allies now acknowledge that they must enhance their ability to logistically support power projection so they can operate effectively

34 with the United States or, as some countries desire, operate independently in a regional organization (such as the European Union) that excludes the United 37 States. Foreign domestic budget pressures are colliding head-on with national security ambitions. However, to the extent 40 that other countries actually enhance their capability to logistically support out-of-42 43 country operations, through 44 programs as NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative, opportunities for multinational 45 logistics will expand. That expansion will 46 result in more efficient operations and cost 47 48 savings for all participants.

5. Multinational Logistics **Doctrine for the Future**

Depending on developments in US and multinational warfighting and logistic capabilities, the requirement for US participation in multinational logistics could expand in the future. The doctrine contained in this publication, however, is sound and should continue to apply in 60 foreseeable future multinational operations. The challenge for US commanders and logistic planners will be to take full advantage of the potential benefits of multinational logistics to enhance US operational capabilities and conserve resources.

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APPENDIX F CRITICAL AREAS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

Critical areas that remain contentious or are not adequately addressed in JP 4-08 and are to be evaluated during Focused Logistic Wargame 2001 are as follows. a. Planning, management and deconfliction of competition for scarce in-theater resources. • Are possible solutions for reduction in resource competition among contributing nations adequately addressed, especially in operating environments with little or no infrastructure? • Does the publication adequately discuss coordination and control of scarce resources to ensure their attribution against the Commander's highest priorities? • Is there sufficient discussion as to the means by which coordination with other nations may be accomplished? • Are legal requirements and issues that permit or deny the deconfliction of competition for in-theater resources sufficiently addressed? b. Possible/optimal command structure requirements. • Are the various possible command structure requirements, especially between/among the multinational force commander and the national support elements, sufficiently discussed in the publication to ensure the required logistic support to the force? • Does the doctrine provide sufficient description of various logistic support organizational structures that may be possible for the command and control of multinational operations? • What are the possible ramifications of various command and control structures and are they discussed sufficiently?

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> Is the doctrine consistent with existing US joint doctrine and with multinational logistics standardization agreements ratified by the US with regard to command and control structures?

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• Does the doctrine sufficiently describe the various elements of possible organizational structures?

 Are the terms used for the various support elements of possible organizational structures approved terms?

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• Has equal coverage of all options, including the use of service boards and retention of the function within the CJ-4 been provided?

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Appendix F • Is there clear delineation of what organizational structures have command authority or 1 staff cognizance? 2 3 4 c. Anti-terrorist/Force Protection (AT/FP) requirements for logistic forces. 5 6 • Does the doctrine provide an adequate description as to what constitutes adequate AT/FP requirements for logistic forces, including transiting units, during multinational 7 8 operations? 9 10 • Does the doctrine specifically provide AT/FP considerations for logistics force units outside the US main force that are providing logistic support to contributing nations? 11 12

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The development of JP 4-08 is based upon the following primary references:

1

2

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Appendix G 20. JP 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System. 21. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 22. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. 23. JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations. 24. JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. (In Development) 25. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. 26. JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations. 27. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. 28. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations. 29. JP 3-17, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations. 30. JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations. 31. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. 32. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations. 33. JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System. 34. JP 4-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations. 35. JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control. 36. JP 4-01.8, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. 37. JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations. 38. JP 4-02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Logistic Support in Joint Operations. 39. JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine. 40. JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support. 41. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

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APPENDIX H ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

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GLOSSARY PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

1	ABCA	American-British-Canadian-Australian
2	ACSA	acquisition and cross-Service agreement
3	ADAMS	Allied Deployment and Movement System
4	AECA	Arms Export Control Act
5	AFCAP	Air Force contract augmentation program
6	AFCESA	Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency
7	AJP	Allied Joint Publication
8	ALP	Allied Logistic Publication
9	ALSS	advance logistic support site
10	AMCC	Allied Movement Coordination Center
11	AOR	area of responsibility
12	ASR	alternate supply route
13	11010	atternate suppry route
14	BOA	basic ordering agreement
15	Borr	ousie ordering agreement
16	C2	command and control
17	CINC	commander of a combatant command: commander in chief
18	CJ-3	Combined-joint Operations Officer
19	CJ-4	Combined-joint Logistics Officer
20	CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
21	CJTF	combined joint task force
22	CMAA	Cooperative Military Airlift Agreement Authority
23	CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
24	COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
25	COCOW	Chief of Mission
26	COMMZ	communications zone
27	CONUS	continental United States
28	CUL	common-user logistics
29	COL	common-user logistics
30	DDP	detailed denleyment plans
31	DFAS	detailed deployment plans
32	DIRMOBFOR	Defense Finance and Accounting Service Director of Mobility Forces
33	DIA	Defense Logistics Agency
34	DOD	Department of Defense
35	DODD	Department of Defense Directive
35 36	טטטט	Department of Defense Directive
30 37	ECC	Engineering Coordination Center
38	ECC	Engineering Coordination Center
38 39	EAA	Faraign Aggistance Agt
	FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
40	FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
41	FEPP	foreign excess personal property
42	FLS	forward logistic site
43	FMS	foreign military sales
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HNS	host-nation support
HNSCC	Host-Nation Support Coordination Center
HQ	headquarters
HSS	health service support
IA	implementing arrangement
ICR	in-country resources
IFOR	Implementation Force
IO	international organization
ISB	intermediate staging base
J-4	Joint Staff, Director for Logistics
JFC	joint force commander
JLCC	Joint Logistics Coordination Center
JTCC	Joint Transportation Coordination Center
JTF	joint task force
JTLM	Joint Theater Logistics Management
JV	Joint Vision
LN	lead nation
LOA	letter of offer and acceptance
LOC	line of communications
LOGCAP	logistic civilian augmentation program
LOTS	logistics over-the-shore
MACB	Multinational Acquisition and Contracting Board
MEDCC	Medical Coordination Center
MILU	multinational integrated logistic unit
MJLC	Multinational Joint Logistic Center
MMCC	Multinational Movement Coordination Center
MN	multinational
MNF	multinational force
MNFC	multinational force commander
MNL	multinational logistics
MNLC	Multinational Logistic Center
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSR	main supply route
MTW	major theater war
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMCC	National Movement Coordination Center
NSE	National Support Element

	Glossar
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PMC	personnel, mail, and cargo
POL	petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POW	prisoner of war
PVO	private voluntary organizations
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RAMCC	Regional Air Movement Coordination Center
RSN	role specialist nation
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SC	Strategic Command (NATO)
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
STANAG	standardization agreement (NATO)
	Sumuni allunon agreement (1 array)
TA	technical arrangements
TACO	Theater Allied Contracting Office
TACON	tactical control
TAV	total asset visibility
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
TPL	third party logistics
UN	United Nations
USC	United States Code
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
USJTF	US joint task force
USTRANSCOM	US Transportation Command

1 2 PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 3 advanced base. A base located in or near 48 4 military forces, governmental and 49 nongovernmental civilian organizations a theater of operations whose primary 5 and authorities, and the civilian 6 mission is to support military 50 7 operations. (JP 1-02) 51 populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile 8 operational area in order to facilitate 52 military operations, to consolidate and alliance. An alliance is the result of 53 achieve operational US objectives. 54 10 formal agreements (i.e., treaties) Civil-military operations may include between two or more nations for broad, 55 11 performance by military forces of long-term objectives which further the 12 56 activities and functions normally the common interests of the members. (JP 13 57 responsibility of the local, regional, or 14 1-02) 58 national government. These activities 15 59 may occur prior to, during, or area of operations. An operational area 60 16 defined by the joint force commander subsequent to other military actions. 17 61 for land and naval forces. Areas of They may also occur, if directed, in the 18 62 operation do not typically encompass absence of other military operations. 19 63 Civil-military operations may be 20 the entire operational area of the joint 64 performed by designated civil affairs force commander, but should be large 21 65 forces, by other military forces, or by a 22 enough for component commanders to 66 23 accomplish their missions and protect 67 combination of civil affairs forces and 24 their forces. (JP 1-02) 68 other forces. Also called CMO. (This 69 term and its definition are provided for 25 information and are proposed for 70 26 area of responsibility. The inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 geographical area associated with a 71 27 combatant command within which a 72 by JP 3-57.) 28 29 combatant commander has authority to 73 30 plan and conduct operations. 2. In 74 coalition. An ad hoc arrangement 31 naval usage, a predefined area of enemy 75 between two or more nations for 32 terrain for which supporting ships are 76 common action. (JP 1-02) responsible for covering by fire on 77 33 known targets or targets of opportunity 78 34 combatant command (command and by observation. Also called AOR. 79 35 authority). Nontransferable command 36 (JP 1-02) 80 authority established by Title 10, United States Code, section 164, 37 81 38 base. 1. A locality from which operations 82 exercised only by commanders of 39 are projected or supported. 2. An area 83 unified or specified combatant or locality containing installations which 40 84 commands unless otherwise directed provide logistic or other support. 3. by the President or the Secretary of 41 85 Home airfield or home carrier. (JP 1-Combatant command Defense. 42 86 (command authority) cannot be 43 02) 87 delegated and is the authority of a 88 44 combatant commander to perform those 45 civil-military operations. The activities 89 functions of command over assigned 46 of a commander that establish, maintain, 90 47 influence, or exploit relations between 91 forces involving organizing and

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employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant (command authority) command provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the commander combatant considers necessary to accomplish assigned Operational control is missions. inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

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combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by Service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. (JP 1-02)

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servicing. common That function performed by one Military Service in support of another Military Service for which reimbursement is not required from the Service receiving support. (JP

commonality. A quality that applies to materiel or systems: possessing like and interchangeable characteristics enabling each to be utilized, or operated and maintained, by personnel trained on the others without additional specialized training. Having interchangeable repair parts and/or components. Applying to consumable items interchangeably equivalent without adjustment.

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communications zone. Rear part of a theater of war or theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (JP 1-02)

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concept of logistic support. A verbal or graphic statement, in a broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign. (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for 81 coordinating specific functions or 82 activities involving forces of two or 83 more Military Departments or two or 84 85 more forces of the same Service. The 86 commander or individual has the 87 authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does 88 89 not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential 90 agreement cannot be obtained, the 91 matter shall be referred to the appointing 92 93 authority. Coordinating authority is a

consultation relationship,

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authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

country team. The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

cross-servicing. That function performed by one Military Service in support of another Military Service for which reimbursement is required from the Service receiving support. (JP 1-02)

deployment. 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within operational areas. 3. positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational Deployment encompasses all areas. activities from origin or home station destination, through specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (JP 1-02)

depot. 1. Supply - An activity for the classification, receipt, storage, accounting, issue, maintenance, procurement, manufacture, assembly, research, salvage, or disposal of material. 2. Personnel - An activity for the reception, processing, training, assignment, and forwarding of personnel replacements. (JP 1-02)

 distribution. 1. The arrangement of troops for any purpose, such as a battle, march, or maneuver. 2. A planned pattern of projectiles about a point. 3. A planned spread of fire to cover a desired frontage or depth. 4. An official delivery of anything, such as orders or supplies. 5. The operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the "right things" to the "right place" at the "right time" to support the geographic combatant commander. 6. The process of assigning military personnel to activities, units, or billets. (JP 1-02)

distribution system. That complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between the point of receipt into the military system and the point of issue to using activities and units. (JP 1-02)

dominant user concept. The concept that the Service which is the principal consumer will have the responsibility for performance of a support workload for all using Services. (JP 1-02)

enabling force. Early deploying forces that establish critical capabilities to support subsequent deployment and sustainment of a force. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

evacuation. 1. The process of moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities. 2. The clearance of personnel, animals, or material from a given locality. 3. The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping unserviceable or abandoned

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materiel, United States. and foreign, to appropriate reclamation, maintenance, technical intelligence, or disposal facilities. 4. The ordered or authorized departure of noncombatants from a specific area by Department of State, Department of Defense, or appropriate military commander. This refers to the movement from one area to another in the same or different countries. The evacuation is caused by unusual or emergency circumstances and applies equally to command or non-command sponsored family members. (JP 1-02)

executive agent. A term used in Department of Defense and Service regulations to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a Department of Defense Executive Agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of the other Services; such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. (JP 1-02)

facility. A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members,

civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02)

foreign military sales. That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also called FMS. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401 and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas

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of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation rudimentary facilities; and **(4)** construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 1-02)

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humanitarian assistance. **Programs** conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02)

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in-country resources. Resources obtained in a host nation through agreements made between nations or commanders and individual civilian providers, rather than the foreign national government acting as guarantor of support. Also called ICR. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

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interchangeability. A condition which exists when two or more items possess such functional and physical characteristics as to be equivalent in performance and durability, and are capable of being exchanged one for the other without alteration of the items themselves, or of the adjoining items, except for adjustment, and without

48 selection for fit or performance. (JP 49 1-02)

intermediate staging base. A temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the host nation. Also called ISB. (JP 1-02)

international logistics. The negotiating, planning. and implementation of supporting logistics arrangements between nations, their forces, and agencies. It includes furnishing logistic support (major end items, materiel, and/or services) to, or receiving logistic support from, one or more friendly governments, foreign international organizations, or military forces, with or without reimbursement. It also includes planning and actions related to the intermeshing of a significant element, activity, or component of the military logistics systems or procedures of the United States with those of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or military forces on a temporary or permanent basis. It includes planning and actions related to the utilization of United States logistics policies, systems, and/or procedures to meet requirements of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or forces. (JP 1-02)

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international organizations.

Organizations with global influence, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Also called IOs. (JP 1-02)

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interoperability. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate together. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics

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systems or items of communicationselectronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)

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joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP 1-02)

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joint logistics. The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more Military Departments of the same nation. (JP 1-02)

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lead nation. A nation that has agreed to assume responsibility for procuring or providing multiple logistic support services to all or part of a force, usually multinational, within a designated geographic region. Also called LN. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

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Letter of Offer and Acceptance. Standard Department of Defense form on which the US Government documents its offer to sell to a foreign international government or organization US defense articles and services pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. Also called (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

46 47 48 line of communications. A route, either land, water, and/or air, which connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning and

carrying out the movement and 57 58 59 60 61 62

maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, movement. distribution. storage. 63 maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, 64 65 evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, 66 maintenance, operation, and disposition 67 of facilities; and d. acquisition or 68 furnishing of services. (JP 1-02)

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logistics assessment. An evaluation of: a. the logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area. b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (JP 1-02)

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logistics estimate of the situation. An appraisal resulting from an orderly examination of the logistics factors influencing contemplated courses of action to provide conclusions concerning the degree and manner of that influence. (JP 1-02)

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logistics over-the-shore operations. The loading and unloading of ships with or without the benefit of fixed port facilities, in friendly or nondefended territory, and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy. Or

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as a means of moving forces closer to tactical assembly areas dependent on threat force capabilities. Also called LOTS operations. (JP 1-02)

logistics sourcing. The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the time-phased force and deployment data. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

materiel. All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

movement control. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. (JP 1-02)

multinational force commander. A general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements

from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander's command authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called MNFC. (JP 1-02)

multinational integrated logistic support. Two or more nations agree to provide logistic assets to a multinational force under operational control of a multinational force commander for the logistic support of a multinational force. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

multinational integrated logistic support unit. An organization resulting when two or more nations agree to provide logistics assets to multinational logistic force under the operational control of a multinational commander for the logistic support of a multinational force. Also called MILU. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

multinational logistic support arrangement. Any arrangement involving two or more nations that facilitates the logistic support of a force (either the forces of the countries participating in the arrangement or other countries). (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

multinational logistics. Any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those conducted under United Nations mandate. Multinational logistics includes activities involving both logistic units provided by

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participating nations designated for use by the multinational force commander as well as a variety of multinational logistic support arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

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multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code Title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

national support element. Any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are part of a multinational force. National support elements are under the operational control of the national authorities and are not normally part of the multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation Also called NSE. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

naval advanced logistics support site.An overseas location used as the

primary transshipment point in the theater of operations for logistics support. A naval advanced logistics support site possesses full capabilities for storage, consolidation, and transfer of supplies and for support of forwarddeployed units (including replacements units) during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval advanced logistics support sites, with port and airfield facilities in close proximity, are located within the theater of operations but not near the main battle areas, and must possess the throughput capacity required to accommodate incoming and outgoing intertheater airlift and sealift. When fully activated, the naval advanced logistics support site should consist of facilities and services provided by the host-nation, augmented by support personnel located in the theater of operations, or both. Also called ALSS. (JP 1-02)

naval forward logistic site. An overseas location with port and airfield facilities nearby, which provides logistic support to naval forces within the theater of operations during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval forward logistic sites may be located in close proximity to main battle areas to permit forward staging of services, throughput of high priority cargo, advanced maintenance, and battle damage repair. Naval forward logistic sites are linked to in-theater naval advanced logistic support sites (ALSSs) by intratheater airlift and sealift, but may also serve as transshipment points for intertheater movement of high-priority cargo into areas of direct combat. In providing fleet logistic support, naval forward logistic site capabilities may range from very austere to near those of a naval advanced logistic support site. Also called FLS. (JP 1-02)

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nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private 2 3 citizens that maintain a consultative 4 status with the Economic and Social 5 Council of the United Nations. 6 Nongovernmental organizations may be 7 professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply 8 9 groups with a common interest in 10 humanitarian assistance activities 11 (development and relief). 12 "Nongovernmental organizations" is a term normally used by non-United 13 14 States organizations. Also called 15 See also private voluntary NGOs. organizations. (JP 1-02) 16

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operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders subordinate of organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement periods. (JP 1-02)

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peace operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. (JP 1-02)

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pipeline. In logistics, the channel of support or a specific portion thereof by means of which materiel or personnel flow from sources of procurement to their point of use. (JP 1-02)

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planning factor. A multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort involved in a contemplated operation. Planning factors are often expressed as rates, ratios, or lengths of time. (JP 1-02)

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private voluntary organizations. Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. "Private voluntary organization" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organizations." Also called PVOs. See also

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nongovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02)

rationalization. Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons/materiel resources and non-weapons military matters. (JP 1-02)

restricted items list. A document listing those logistic goods and services for which nations must coordinate any contracting activity with a commander's centralized contracting organization. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

role specialist nation. A nation that has agreed to assume responsibility for providing a particular class of supply or service for all or part of the multinational force. Also called RSN. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located

in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 1-02)

standardization. The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research. development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered

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as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02) $\,$

sustainability. The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (From the definition of "military capability" in JP 1-02.)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

theater. The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

third party logistics. A variety of capabilities -- other than US military or other DOD logistic assets -- that may be employed to support US forces during an operation. These capabilities include those resources provided by a

foreign nation, either directly with military units or by military and/or civilian personnel; by contractor support arranged for by a foreign nation; or the direct use of civilian contractors in programs such as the Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) or Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

time-phased force and deployment data.

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: a. In-place units. b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. c. Routing of forces to be deployed. d. associated Movement data with deploying forces. e. Estimates of nonunit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)

transportation system. All the land, water, and air routes and transportation assets and associated information systems involved in the movement and tracking of US forces and their supplies across the range of military operations worldwide. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT WARFARE JP 0-2 UNAAF JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0 INTELLIGENCE C4 SYSTEMS **PERSONNEL OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS**

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Test Publication 4-08** is in the **Logistics** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

